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Designing and implementing a critical literacy-based approach in an Indonesian EFL secondary school

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BIODATA

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the design and implementation process of a critical approach to teaching English, one that is termed Critical Literacy, in an Indonesian secondary school. Despite its popularity as pedagogy and a way of thinking in the West, there is a gap in terms of the implementation of a Critical Literacy approach in South East Asian countries, especially in Indonesia. The methodology of this study is action research involving a teacher at one school in Bandung, West Java province and his classroom consisting of 39 students. Data includes classroom observation, students’ reflective journals and interviews both with the teacher and the students, as well as reflective dialogue between the teacher and me as the teacher-researcher. This study also investigates the benefits as well as the challenges of this new approach that is expected to bridge the gap between its implementation in Western countries and in Indonesia. For teacher educators, this project provides both theoretical and practical frameworks that are needed to prepare pre-service teachers to teach this critical approach in English language teaching.

Keywords: Critical literacy, Action research, EFL secondary teacher

INTRODUCTION

English teaching in Indonesia has been dominated mostly by conventional grammar teaching that emphasizes memorisation of language and linguistics rules and conventions. Despite a number of curriculum changes in Indonesia (Depdiknas, 2006), this approach continues to prevail in most English classrooms throughout the archipelago. This practice of English language teaching is not without criticism. Critical language educators in Indonesia such as Alwasilah (2001), Dardjowidjojo (2003) and Mistar (2005) argue that the grammar-driven methodology is not sufficient to enable students to communicate well; moreover, it does not support learners to think critically.
One of the key factors contributing to the overuse of grammar-driven methodology is the national examination system that emphasises rote learning packed into multiple choice test items, which neglects students’ critical thinking abilities.

Grammar and other language rules are by no means unimportant; in fact, knowledge of grammar is a prerequisite in language learning. However, English teaching that over emphasises this aspect is often regarded as insufficient and irrelevant for learners living in the information era (Kalantzis & Cope, 2012).

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

**Critical Literacy in language education**

Critical literacy is grounded in critical social theory and rooted in the Frankfurt School (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2000) where researchers such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and Herbert Marcuse worked together in the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, Germany, in the mid-1930s. Inspired by Kant’s critical viewpoint and Marx’s critique of ideology, this school of thought pursued the objective of discovering and revealing basic inequalities and hypocrisy in society by means of “immanent critique” and “dialectical thought” (McDaniel, 2006). Paulo Freire (1970), the Brazilian educator, also developed and popularised the notion of critical pedagogy, transferring critical theory into schools’ practices, in his well-known book, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. His work has made a significant contribution to the concept of critical literacy in language curriculum as a conscious act to empower disenfranchised groups to unpack the unequal power relations in society and transform themselves through literacy education. Similarly, Janks (2000) also argues that critical literacy education should teach learners to understand the complex relationship between language and power.

Although this approach has been widely defined based on the contexts of its use in language education, some argue that it should not be viewed simply as an instructional strategy but as a philosophical belief embodied in literacy education that “students are language users, not language recipients” (Lee, 2011, 100).

For the purpose of this paper which examines critical literacy and English as a foreign language, I would like to draw a definition from Luke and Dooley (2011).
Critical literacy is the use of texts to analyse and transform relations of cultural, social and political power... to address social, economic and cultural injustice and inequality... it views texts – print and multimodal, paper-based and digital - and their codes and discourses as human technologies for representing and reshaping possible worlds. Texts are not taken as part of a canonical curriculum tradition or received wisdom that is beyond criticism (Luke & Dooley, 2011, 1, my italics).

Within this framework, critical literacy is viewed as empowering students to be able to develop their own critical stance or ideological standpoint while learning a language, to challenge the taken-for-granted point of views, and to discover hidden ideologies embedded in texts. Texts in critical literacy are not limited to printed and digital texts presented in words but also audio, visual images and representations, toys, video games, comics, advertisement, television shows, comics and many more (Gee, 2010).

There are a number of existing critical literacy pedagogies such as Janks (2000) on a synthesis of critical literacy education, Luke and Freebody (1997) on the four resource model, Lewison and colleagues (2002) on four dimensions of critical literacy. Each model describes ways to understand critical literacy practices for students, teachers, teacher educators and researchers. In designing, implementing as well as analysing critical literacy in this study, I used the four dimensions of critical literacy (Lewison, Leland, & Harste, 2008). This theory was chosen as it emphasises a link between personal and cultural resources in critical literacy instruction. Lewison, Leland et al. (2008) believe that it is “a transaction among the personal and cultural resources we use, the critical social practices we enact, and the critical stance that we and our students take on in classrooms and in the world” (5). From this point of view, they also see a connection between critical literacy in the classroom and as a way to understand the world.

This framework divides critical literacy practices into four dimensions (1) disrupting the commonplace, (2) considering multiple viewpoints, (3) focusing on socio political issue and (4) taking actions.

The first dimension of this framework is disrupting the commonplace which suggests investigating widely held beliefs using a new lens (Van Sluys, 2005). This dimension may also involve an analysis of how media represents people as in television, video games, toys (Marsh, 2006; Shannon, 1995; Vasquez, 2000). Considering texts and experience from different points of view is the core of the second dimension. This dimension also requires readers to identify marginalised voices in the texts (Harste et
An important point in the third dimension is focusing on socio-political systems. This particular focus emphasises the need to link literacy education with the socio-political context. Indeed, this characteristic separates critical literacy from critical thinking (Lee, 2012). The last dimension of this framework is taking action which is often considered as the heart of critical literacy (Van Sluys, Lewison, & Flint, 2006). Taking action to promote social justice does not always require someone to become a social activist, but a shift in attitude or the way one develops from a superficial reading to critical reading can also be categorised as taking action (Van Sluys, 2005).

**Critical Literacy and English as a Foreign Language**

Despite a vast development of literature on critical literacy in English-speaking backgrounds, the theory and its implication in EFL classrooms are limited (Ko & Wang, 2009) but gradually show development. According to Kim (2012), there are at least two reasons why critical literacy is a neglected field of research in EFL settings, especially in Asian countries. First, there is insufficient understanding on the need of critical literacy in this region and second is a lack of knowledge and skills on its implementation in non-Western contexts. Related to this, Kuo (2009) argues that the absence of critical literacy in Asian countries may be related to some cultures that are typically marked by compliance, as in Taiwan. Meanwhile, Falkenstein (2003) states that the lack of critical literacy in EFL context might be due to foreign language educators who underestimate the capability of these learners to take a critical attitude using a variety of texts to nurture social justice.

Despite a limited inquiry on critical literacy in EFL settings, some studies in this area indicate that EFL students, with appropriate support and adequate time, are capable of implementing a critical stance using English language as a basis to develop social justice and critical awareness.

In the Indonesian context, despite a call for a more critical approach in English language teaching (Alwasilah, 2001), critical literacy has not been embedded in the curriculum. Consequently, this study is expected to shed light on the feasibility of designing and implementing critical literacy in Indonesia as well as to fill the gap in term of its implementation in EFL and mainstream English classrooms.
THE STUDY

Research questions

There were three main research questions that I explored in this study.

1. How is critical literacy designed and implemented in an Indonesian secondary school?
2. Does critical literacy pedagogy empower students to become critically literate?
3. What impacts does critical literacy have on students’ motivation to learn English?

Research design

As the study seeks to provide ways to design and implement a critical literacy approach in EFL classes, action research is employed as the methodology of this research. Action research is a methodology that emphasises diagnosis, action and reflection (McNiff & Whitehead, 2002). It usually starts with identifying problems faced by participants in the research that require improvement. According to Zuber-Skerritt (1996), action research is aimed at practical improvement, innovation and a better understanding from the practitioners involved with their own practice. As a tool for change and innovation in education, action research can be used as an appropriate methodology of research in different areas including in learning strategies, evaluative procedures, and continuing professional development for teachers and teaching methods as in replacing a traditional method with a discovery method (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007). Therefore, action research is relevant to this study because it involves a change and innovation in the practice of English language teaching at the research site.

The method of action research applied in this study is based on the seminal contribution of Kemmis and McTaggart (1990) who described cycles of action research: plan, act, observe and reflect. This will be further explained in the Procedures Section below.

Participants

This study is part of my doctoral research that I conducted in Bandung, West Java province. My fieldwork started in July – December 2010. I began recruitment by sending letters to several schools in this region. The school that participated in the study was
the one that responded most swiftly to the letter. After receiving their response, I visited
the school and talked with all English teachers. In the beginning, I imagined it would be
more beneficial to have the three of them take part in the study but out of three teachers,
only one teacher volunteered: Bagas. Apart from the teacher, this study also involved
his Year 11 class consisting of 39 students. Based on regular English tests conducted
in this class, students’ English language proficiency in this study may be categorised as
basic to intermediate. Students’ English responses in this article were written as they
were, including grammatical or spelling mistakes. English translation is provided under
students’ responses in Indonesian language.

Teachers’ decisions not to participate in educational research, especially in literacy
education, is nothing new as reported by O’Mara and Gutierrez (2010) and Comber and
Kamler (2008). Daily teaching routines as well as administrative roles seem to give
teachers little time to take part in the research. Moreover, as this project requires
teachers to be involved in professional learning, the teachers at the school were
concerned with rescheduling the classes they missed as they attended the professional
learning. Furthermore, in action research projects, the study often involves a change in
the teachers’ practice in order to improve their teaching; consequently, resistance can
spring from teachers’ ‘unreadiness’ to accept new ideas (Kemmis & McTaggart, 1990).

Data formation and analysis

Data collected in one semester included classroom observation, interviews with both
the teacher and students, and students’ reflective journals. The classroom observation
was in the form of video and audio recording as well as field notes. The interviews with
the teacher and students were audio recorded and conducted twice: once in the middle
and once at the end of the project. Students’ reflective journals were collected once
every two weeks. These journals were read, commented on by me and the teacher and
returned to the students.

Different methods of data collection were employed within the study to enrich the
validity of the research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). For example, students’ behaviour and
their responses in the class were verified and compared with their journal or interviews
in order to provide richer and more meaningful information. Another method employed

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1 All names are pseudonyms.
to ensure trustworthiness was to validate the students’ English responses by using their native Indonesian language. This technique was employed to ensure that the information students provided in the target language was accurate and that they had said what they really intended to say in their mother language.

All data were analysed using existing critical literacy frameworks such as the framework provided by Lewison et al (2008), as I elaborated in the previous section. As this study involves classroom discussion, critical discourse analysis is also used especially to analyse classroom talk (Gee, 2005). Data from both students and teachers during the design and implementation process were categorised according to each of the dimensions.

Procedure

Each of the processes of designing and implementing a critical literacy approach in this study were divided into four cyclical stages of action research: plan, act, observe, and reflect (Kemmis & McTaggart, 1990). The cycle applied throughout the research, consisted of planning each lesson, putting the plan into practice, carefully observing effects of our teaching, reflecting on our practice and replanning our next teaching. In implementing the cycle, I, who acted as the teacher-researcher, worked collaboratively with the teacher.

Plan

- I observed Bagas’ class to learn about and experience his teaching practice. Then we had a discussion regarding problems that he identified in his class.

- Based on the problems that he presented, I offered a suggestion to his teaching practice which was the critical literacy approach.

- As the approach may be appropriate to change the classroom issues above, the teacher was interested in the method but had vague ideas on what it was or how it could be implemented in the classroom, consequently:

- I designed a professional learning session consisting of workshops for the teacher in order to introduce critical literacy, its importance and implementation. Professional learning in an education field is similar to a teacher education course where educators introduce and provide teachers with new ideas to teaching.
I also provided students with critical literacy questions synthesised from different theorists (see Table 1 below)

Both the teacher and I planned our syllabus informed by critical literacy for the whole semester.

**Act**

We put our plans into practice and taught the students with the critical literacy approach in English classrooms. As the teacher was new to this concept, in the first two lessons I demonstrated the teaching before he moved to his own independent teaching practice.

**Observe and Reflect**

- What effect did this approach have on students’ motivation to learn English?
- Did critical literacy help students to become critically literate?

**Table 1. Examples of critical literacy questions and its theoretical foundations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Literacy Questions</th>
<th>Objectives and Theoretical foundations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What kind of text is this? Who wrote this text? What is this text about?</td>
<td>To crack the code (Luke &amp; Freebody, 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are the characters in the text presented?</td>
<td>To analyse how people are constructed and positioned in multimedia (Marsh, 2000, Vasques 2000, Van Sluys et al., 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the text have a balanced point of view?</td>
<td>To consider multiple viewpoints (Lewison et al., 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whose voice is heard? Whose voice is not heard?</td>
<td>To use different voice to examine texts (Luke and Freebody, 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What does the text want you to believe or</td>
<td>To realise that no text is neutral or free of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Do you agree with the information in the text? Does the text change the way you think? To be aware that texts are written to persuade people to the points of views presented by the author.

Findings

For the purpose of this paper, data in the findings will be divided into two sections: from the critical literacy point of view and from the viewpoint of English language teaching. The first part consists of the four dimensions of critical literacy and the second one focuses on evidence from the students’ increased motivation in English learning. Data from findings are from both the students and the teacher.

Disrupting the commonplace

In the first dimension of disrupting the commonplace, critical literacy helps students to question the everyday issue from a critical inquiry perspective and problematise all subjects of study (Shor, 1987). This practice highlights the importance of challenging the taken-for-granted assumption that has long been believed as a fact. Popular culture can also be used to disrupt the common belief, especially to analyse how people are positioned and constructed by media (Van Sluys, et al., 2006).

In this study, I invited students to analyse one television commercial advertising women’s deodorant which was highly popular at the time the research was being conducted. The commercial starts with two young girls driving a convertible car when suddenly they have a flat-tyre and are forced to stop and try to find help. When the first girl in short sleeves waves her hand, her dark underarms are revealed, no one stops to help them. Then, when the second girl tears off her long sleeves and shows her white underarm skin and waves her arm to get help, a car full of young boys stop to help the girls. Before it ends, the commercial contrasts both of the girls’ underarm skin and finally finishes with a slogan “putihnya kulit ketiakmu, perhatian pun tertuju padamu” (the whiter your underarm skin is, the more attention you’ll get).
In the beginning, students seemed to be confused and asked why we should discuss a television commercial. This may indicate that they viewed the commercial as a neutral text which has no hidden meanings. I encouraged them to view the advertisement with a critical lens by using critical literacy questions provided in Table 1 as well as to think about other advertisements in daily life. Using these questions, students started to gain awareness that the representation of girls and boys that they thought as normal before was unfair as it advantaged one group against another. In a journal, Rani expressed her concern

I think stereotype is what people think and we take granted for it. Like a girl with fair skin and long hair always get the first attention, and that’s not fair. Cause honestly my skin is not white and my hair is short. Now I realize that beautiful does not only mean long hair and fair skin. After I learn stereotype I think there are more stereotype in our life, I also learn that it’s not fair. I’m scared that there are a lot of things that is normal but after we discuss it it’s not normal anymore.

Rani’s first sentence was a clear definition of gender representation in which she gave an example from the commercial that we all watched in the classroom. She examined that the advertisement benefited females with certain qualities (fair skin and long hair always get first attention) and disadvantaged female with opposite traits similar to her (my skin is not white and my hair is short). There was a significant adjustment when engaging with critical literacy for her as she wrote now I realize that beautiful does not only mean long hair and fair skin. Further, she also disrupts her own belief about what has been considered as normal is in fact the opposite as she described there are a lot of things that is normal but after we discuss it it’s not normal anymore.

This practice has assisted Rani, in particular to develop critical awareness based on everyday texts that are present in our daily life. Student began to change their perspective that texts are not neutral and not free of bias. Other data also shows that another student, Ilham, problematises images of a husband and wife in another commercial. He challenged a stereotype of a wife who was busy in the kitchen preparing the meal while her husband relaxed in the living room watching television. Ilham said “Why in the tea commercial, a wife is busy in the kitchen and her husband just relax in front of television with the children?”. 
Considering multiple viewpoints

The second dimension of critical literacy helps learners to include different perspectives rather than one’s own in order to understand other people’s experience, feelings and perspectives. We practised this dimension by engaging students to identify voices that are heard and missing (Luke & Freebody, 1997), also perspectives that have been silenced or marginalised (Harste, et al., 2000).

Another topic that we included in our curriculum was homophobia. Controversial and real life topics are recommended in the critical literacy classroom (Lewison, Leland, & Van Sluys, 2002) as they represent that society needs to be examined using a critical lens. The teacher and I chose this topic as we were concerned about the chaotic demonstration in the capital city, Jakarta, undertaken by an anti-homophobia group, the Islamic Defender Front (locally known as FPI which stands for Front Pembela Islam). This group led a destructive rally in Jakarta and demanded a gay film festival be abandoned. They attacked the office of the event organisers that they deemed responsible for the festival.

Bagas started the lesson by asking students to read a text about this demonstration. After that, we engaged in a discussion about the essence of the demonstration, which centred on the issue of homophobia. We asked students whether it was wrong to hate people who had different sexual orientation. In the beginning, some students said that being homosexual was “disgusting”. Then Bagas showed a video co-starring a famous transgender actor in Indonesia, I also showed an article about the life of a homosexual youth who almost killed himself due to lack of social acceptance. We also invited students to think about equity for people who were different in Indonesia in areas such as job opportunities. Our reasons to conduct the teaching in this manner were to demonstrate our students the importance of viewing an issue from different perspectives. This approach is in line with Delgado and Stefancic (2001) who believe that considering multiple points of views in critical literacy education is to build agenda and strategies towards a more just society, for a broader range of people and avoid underestimating human experience.
In the discussion, students started to identify marginalised people and silenced voices, not only in the text but furthermore in Indonesian society. They seemed to have shown social awareness and sympathy towards people who were not accepted in the mainstream society, such as people with different sexual orientations.

One student even showed respect to homosexual people, the group that she initially condemned. Maya said in a mixed Indonesian and English

*Dulu aku pikir homosexual itu jijik ya karena mereka ngga beragama. Now after discussing with my teachers and friends, aku jadi sadar kalau itu pilihan seseorang. Maybe that's not what they want. Aku pernah nonton Oprah Show ada perempuan yang jadi lesbian karena disiksa sama bapaknya. So now I will think about many things before I…apa tuh, menjudge gitu. Sekarang kalau ada yang ngga ‘normal’ aku berusaha mengerti kenapa gitu…juga tentang homosexual ini. Menurut aku negatif sih, tapi kita harus menghargai karena itu kehidupan mereka.*

[I used to think that homosexual is disgusting, because they have no religion. Now after discussing with my teachers and friends I realize that homosexual is someone’s choice. Maybe that’s not what they want. I watched *Oprah Show*, a girl becomes a lesbian because her father abuses her. So now I will think about many things before I judge something. Now when there’s something beyond normal, I’ll try to understand the situation not just say that is wrong…like homosexual, I think it’s negative but it’s their life and we have to respect].

This perspective that Maya offered was rich and deep; she described how she changed her point of view about something. She tried to consider multiple perspectives into her thinking as in I watched *Oprah Show* and an important step in critical literacy so now I will think about many things before I judge something.

**Focusing on the socio-politics**

Another topic that we discussed was the catastrophes that happened in Indonesia during October 2010. In this period there were three disasters: the tsunami in Mentawai, the volcanic eruption in Central Java and the flash flood in Papua. The aim of this lesson was to view catastrophes in a critical lens as some people in Indonesia perceived disasters as merely God’s will and hardly question authority, such as the government’s accountability.

Bagas firstly asked students questions such as “Can we predict when the disasters happen? Can we do something to prevent or minimize the effect of it? Are we prepared for the disasters? Are there any information/signs or system to make us better prepared? Does disaster mean God is angry with us? Who should be responsible for it?”. Next,
students examined news that broadcasted different disasters. Our plan was to compare which disaster gained more publication and attention in the media and assisted students to relate this with a larger socio-politics system. As students were getting better and more familiar with critical literacy practice, they were able to identify easily which voices were heard and which were silenced. According to them, the Merapi eruption in Yogyakarta, Central Java was the one that gained more attention from media as it dominated the news while the other two were hardly recognised. The discussion centred on why there was imbalanced perspective in reporting the news.

A critical reason that related to a larger socio-political system can be found in a classroom dialogue where one of the participants in the discussion, Kirana, distanced herself with people from West Papua. She admitted that she did not know about any flash flooding in Papua as she said “they don’t know what happen in Papua because it’s far from us”. She used exclusive language (‘us’ versus ‘them’) that may show no solidarity with people outside her. In critical discourse analysis, the use of exclusive and inclusive language marks the opposing motivation of status and solidarity (Gee, 2001). In this case, Kirana indicated that she did not seem to share any commonalities with the West Papuan people and that she was different to the West Papuan people who were described as far from her and the island of Java where she lived. This may mean the students felt their identity as a nation was different to the people of West Papua whose appearance looked more like the Pacific Islanders than Indonesians.

After the above dialogue, we also asked students the reason why the national media preferred to broadcast the disasters in Java Island. Some students linked the lack of news on the tsunami and flash flood with the ethnicity and political issues as revealed by Kinan below.

Well because people have the newspapers they are Javanese they live in Java that’s why they’re more interested with the news in Java, if they live in Sumatra or Papua there’ll be more news about it.

Their response may reflect the fact that in reality West Papuan people were underrepresented in the central government as indicated by a lack of their representation in the administration. On the other hand, the Javanese who inhabit Java Island can be found in many strategic administration positions including those who become chief executive officers of giant media companies in Indonesia. These
executive officers dominate the information distributed in the country, at the same time they also dominated the country. The imbalanced social welfare students raised in the discussion was in line with Fairclough (1989) who referred to the relationship between social class and economics production; as he said, “the power of capitalist class depends also on its ability to control the state” (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 32-33).

Another response was expressed by Erwin in the discussion who was worried he may die if tsunami strikes his classroom as the result of lack of knowledge on what to do. He contrasted the Indonesian situation with the one in Japan as he said

_Aku pernah nonton TV tentang tsunami di Jepang. Anak-anaknya tahu harus ngapain karena informasinya jelas terus mereka latihan sering kan. Katanya daerah kita di Jawa Barat bisa kena tsunami juga tapi terus ngga pernah denger berita itu lagi. Kalau kejadian di sekolah, mungkin aku bisa mati kali karena ngga tau harus ngapain._

[I watched on TV about tsunami in Japan, the children know what they should do because the information is clear, they have enough practice too. I heard we are in West Java area can also be affected by tsunami, but then the news just gone. If it happens here at our school, maybe I’ll be dead because I don’t know what to do].

Both Bagas and I engaged students more in the discussion by further questioning why we did not know. From the discussion, students seemed to understand that the authorities were the ones who should also be responsible for the catastrophes especially in providing the alarm systems. Lintang said

_I think we don’t know because we don’t have…apa sih kaya tanda bahaya gitu [what do you call it like a warning system]. If the government buy them and give them to people, I think that will help. Kayanya kita sering banget kena tsunami tiap tahun [It seems like every year tsunami hits us]. It is true that tsunami and volcano eruption can happen anytime, but why our technology and knowledge still limited?_

**Taking actions**

The last dimension of taking action is often considered as the heart of critical literacy (Van Sluys, et al., 2006). Although seeking justice is inseparable from critical literacy practice, taking action does not mean that critical literacy educators should entail themselves in becoming activists in social and political movements (Lee, 2012). According to Van Sluys (2005), taking social action can also include a change in reading, for example through resistant reading.

In this project, some participants in this study demonstrated a significant change in the way they read. Before they became involved in the project, they viewed reading only as a practical set of skills. For example, they read only to find the main ideas of a
paragraph as often found in traditional textbooks and tended to exclude reading critically. An example of this shift was well represented by Satria in the interview.

Now I learn not to trust the news instantly. Also when my friends talking to me, I don’t want being fooled too. I will select what they say, not to trust them straight away, I have to know it’s uhhmm… menjurus atau engga. Juga kalau baca artikel di koran, dulu saya serap semua, saya percaya namanya udah ada di koran pasti bener, sekarang saya tahu itu salah jadi ngga saya serap semua. Saya ngga percaya semua informasi begitu aja [is it leading me to something or not. Also when I read articles in the newspaper, I used to absorb all information, you know when it’s in the newspaper it must be right. Now I know it’s wrong so I don’t absorb all information. I don’t trust all information now.]

Satria seemed to be more careful in reading and interpreting texts given to him, e.g. the newspaper. He displayed a resistant reading now as he reflected on his experience in the past when he used to believe all information in the newspaper.

**Critical literacy and motivation to English learning**

Data from classroom observation, students’ journals and interviews indicated that the approach empowered students to gain more motivation and interest in English learning. Motivation, as some students revealed, mostly arrived from some principles of critical literacy we implemented in the class such as encouraging students to express different opinions in the class and engaging them in real life issues as revealed by Zahwa and Dimas.

Zahwa: *Belajar kaya gini itu bikin kita terpacu jadi lebih semangat buat belajar bahasa Inggris karena kita disuruh ngomong terus ditanggepin sama gurunya juga sama teman, jadinya enak.*

[Learning English this way makes me more excited to learn because we are asked to talk, and teacher and other kids listen and comment on it, so it’s good]

Dimas: *Belajar seperti ini udah enak, kalau bisa dipertahankan soalnya kita ngga bosen, ngga terpacu sama teori atau ngerjain latihan di buku teks, kita bisa sharing dan diskusi tentang berita-berita yang baru, tentang kehidupan nyata gitu lah. Saya jadi lebih termotivasi buat tahu lebih banyak soalnya nanti kan ditanya apa pendapat kita…*  

[Learning like this is good, please keep it like that because it doesn’t make us bored, we’re not stuck to theory or doing exercises from the textbook. We can share and discuss about news, I mean real things. I’m more motivated to know more because later in the class the teachers will ask what we think].

Unlike the conventional English teaching which may be based mostly on school textbooks, in critical literacy pedagogy teachers empowered students to discuss and analyse real and current social issues. This kind of engagement, according to students like Zahwa and Dimas, was “exciting” and “good”; therefore, they were more motivated to learn English. Critical literacy educators places a premium importance on students’ voices in the class (Janks, 2000; Lewison, et al., 2008). Consequently, teachers should
encourage students to articulate their view points and not dominate the classroom talk. Zahwa and Dimas seemed to cherish the opportunity to engage in classroom discussions because they believed that their opinions mattered (…makes me more excited to learn because we are asked to talk, and teacher and other kids listen and comment on it, so it’s good).

A detailed analysis on a classroom transcript showed a number of occasions when students’ responses were overlapped which indicated their engagement with the topic. Students showed enthusiasm in taking part in the discussions. There were many factors in their increased engagement. According to students, this approach gave them more opportunities to speak “without rules”.

As opposed to traditional grammar teaching that emphasised language rules and conventions, the approach that we implemented highlighted the importance of being critical in dealing with everyday life. Some of the critical literacy values that we emphasised were taken from the critical literacy framework as mentioned in earlier sections. The frameworks are disrupting the commonplace, viewing an issue from multiple perspectives, considering socio-political situations and taking a social action. Within this framework, the critical literacy approach has moved far away from merely memorising the grammatical rules of English.

Today I learn about natural calamities. Many natural calamities it happened in Indonesia that is Flash Flood, Volcanic Eruption, and Tsunami. We discus about Flash Flood in Wasior, West Papua. I think this lesson is important because the disaster happened in my country. The flood has destroyed Wasior and most of people’s home. Lot of victim from flood that is 153 have been killed in Wasior flooding, while 123 others are still reported missing. After I have the lesson I know how to understand from the text. Thanks Mrs G. I feel concerned about disaster’s it happen in Indonesia. Remember for understand a text 5W +1H what, when, where, who, why + how. I know! (Nia).

From this journal, which was all written in English, it can be inferred that she had gained mastery in complex English sentence structures such as an accurate use of the passive voice (153 have been killed, while 123 are still reported missing) and the use of present perfect tense (the flood has destroyed) which were precisely used as the flood was still occurring when we discussed this in the classroom. She was also capable of using synonymous words such as calamity and disaster that give different dimensions to the text. A very minor mistake such as capitalisation for all proper nouns in the middle of a sentence (Flash Flood, Volcanic Eruption, Tsunami), spelling (discus for discuss) and inaccurate apostrophe ‘s in disaster’s did not distract from the overall meaning. Apart
from being an avid English writer as she demonstrated, she also revealed her own strategy to comprehend a text (5W +1H what, when, where, who, why + how). This strategy seemed to become a highlight in her learning process as well as the moment of discovery as she celebrated this in a triumphant remark I know!

Concluding remarks

Critical literacy as a new approach in Indonesian EFL brings many benefits as well as challenges for the teacher and students. A benefit includes students’ critical engagement with texts and their ability to relate these texts to the world. As a new method, the teacher should be encouraged to consider this approach as an alternative approach to language teaching. This encouragement can be done through providing professional learning sessions. Challenges that the teacher and students face are likely to be their unfamiliarity with the approach. Most of the students in this study admit that English is difficult and it is more challenging to become critically literate in the foreign language. Consequently, I found some students who resisted our critical literacy approach may have done so because of difficulties in English proficiency. One of the students in the class who seldom participated in classroom discussions, Dewa, stated this challenge in the interview.

Mengkritik berita atau teks itu susah banget, karena saya harus ngerjain dulu ke bahasa Indonesia terus saya harus mikir apa pendapat saya tentang itu dalam bahasa Inggris. Susah lah, kaya dua hal bareng-bareng dikerjain gitu

[Criticising texts like in the news or something is very difficult because I have to translate it first to Indonesian. Then I have to think about my opinions in English. It’s a very hard work. It’s like doing the same things at the same time]

The reasons for resistance from students in this study are different from a similar study on critical literacy in Taiwan (Kuo, 2009). Kuo’s study reveals that student’ resistance in critical literacy instruction may be due to the cultural values that are marked by compliance, especially in Taiwan. Our results, however, display a similarity with the work of Huang (2011) in Taiwan. Huang (2011) argues that it is not easy for students to implement critical literacy in a foreign language where they do not feel comfortable with the language.

This study also has demonstrated how I design and implement critical literacy in a secondary school setting with the teacher who is actively involved throughout the
research. Hopefully, it sheds light for other critically literate educators to implement this technique into their schools.

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Indonesia’s Response towards East Asian Financial Regionalism

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines Indonesia’s response to the development of East Asian financial regionalism. As a potential leader in the regional context, Indonesian political and economic dynamics toward financial regionalism is interesting to explore because it is relatively distinct to other countries in East Asia. Three major regional institutions of the East Asian region (ASEAN, APEC and ASEAN Plus Three) will be observed particularly focusing on surveillance processes, financial support arrangements, and financial market development to determine the Indonesian response. The initial findings indicate that in consideration of the potential economic benefits, Indonesia has positively supported the arrangements in the ASEAN and ASEAN Plus Three financial cooperation; while putting participation in APEC processes of financial cooperation at a lower priority due to the lack of cohesiveness among the members and concrete initiatives.

Keywords: East Asia, Financial regionalism, ASEAN, APEC, ASEAN Plus Three

INTRODUCTION

In general, the study of East Asian regionalism brings the issues of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) into discussion. The activities of these three regional institutions have been contributing to the dynamic of regional economic regionalism. Particularly in finance, the regional institutions have produced many concrete initiatives even though some arrangements remain unfinished. At this point, ASEAN and APT have showed advanced progress in the area of finance such as capital/bond market development, economic surveillance, and financial service liberalisation. In contrast, it is
likely that APEC provides limited improvement towards regional financial arrangements in the region. The contribution of APEC in financial regionalism is somewhat less important since it has not produced clear outputs and has been relatively inactive in developing networks among regional finance ministers (Amyx, 2008, 117). Therefore, East Asian financial regionalism is mostly influenced by the dynamics of ASEAN and APT.

The progress of and debate around financial regionalism in East Asia has been captured by scholars predominantly with regional perspectives. Scholars such as Jennifer Amyx, Gordon De Brouwer, Helen Nesadurai, Randall-Henning, and William Grimmes have worked on financial-monetary cooperation in East Asia mostly by focusing on the regional cooperation with a lack of member countries' perspectives. While their works are important, it is also necessary to unveil the perspective of particular regional member countries in order to understand the response of national authorities to the existing regional financial arrangements. This paper attempts to address this hiatus by providing the means to understand the responses of member countries in the East Asia region to the development of regional financial regionalism, using Indonesia as a case study.

As a leader in ASEAN, Indonesia has played an active role in building financial regionalism in East Asia. Indonesia’s current situation and condition has built the nation as an important player in East Asia. Indonesia’s large population promises a large market and strong consumption that are significant for regional demand. The country is also abundant with raw materials and energy, which are essential for production processes in East Asian industries. Beyond that, Indonesia is also an active member of the three regional institutions as well as the G-20, reflecting its critical role in shaping regional as well as international financial architecture. Considering Indonesian domestic strengths and international status, there is a potential for Indonesia to be a new rising power in the region.

Against this backdrop, this study explores Indonesia’s response towards the dynamics of East Asian financial regionalism, focusing on the issues of surveillance processes, financial support arrangements, and financial market development in three major regional institutions of the East Asian region (ASEAN, APEC and APT). These areas are selected among other financial initiatives as they have become major issues across
the East Asian regional institutions. The first section of this paper provides an overview of the regional financial cooperation under the three institutions in order to give an illustration of current regional development. In the second section, the Indonesian response towards the cooperation will be outlined and analysed.

OVERVIEW ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST ASIAN REGIONAL FINANCIAL COOPERATION

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The issue of financial-monetary cooperation was practically excluded from ASEAN economic discussions until the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the ASEAN Swap Arrangements (ASA) was released in August 1977. The MoU became an important point for regional financial regionalism since the document provided a policy framework for ASEAN nations to collaborate on financial issues particularly in dealing with international liquidity problems (ASEAN, 1977). The initial amount of ASA was USD 100 million in which each ASEAN member country contributed an equal amount of USD 20 million. However, despite its progress toward financial-monetary cooperation in the South East Asia region, the ASA practically had little impact on addressing liquidity problems since the total fund was relatively limited to deal with payment difficulties (Henning, 2002; Pascha, 2007).

The development of ASEAN financial cooperation was further enhanced with the inception of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). In 1997, for the first time in ASEAN’s history, ASEAN finance ministers realised the importance of pragmatic cooperation in the area of finance including the banking sector, capital market, customs, insurance, taxation and human resource development (ASEAN, 1997). The meeting was also held to follow the mandate of the 1995 ASEAN leaders’ summit that expected to have closer economic cooperation. This foremost meeting was incidentally conducted in the early stages of the AFC. In general, the issue of liquidity support arrangements and surveillance processes dominated the progress of ASEAN financial cooperation since its formal establishment in 1997. Although other issues such as liberalisation of financial services, insurance cooperation, and customs also received attention from ASEAN member countries, the progress of these non-crisis counter initiatives seemed to be slow considering the focus of the region to mitigate the AFC impact.
ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP)

The ASP that was initially created to deal with the Asian financial crisis, later on has been perceived as a critical element to monitor economic development in the region. The development of ASP was substantially marked when Japan, China, and Korea were welcomed to enhance the ASP with continuing support from ADB. This re-marked the collaboration of ASEAN+3 countries in creating a new monitoring system to support the self-help mechanism, particularly in dealing with crises.

Capital Market Development

Since its inception, the Roadmap for Monetary and Financial Integration (RIA-Fin) has made substantial progress, especially in capital market development. Beginning with technical training in several areas of capital market, the cooperation continued with the creation of a forum, termed the ASEAN Capital Market Forum/ACMF, which was intended to harmonise rules and regulations. The ASEAN capital market cooperation has demonstrated positive progress, particularly after the establishment of ASEAN Standards and Plus Standards. The cooperation also introduced the ASEAN Index that was expected to function as a catalyst toward deeper integration in capital markets (ASEAN, 2006). In 2009, the ASEAN finance ministers launched the Implementation Plan to Promote the Development of Integrated Capital Market in ASEAN. The Plan was aimed at providing strategic initiatives through optimising capacity and managing risks in order to build an integrated regional capital market (ASEAN, 2009). Furthermore, in 2011, ASEAN finance ministers agreed to launch the ASEAN Exchange as a stepping stone to brand ASEAN as an asset class, following the initiative of ASEAN Exchange linkages.

Financial Service Liberalisation

Since 1998, financial services liberalisation became a part of formal negotiation in the second package of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). The negotiation was conducted in the form of a “request and offer” mechanism toward particular sub-sectors. In general, the negotiation of financial service liberalisation has shown slow progress. For instance, the fourth round of the negotiation was initially expected to be concluded in 2007, but it was extended until 2008. In this regard, there was a tendency that ASEAN member countries were cautious in providing commitments considering their domestic readiness to liberalise financial services. Rajan
and Sen (2002) argue that there was no single member willing to offer commitment in all sub-sectors in financial services. This situation was contrary to the sense of liberalisation that reflects the attempts of particular parties to remove their domestic barriers and also their willingness to open their market for foreign competitors (Park & Bae, 2002, 5).

**Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)**

The financial issue became a part of APEC's concerns, at least since 1994 when the APEC Finance Ministers met in Honolulu. At that moment, they primarily conveyed three main issues: sustaining growth with low inflation, financing investment and infrastructure development, and promoting capital market development (APEC, 1994).

In financial capital markets, APEC financial cooperation was initiated by enhancing public access to economic and financial information. At this point, a standard for dissemination of macroeconomic and financial data, namely the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS), was introduced to member countries for adoption. In later developments, regulatory issues were considered by APEC finance ministers to promote financial and capital market development. In this case, the ministers agreed on the principle consisting of four core conditions that emphasised a stable and transparent legal and regulatory system as one of the conditions (APEC, 1997).

The issue of economic/financial surveillance emerged for the first time during the APEC Leaders' Summit in Vancouver, November 25th 1997, in response to the AFC. However, instead of creating an APEC owned surveillance unit, the leaders simply endorsed the Manila Framework created by several countries plus IMF, World Bank, Bank for International Settlement (BIS) and ADB, on November 18th, 1997. The framework basically endorsed the IMF as the main actor in the international monetary system, and also underlined its role in surveillance processes (Ito et al., 2005, 10). Regarding this arrangement, APEC finance ministers echoed the Leaders’ endorsement. Unfortunately, a discussion on the operation of surveillance was absent from the APEC finance ministers in the midst of the AFC, although they admitted that the issue was critical. This phenomenon might contribute to the disappointment of Asian member countries that perceived APEC as lacking crisis sensitivity. The issue of surveillance even disappeared from the Ministers’ statement after their 8th annual meeting.
ASEAN Plus Three (APT)

It can be said that the APT is the newest regional institution compared to the two previous institutions (ASEAN and APEC). Some scholars (Beeson, 2007; Ravenhill, 2006; Sheng, 2009; Yue & Pangestu, 2006) even argue that the establishment of APT was basically the result of the dynamics in ASEAN and APEC, particularly during the AFC. The birth of the APT forum was a reaction to the absence of collective action and the sense of solidarity of ASEAN and APEC during the financial shock. During the economic turbulence, ASEAN had limited resources to protect their members from the crisis. Unfortunately, APEC, consisting of major world economies, was unlikely willing to provide assistance to the victims of the crisis.

In later developments, the APT forum displayed more concern for economic issues rather than political agendas. Shin and Cho (2010) argue that East Asian countries tend to restrain themselves from domestic political issues in order to maintain economic cooperation. In some cases, even when two East Asian countries had a political dispute, their commitment toward economic cooperation was not affected by the political dispute.

There are several financial initiatives under the APT framework that have been explored and implemented. In this paper, three major initiatives related to regional economic surveillance, liquidity support arrangements and regional bond market developments will be discussed since they have exhibited major progress and concrete results.

Surveillance Processes

The APT surveillance process has been formed under the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD). Operationally, during ERPD sessions, finance minister deputies provide a report of their own economy for other members. The ERPD report consists of macroeconomic development, financial market development, recent macroeconomic policy management, economic outlook, and economic policy issues and challenges. At this stage, the APT surveillance process relies on self-assessment rather than having third party assessment define the objectivity of the surveillance. The process would be followed by exchange of views and policy discussion that lead to peer review processes. The peer review is an important feature of the ERPD that is expected to create peer pressure for other members to make policy adjustment as suggested during the process.
The effectiveness of the ERPD has been challenged by several scholars (Kawai & Houser, 2007; Jung in Nesadurai, 2009; Anas & Atje, 2005). Their critiques of ERPD include the degree of pressure that may emerge as a result of peer review, the analytical and psychological barriers that are faced by less advanced economies in criticising advanced members and the absence of permanent surveillance units that facilitate continuous surveillance mechanisms. The debate reached its peak when there was a demand to create a surveillance unit to support the operation of Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). At the APT deputy finance ministers’ meeting in Nha Trang, 2010, several deputies argued that the ERPD was not needed anymore since APT was about to launch the new regional surveillance unit, namely ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), that would take over most, if not all, of the ERPD processes. Therefore, in order to avoid duplication, some member countries proposed to terminate the ERPD. In contrast, some members argued that ERPD was still needed since it provided direct exchange views and policies as part of its process that could not be found in other types of surveillance mechanisms. Finally, the supporters of ERPD succeeded in maintaining the process along with the operation of AMRO.

A more advanced step regarding surveillance has been made by APT financial cooperation through AMRO. After a series of discussions, the APT finance ministers launched the operation of AMRO in 2011 serving as an independent surveillance unit that will monitor and analyse regional economies as well as contribute to early detection of risks and the decision-making process of CMIM (APT 2011). Located in Singapore, AMRO is expected to provide a report as supplement to the IMF’s global surveillance report.

Liquidity Support Arrangements

The APT liquidity support arrangement started in 2000 when an expanded ASA was merged with a network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) under the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). Both ASA and BSAs were basically aimed at providing liquidity support for APT member countries facing short-term liquidity problems. Different from ASA that allowed ASEAN members to draw the maximum of up to twice their commitments, the basic drawing principle of BSAs only allowed the requesting countries to draw up to 10 per cent of the maximum drawing amount without an IMF-linkage program (Rana, 2002,
9). If they wanted to draw the remaining funds, they should commit to an IMF program arrangement. In 2000, ASA was expanded by ASEAN member countries (including the new ASEAN members) with a total size of USD 1 billion. Next, it was increased to USD 2 billion in April 2005 reflecting stronger ASEAN members’ commitment toward regional financial cooperation.

The operation of CMI had been reviewed in order to further develop better regional liquidity support arrangements. The reviews included several key elements of CMI such as size, pooling structure, surveillance, decision-making process, IMF linkage, and the type of contract agreement. The significant change toward the regional arrangement was produced in Kyoto in which all ASEAN+3 finance ministers agreed to govern the self-managed reserve pooling based on a single contractual agreement (APT, 2007).

In their 12th meeting in Bali, the APT finance ministers agreed on all main elements of the CMIM including the shared contribution of each nation, borrowing access, surveillance mechanisms and participation of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, China (APT, 2009). Following the Bali meeting, in December 28, 2009, the establishment of CMIM was simultaneously publicised by APT member countries, which expected the greater announcement effect to boost confidence and stability in regional markets. Eventually, the announcement was relatively successful in mitigating the effects of the global financial crisis from hampering the East Asian region, although several member countries such as Singapore and Malaysia experienced negative growth during that period.

**Bond Market Development**

The AFC produced a lesson learned regarding mismatch in maturity and currency. In response to this problem, the APT finance minister deputies proposed the creation of the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) during their meeting in Chiang Mai, 17 December 2002 (Miyachi, Kawawaki, & Ahmed, 2003). The ABMI has produced many outputs. Among these outputs the establishment of the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF) and the ASEAN+3 Bond Market Forum (ABMF) are considered as being the most important results. The CGIF was established in May 2009, aiming to support the issuance of local currency-denominated corporate bonds in the region (APT, 2009). The initial size of CGIF was USD 500 million, and then increased to USD 700 million. Operationally, the ADB acts as a trustee that manages the fund and
provides credit enhancement for corporate bonds in the region. In this case, the credit enhancement facilitates corporate bonds to have higher market access.

The latest outcome of ABMI was the establishment of ABMF. This forum is dedicated to foster standardisation and harmonisation of regulation related to regional cross-border bond transaction (APT, 2010). Interestingly, the forum involves not only capital market authorities but also private sectors. The collaboration between regulators and market players are expected to facilitate sharing of knowledge, expertise and experience to promote harmonisation and standardisation that lead to market integration (Yamadera et al., 2010,102). Operationally, ABMF is tasked to identify major barriers in cross border transactions. The outcome of this initial process will become a platform to create a standard of business procedure and information that could potentially reduce transaction costs and risk due to various economic stages in the region. In this regard, it still remains unclear whether ABMF will modify the existing standards or produce new standards that will be applied in all APT member countries.

INDONESIA’S RESPONSE

The Indonesian responses toward the development of the East Asian financial regionalism are mainly influenced by the outcomes of the initiatives in the three regional institutions. In general, it can be said that ASEAN and APT have largely appealed to Indonesia rather than APEC since both institutions have produced concrete outcomes. APEC, in contrast, has not produced solid or tangible initiatives in the areas discussed in this paper.

Table 1. Indonesian response to selected initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>ASEAN</th>
<th>APEC</th>
<th>APT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Support Arrangement</td>
<td>Joined &amp; Activated</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Joined and Contributed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Market Development</td>
<td>Prudentially Committed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Positively follow the ongoing process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance Process</td>
<td>Setting up NSU</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Synchronizing national and regional surveillance mechanism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As stated in the table 1, it is clear that Indonesia has no response towards the development of financial support arrangements, development of financial markets, and surveillance processes in the APEC framework. On the other hand, Indonesian engagements with these areas of cooperation are found in both ASEAN and APT frameworks. The following discussion examines in more detail Indonesian responses in each regional institution.

Nurturing ASEAN collectiveness

For Indonesia, the first attempt to engage in ASEAN financial initiatives was in 1977 when Indonesia joined the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) along with 4 other ASEAN member countries (Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand). Two years later, Indonesia even activated the swap facility amounting at USD 20 million as a prevention measure towards slower economic performance (Henning, 2002, 14). Following the ASA, Indonesia has also committed to the negotiation of financial issues under AFAS. During the Soeharto Administration, the commitment could be seen in the promptness of the government in adopting AFAS into the Indonesian regulatory framework. At that time, the government needed only 15 days to legalise the agreement as part of Indonesian regulation since the signing of the agreement, 15th of December 1995. Presidential decree No. 88 on AFAS was released by former president Soeharto by the 30th of December 1995. This regulation provided a legal basis for relevant authorities in Indonesia to work with their counterparts in ASEAN related services including the financial sector.

As mentioned in the previous discussion, the financial issue became a part of the AFAS negotiation process since the second package was started in 1998. In November 2002, President Megawati Soekarnoputri signed the Presidential decree No. 81 ratifying the second package commitments on financial services. The trauma of the AFC seemed to be a strong consideration for Indonesia to present a prudent position that delayed the ratification of the commitment. Rajan and Sen (2002) even argue that Indonesia basically did not make any specific commitment in financial services, as it only mentioned general conditions for the banking sector. Cautiously, Indonesia also stated in its schedule of specific commitment to maintain a right to withdraw, modify, and make
technical changes to the offer; a statement that was not provided by other ASEAN member countries.

In 2005, under Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) Administration, Indonesia has offered commitments in the areas of commercial banking business such as acceptance of deposits, lending, mortgage, money transmission services, and foreign exchange for the third package of financial services under AFAS. The offers showed the higher degree of Indonesian confidence toward liberalisation in the financial service, compared to the initial commitment. However, the commitment was just legalised by the Presidential Decree No. 51 in 2008, three years after the signing of the commitment. Further Indonesian commitments toward liberalisation in financial services under AFAS was marked by the release of the Presidential Decree No.6/2009 on the implementation of the fourth package of commitments on financial services. In its specific commitment of this package, Indonesia provided a very limited offer in factoring services.

In 2011, a progressive offer was made by the Indonesian Government in the fifth package of AFAS in which the government allowed foreign-service providers to hold up to 49 per cent of capital share in the form of joint-venture companies. This commitment is basically in addition to the existing Indonesian regulation that allows foreign investors to hold 99 per cent and 80-85 per cent of total capital shares of banking and non-banking domestic companies, respectively. This offer reflects the high degree of liberalisation in Indonesian financial sectors, not only in the banking sector but also in the non-banking sector. It can be said that Indonesia is too open compared to other ASEAN member countries in terms of financial services.

Despite the growing trend of financial service liberalisation in Indonesia, the contribution of this sector toward economic growth was limited. A study conducted by the Indonesian capital market and financial institution supervisory agency (Bapepam-LK) reveals that the financial service sector has not provided significant impact on economic growth (Bapepam, 2008).

Indonesia also established a National Surveillance Unit (NSU) in response to the ASEAN surveillance process. In general, the Indonesian NSU is aimed at (i). monitoring and analysing macro-economic indicators; (ii). mapping the relations among economic

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2 Bapepam-LK is the unit under the Ministry of Finance Indonesia, which has mandate to supervise and regulate capital market and financial service, excluding the banking sector. From December 2012, the mandate has been transferred into Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK)/Financial Service Authority which is outside the Ministry of Finance.
sectors; (iii). conducting early crisis detection; (iv). and providing inputs for policy formulation (Syaifullah, 2006). The Indonesian NSU consists of two entities. For monetary and banking sector developments, Bank Indonesia (the central bank) has been in charge, while the Ministry of Finance has been dealing with fiscal and real sector developments (Anas & Atje, 2005, 16). Within the Bank Indonesia, the surveillance process is divided into two parts. For monetary issues, the Directorate for Monetary Policy and Economic Research (Directorat Riset Ekonomi dan Kebijakan Moneter) is in charge; while for banking sector, the surveillance is conducted by the Banking Division (Dewati, 2006, 28).

In the Ministry of Finance, the NSU was established in 2003. The establishment was quite late, since the ASP was inaugurated in 1998. The delay might correlate with the internal priority agenda as well as restructuring process within the Ministry of Finance in the wake of the AFC that took much attention from the ministry. The lack of human resource capacity and infrastructure were other reasons for the delay. Therefore, along with several ASEAN member countries, Indonesia sought ADB to support the newly Indonesian NSU.

Since there are two institutions that are in charge of dealing with the economic surveillance process in Indonesia, the Ministry of Finance and Bank Indonesia set a joint forum namely fiscal monetary coordination meeting (Syaifullah, 2006, 34). The meeting is a medium for both institutions to share their views as well as to reconcile the findings of the Ministry from the real or macro-economic sector, with the analysis of Bank Indonesia. Moreover, the output of the meeting will partly become joint inputs for policy making process in both institutions. Under the newly democratic regime, the Indonesian NSU has been providing economic analysis not only for the ASP but also for the ERPD of the APT.

APEC and intangible outcomes

In the early development of APEC, Indonesia contributed to formulate an important milestone in APEC’s history, namely the Bogor Declaration, at the 1994 Leaders’ Meeting. Not only being the host country of the declaration, Indonesia was also keen to support the core message of the declaration to build a free and open trade and investment in the region (Soesastro, 2004, 16). Soesastro adds that the Indonesian
Government even realised some points of the Bogor Declaration by deregulating trade policies in 1995 and 1996. Former Indonesian president Soeharto recognised that globalisation and trade liberalisation were inevitable and should be faced. The President frequently stated that like or dislike, ready or not ready, Indonesia had to face globalisation.

Indonesia’s expectations of the benefits inherent in joining APEC have dropped especially due to the lack of APEC support during the Asian financial crisis. As a victim of the AFC, Indonesia felt that APEC was not responsive and less effective to help the nation from the economic turbulence (Kuncoro, 2007). APEC even recommended to the strengthening of the IMF’s roles in tackling the crisis; a proposal that was eventually found not suitable for the Indonesian case.

The lack of concrete and pragmatic cooperation under the APEC finance ministers’ process is another reason behind the less supportive response of Indonesia. Until today, there are no concrete and unique products of APEC in relation to the three areas discussed in this paper so far. Although there are several discussions on financial issues, APEC finance ministers’ processes remain as a talking forum without clear outcomes.

The character of APEC as legally non-binding cooperation, also discourages member countries, including Indonesia to commit to specific issues. For instance, although Indonesia did not provide any improvements planned for financial services as a part of its Individual Action Plan (IAP), for 2010, this stance gained no pressure from other APEC member countries.

**Reaping more benefits from the APT**

For Indonesia, deeper regional cooperation and integration offer potential benefits and opportunities. Referring especially to finance, Indrawati (2007) underlines that the APT has proven an important forum in responding to financial crises as well as globalisation. Therefore, in recent years, Indonesia has encouraged the ASEAN Bloc to work closely toward East Asian financial regionalism. At the 2011 ASEAN Finance Minister Meeting (15th AFMM), the President SBY encouraged ASEAN states to unify and to be more competitive as a driving force for East Asian regionalism (Theo, 2011). This appeal is

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3 The whole Indonesia IAP for 2010 can be accessed through http://www.apec-iap.org/document/INA_2010_IAP.htm
plausible since ASEAN member states could not stand alone to compete with their Plus Three colleagues that have higher levels of economic development.

In concrete support, Indonesia joined CMI in 2000 as the initial initiative of APT toward liquidity support arrangements. Under the CMI scheme, despite its contribution to the ASA amounting to USD 200 million, Indonesia further refined the CMI mechanism by signing several BSA agreements with Plus Three countries. With Japan, the agreement was signed in February 2003 with a total amount of up to USD 3 billion (MoF Japan, 2011). The BSA has been renewed and increased twice, and by 2009, the amount was doubled to USD 12 billion. In the same scheme, Indonesia also maintained BSA with China. The first BSA with China was signed in December 2003 amounting at USD 1 billion. Then, 2 years later, it was renewed and increased up to USD 2 billion (Jhaveri, 2005). With Korea, Indonesia has agreed to make a two-way BSA in which both Indonesia and Korea provide USD 2 billion as liquidity support assistance.

In further engagement with the APT financial initiatives, Indonesia signed the Article of Agreement of CMIM as well as contributing USD 4.5 billion in 2010. The signing was relatively quick despite complex administration and bureaucratic processes including coordination with Bank Indonesia (BI). The CMIM was viewed by the Indonesian Government as an alternative source for liquidity support as well as correction for the IMF as the existing international support fund (Rahmi, 2009). In the recent improvement of the CMI’s total size, Indonesia committed to double its contribution to CMIM (USD 9.104 billion). This commitment shows greater support from Indonesia toward the existence of the APT regional pooling fund.

To further respond to the CMIM Agreement, recently the Indonesian MOF and BI, along with LPS and the Indonesian Financial Service Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan/OJK), established a Crisis Management Protocol (CMP) as a part of surveillance processes. The protocol is aimed at providing guidance and procedures to implement crisis prevention measures and national mitigation (Brodjonegoro, 2012). In practise, the protocol covers a surveillance process, exchange of information, the sharing of data, discussion among relevant institutions, and a decision-making process. It includes guidelines to make timely decisions as to whether the authorities need to declare a crisis, or a situation that may lead to crisis. The establishment of CMP is a complementary action supporting the existence of the NSU, as the main surveillance
unit in Indonesia. The CMP is also expected to be in line with the procedures in the regional initiative on economic surveillance, in order to create a better crisis mitigation process between national and regional arrangements that lead to systematic and simultaneous measures.

In terms of financial market development, Indonesia has contributed to the regional bond market development through credit enhancement regional bond issuance as well as harmonisation and standardisation of regulation and best practice. For credit enhancement, following the signing of the CGIF agreement in Tashkent, May 2010, Indonesia contributed USD 12.6 billion to the scheme (Suharmoko, 2010). The contribution that was disbursed in July 2011, was claimed as a minimal guarantee needed by Indonesian corporate bonds that are eligible to access the credit enhancement of the CGIF. The eligibility of Indonesia to access the CGIF could be larger since Indonesia has recently enjoyed the new higher credit rating of investment grade. The upgrade would potentially enhance the Indonesian corporate bond eligibility since ADB, as the trust fund of CGIF, uses the sovereign rating as one of its assessment criteria. Anggito Abimanyu, the former head of Indonesian fiscal policy office, has encouraged Bank Indonesia to use Indonesian reserves to further contribute to the CGIF as a long-term investment (Antique & Latif, 2011). Positive responses are also shown by the Indonesian private sector that perceived the CGIF as a stimulant to boost investors’ confidence and decrease level of risks (Darmawan, 2011). Although there have been no Indonesian corporate bond issuers who have already utilised credit enhancement from CGIF yet, this arrangement looks to gain positive feedback from market players.

Further Indonesian support toward regional liberalisation project under ABMI is shown through its engagement in the ABMF. In this forum, the Indonesian engagement is not only coming from the government side (represented by Bapepam-LK and Debt Management Office of the MoF), but also from non-state actors (represented by Indonesian Central Securities Depository/KSEI and Indonesian Stock Exchange/IDX). This composition reveals the strong commitment of the Indonesian market and regulators. Unfortunately, the early development of ABMF has not resulted in any concrete outcomes that push or encourage national regulatory agencies to harmonise or standardise their regulations or practice. Therefore, the Indonesian government has not transformed any instruments within its national regulatory system to accommodate
the harmonization and standardization of bond market regulations and practices under the APT framework.

CONCLUSION

Indonesia has joined numerous initiatives as part of East Asian financial regionalism. Among the initiatives, Indonesia has emphasised its concern about financial issues particularly in the wake of the AFC. The financial initiatives of ASEAN, APEC, and APT have been embraced by Indonesia in order to gain greater national economic sustainability.

Especially on the financial support arrangements, surveillance processes, and financial market development, it is found that Indonesia has considered ASEAN and APT as more important forums than APEC due to their concrete and tangible programs. This phenomenon supports the contention that Indonesia continually has maintained its involvement with ASEAN economic strategy to build a regional community.

On the broader level, the APT forum has attracted the Indonesian Government to further cooperate with Plus Three countries in the financial sector. For Indonesia, the APT financial cooperation has provided alternative resources not only for crisis prevention measures, but also for market developments. The concrete and tangible results of the APT financial initiatives have become strong incentives for Indonesia to further engage with the APT forum. The cooperation has gained positive responses not only from Indonesian financial authorities but also non-state actors.

The democratic wave is believed to encourage Indonesian financial authorities to be more active and opened in joining the East Asian financial regionalism. Considering its stable economic and political condition, it is predicted that Indonesia’s democratic regime will continually attempt to reap more benefits from ASEAN and APT financial regionalism in the future.
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Why Resist?
A Closer Look at Indonesian Teachers' Resistance to ICT
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ABSTRACT
This paper offers a critical analysis of Indonesian teachers' resistance to ICT (Information and Communication Technology). Although the Indonesian Government has attempted to overcome the issues of access to ICT through the provision of both software and hardware at schools, the use of ICT in teaching and learning process remains low. In light of this, teachers' resistance to ICT is deemed responsible for causing the problem. Therefore, this paper attempts to examine Indonesian teachers' resistance to ICT using a perspective which views teachers as a cultural member and considers teaching as a value-laden activity. This paper suggests that teachers may find mismatches between the policies regarding ICT use and their positions as digital immigrants. Furthermore, their beliefs may also come into play in their decisions whether to adopt or to resist ICT use.

Keywords: ICT Resistance, Teachers, Indonesia

INTRODUCTION

The development of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has rapidly permeated a number of aspects of Indonesian contemporary society. One of the fields in which ICT has been used and integrated is education. Both access to ICT and the skills to be able to engage with it are two of the many essentials in this era of globalisation. Accordingly, it is deemed significant for Indonesian educators to embed ICT in classroom practices so students can contribute in knowledge societies. In light of this, the promises and expectations regarding the integration of ICT in education have underpinned policies in Indonesia requiring teachers to integrate ICT in classroom practices.

Although a number of studies have recorded how the use of ICT may foster teaching and learning, problems regarding ICT adoption persist. The Indonesian Government’s efforts to improve infrastructure as well as to provide schools with more access to ICT
does not seem to result in high use of ICT in education. In this case, teachers are often perceived negatively as being reluctant to integrate ICT in their teaching. However, those arguments often lack teachers’ voices and tend to see the issue from the perspectives of policy makers or administrators. Therefore, in order to come to a thorough understanding on the issue, the complexity of both teaching and teachers’ identities should also be taken into account in the discourse of ICT in education. Thus, this paper uses a perspective which views teachers as a cultural member and considers teaching as a value-laden activity in order to examine Indonesian teachers’ resistance to ICT. To limit the scope of discussion, this paper will focus on teachers of primary and secondary level of education.

In order to address the issue, three major sections are discussed in this paper. Firstly, the discussion on ICT in education covers the promises of ICT integration in education and Indonesian Government policies. Secondly, teachers’ resistance to technology will be scrutinised. Thirdly, some recommendations will be offered in order to better deal with the issue. Finally, there is a conclusion that will summarise major points of the discussion and also address some questions which may offer potential for further research.

ICT IN EDUCATION

Reasons to include ICT in schools

The term ICT, which is short for Information and Communication Technology, is widely recognised in the 21st century. According to Bell, Loader, Pleace, and Schuler (2004) “ICT encompasses all digital computing and communication equipment” (110). The definition denotes that ICT is related not only to computers but also to other digital devices such as mobile phones and digital televisions. Cuban (1986) and Wang & Reeves (2003) have documented how earlier types of ICT such as film, radio and television entered educational settings. Yet, the term ICT used in this article refers to computers and the Internet which are two of the recent, major developments in ICT which have been widely adopted in Indonesian schools.

There have been many factors influencing the inclusion of ICT in education. According to the OECD (2001), economic, social, and the pedagogical rationales become the
underlying principles of ICT integration in schools. The economic factor makes it essential for ICT skills to be acquired because having ICT skills is deemed central to employability in the changing market. In the same vein, Yelland (2001 in Clarke and Zagarell, 2012) argues that traditional approaches to learning are less likely to be suitable to prepare students to participate in contemporary workplaces. The social factor encompasses the need to adopt ICT in schools so the students can contribute to society. The last rationale, the pedagogical rationale, focuses on the pedagogical impact that ICT may have, such as developing higher-order thinking skills (OECD, 2001), increasing levels of participation and collaboration (Davies & Merchant, 2009; Reeves, Herrington & Oliver, 2002), and amplifying creative teaching strategies (Lih-Juan, Jon-Chao, Horng, Shih-Hui, & Chu, 2006). With all the promises that ICT has in education, many technology promoters claim it as being able to revolutionise education (Cuban, 1986; Bromley, 1998; Drenoyianni, 2006) and to “totally transform schools by making them more efficient and productive” (Cuban, 1995, 34). These views have then encouraged schools to adopt new technologies without realising some problematic issues behind the use of ICT.

Ideological issues of ICT Use

Wang and Reeves (2003) state that “especially in the last 25 years, emerging ‘new technologies’ such as computers and the Internet have attracted many people to research and practice focused on improving education with technology” (50). Despite the fact that new technologies usually trigger some enthusiasm in society, there is no guarantee if those technologies can be applicable to answer educational problems. In light of this, Ely and Plomp (1986) point out that “the mystique which surrounds the new technologies causes enthusiasts to try to apply them in almost any setting without, however, raising the ‘right’ questions” (237). The discussion of ‘right questions’ seems to be based on ideological issues that may be embedded in the policies on ICT in education. The ideology is rooted in the American ideas about the nature of technology as deterministic, beneficent, and apolitical (Leonard, 2003). Similarly, most writing on the use of computers in schools “implicitly assumes that technology is beneficent” (Bromley, 1998, 2).
There has been a belief enunciated through the notion of technology determinism stating that access to technology equals to improvement and better society. In the same vein, Bromley (1998) claims that “it is assumed that anything involving new technologies must be an improvement; that it can, and indeed will, make life much easier for educators who now suffer in undertechnologized situations” (2). When looking at computers as a symbol through the theory of representation (Hall, 1997), there has been an unseen circulation of meanings in the society towards the use of computers in education. What may be believed by our society is the equivalence of progressive education and ICT development, particularly computers and the Internet.

Leonard (2003) has also critically examined the perception viewing technology as equal to progress. She challenges the idea that progress can be marked out by the development of technology in society. Thus, progress is seen as a myth as it tends to simply focus on how technologies have been adopted in the contemporary society to mark some degrees of modernity spread through Western ideology. Progress, in her opinion, has not taken place providing that social equalities have not followed. Therefore, computers as a symbol of quality education (Bromley, 1998) and a representation of power (Eisentein, 1998) are articulated in many policies which see access as essential and simply place physical presence of computers as central to successful, progressive, and modern learning. The spread of the ideology then obscures the fact that “technology is where the money is in education” (Kenway, 1998, 76). As a matter of fact, education has been a targeted market by computer companies which may spread the idea that adding technology into the curriculum will automatically add value to students’ learning.

**Policies on ICT in education in Indonesia**

The promises that ICT has in education have made many countries stipulate policies on ICT in education. According to Yeung, Taylor, Hui, Chiang, and Low (2011), some of the policies are Singapore’s *Third Masterplan for ICT in Education*, New Zealand’s *ICT Strategic Framework for Education*, and *The National Education Technology Plan* in the USA. One of the aims of the policies is to integrate ICT in education to enhance student learning. Yeung et al. (2011) further state that the reasons underlying the requirements
to integrate digital technology (DT) in teaching are the pedagogical effects that DT can bring about, such as increasing students’ motivation and learning effectiveness.

Ham and Cha (2009) establish that “most national policy documents assume that a well-trained labor force equipped with ICT literacy is indispensable to national development and individual self-actualization in the ‘knowledge-based’ global economy of the new ‘information age’” (538). Similarly, the Indonesian Government realises how ICT in education is a necessity so that its society can participate in the global market in which information may be one of the prominent commodities. In this Information Age, Yuhetty (2002), states that the Indonesian Government is concerned about recovering the difficulties which its society finds in seeking for, receiving, processing and producing information. The concern that she raised seems to focus on the low percentage of internet users in the country. As reported by the International Telecommunication Union (2011), internet users in Indonesia only comprised 18% of the total population. Indonesia’s diverse socio-economic background along with factors associated with gender, ethnicity, and level of education have all served as issues which widen the gaps between the digital haves and the have nots.

Access is certainly a big concern in many developing countries including Indonesia. Quah (2007) points out that inadequate hardware and software in Indonesian schools becomes the cause why not all schools use ICT. Quah (2007) states further that “the Government of Indonesia is concerned about the low use of ICT in teaching and learning in schools” (25). As such, ICT skills and the provision of hardware and software serve as some major issues that are addressed through some of the programs concerning ICT development, particularly in education.

The (2011) points out the Indonesian Government should immediately solve the problem of access in coping with the demand for computer literate workers by the job market. Due to the close interconnectedness between the job market and education, the government thus attempts to address the problems by introducing ICT in education. The inclusion of ICT in Indonesian education was initiated through the addition of an ICT subject in the 2004 curriculum (Quah, 2007; The, 2011; UNESCO, 2004). Based on the 2004 curriculum, the ICT subject is learned by students at both primary and secondary levels. However, in addition to being offered as subject, ICT is also expected
to be used in teaching and learning activities. Moreover, the Indonesian Ministry of Education (MoE) is “determined to make use of ICT in resolving educational problems” (UNESCO, 2004, 25). As a result, this policy is stipulated in the Appendix of Presidential Instruction No. 6 year 2000.

According to the report by UNESCO (2004), one of the programs launched by the Indonesian Government to develop ICT infrastructure is One School One Laboratory (OSOL) program. The implementation of OSOL is regulated through the Ministry of Communication and Information under Ministerial Decree 17/KEP/M.KOMINFO/4/2003 which encourages the provision of low priced computers. In addition, the government has distributed computers to schools particularly those in remote areas to narrow the gap of access in schools across the country. For instance, recently the government distributed 150 computers and 40 laptops to primary and secondary schools in the Bintan Regency which can be considered as a rural area (Haluan Kepri, 2012). The grant was aimed to facilitate the teaching and learning process using ICT in the schools. UNESCO (2004) also points out that the government has allocated funds to a small number of schools to develop ICT infrastructure as well as to enhance the teachers’ ICT skills. Moreover, considering the limited budget in building ICT infrastructure, the Indonesian government has called on some private companies in ICT such as PT. Indosat, PT. Telkom Indonesia, and Microsoft Indonesia, to take part in the projects.

Although the government has attempted to provide schools with more access to ICT, a survey undertaken by the Ministry of Communication and Informatics in 2011, reports an indication of low use of ICT (Kominfo, 2011). The survey was conducted in 801 private and public schools, comprising primary to secondary levels, in 17 major cities in Indonesia. It is reported that 98% of the schools made use of computers in teaching and 80% of them had access to the Internet. Computers were used for approximately 6.5 hours per week and the Internet was used for 4.1 hours per week. As many as 79% of the schools gave students homework which required them to access the Internet. Yet, the most thought-provoking result is the ratio of teachers that use ICT during their teaching and learning process which was only 0.39%. Bearing in mind that the schools are those in major cities that are assumed to have more access to ICT, it seems
paradoxical that ICT use is very low. Teachers’ resistance to use ICT in classroom instruction is often considered as one of the causes why the use of ICT in schools is still far from satisfactory. Therefore, the following section will scrutinise some aspects that may result in teachers' resistance to implementing ICT in their teaching practice in Indonesia.

INDONESIAN TEACHERS’ RESISTANCE TO ICT

As mentioned in the previous part of this paper, the integration of ICT in Indonesian education seems to offer many potential benefits so that the Indonesian Government stipulated policies on the use of ICT in teaching as well as provided more access to ICT to teachers and students in schools. However, providing that access is already available, there are still many factors contributing to teachers' use of ICT in classroom practices. The situation in Indonesia is in line with what Cuban, Kirkpatrick & Peck (2001) argue that having access to hardware and software is not equal to extensive ICT use by both teachers and students. Similarly, “while there is more technology in classrooms, there is little evidence that these technologies are integrated into instruction” (Onçu, Delialioglu, & Brown, 2008, 20). In light of this, Cuban (1986) states that teachers have been “singled out as inflexibly resistant to ‘modern’ technology” (2). Therefore, although the issues of access are not overlooked, they are not elaborated in details throughout this paper as this paper focuses more on teachers’ resistance to technology providing that the access to it is actually available.

Although many studies have discussed teachers’ ICT resistance as well as adoption, they tend to view it from the perspective of technology promoters, policy makers, and administrators (Cuban, 1986; Cuban et al., 2001). In the same vein, Wang and Reeves (2003) make a strong claim that “failing to pay attention to teachers' perspectives, administrators and technology experts assumed that the failure was caused by teachers’ resistance; they rarely tried to find why teachers didn’t want to use these technologies that seemed so powerful” (57). Considering that teaching is a complex activity, what contributes to their decisions in adopting or resisting ICT use should also be taken into account. In order to do so, different perspectives should be adopted in order to better articulate teachers' voices.
Teachers as digital immigrants

Drawing on the notion of digital natives and digital immigrants, terms coined by Prensky (2001), teachers’ position in regard to ICT may be examined in a way that teachers’ voices can resonate more powerfully. Digital natives are the “‘native speakers of the digital language of computers, video games and the Internet” (Prensky, 2001,1). In the same vein, Brooks (2008) uses the term generation Y and Z referring to those who were born in the era where technology innovations have extensively and significantly affected social life thus enabling them to acquire the technological skills naturally. As opposed to digital natives, digital immigrants are people who were not born in the digital world but eventually adopted new technology. Most Indonesian teachers, therefore, ‘plunge’ into the digital immigrant category. In many ways, this dichotomy emphasises different cultural settings which makes it challenging for teachers to shift from their culture to the new emerging culture. The most salient thing is that teachers may lack skills required to ‘explore the digital world’ which results in their being unconfident in using ICT.

Despite being immigrants and the ‘other’ in terms of acquiring ICT skills, teachers may also be ‘a newcomer’ to the pedagogical consequences that ICT may have in classroom interaction. When being brought into classroom practices, ICT should not be simply seen as a tool. Rather, there are important consequences that may follow along with the integration of ICT in the classroom. Firstly, the presence of computers may shift the pedagogical focus from a teacher-centred to a student-centred approach. Accordingly, ICT also transforms the way in perceiving teachers as the centre of knowledge to viewing teachers as co-constructors of knowledge. Similarly, “the role of a teacher should be to lecture less and, instead, guide students in directions that will allow them to discover as they work (either independently or with other students) and to understand instructional content” (White, 2002, in Lih-Juan, et al. 2006, 58). In other words, integrating ICT in education calls for a paradigm shift (Clarke & Zagarell, 2012), which may be problematic as the shift also involves teachers’ identity. In light of this, appropriation, resistance, and negation are three processes that contribute most to identity formation (Ha, 2008).
The aforementioned consequences seem to cause some tensions if brought to the Indonesian educational culture. Although, lately, constructivism has been a notion that is being echoed along with the development of ICT in the Indonesian education system, it may not be widely practised in schools. For instance, Sutjiono (2005) points out the habit of giving lectures that Indonesian teachers have. This type of habit may be rooted in one of the Javanese philosophy of a teacher, or in Javanese language and Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language), a guru. Although the word may actually come from Sanskrit, many Javanese will say that the word ‘guru’ is made from two Javanese words. The syllable ‘gu’ in guru comes from digugu (the information from a guru is to be trusted) and ‘ru’ from ditiru (a guru is to be a model for students). The values implied from the word seem to bind what people think about a teacher and what a teacher is expected to do. In this digital age, information heavily flows through the Internet, which makes those values seem to be not applicable. Students can obtain information in a much faster way without having to rely on the teachers. Thus, the practice of giving many lectures and being the centre of knowledge can be seen as part of teachers’ identity which has been constructed for many years and now is seen as inappropriate in the information age. Taking up a new identity in many ways brings many challenges and may lead to either resistance or adjustment. This discussion of identity is therefore inextricable from the discussion of changing cultures as elaborated previously.

Another problem that Indonesian teachers encounter is the limited number of software written in Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language). 80 % of the language used in posting online content is English (Baughn & Buchanan, 2001). Therefore, this problem leads to another problem as pointed out by Lih-Juan et al. (2006) that access to technology means access to English. Considering that English is not the first language in Indonesia and learning English may only be affordable for those coming from a higher social class, not all teachers have English competence and therefore do not seem to feel engaged in ICT. In this sense, they are disadvantaged because of being short of both ICT and English skills.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The preceding parts of this paper have discussed how teachers’ resistance to ICT use in classrooms can be a channel to confront ideologies and pedagogical consequences
that are brought along with the integration of ICT in education. Therefore, after the problems on teachers’ resistance have been examined, there should be some recommendations in order to deal with the issues. There are three recommendations offered that may be beneficial in facing this issue.

First, there is an inevitable need to provide ICT training to teachers at the earliest stage possible. Some Indonesian higher education institutions have started this by offering ICT in education as part of the curriculum in their teacher training programs (UNESCO, 2004). However, besides introducing ICT integration in education, there is also a strong need to raise the awareness of the ideological issues as well as pedagogical considerations that should be taken into account when ICT is used in the classroom. Teachers should be aware that those policies are ideological and thus may carry some ‘hidden agendas’. By having the awareness as well as the skills to integrate ICT in education, teachers can be more judicious in assessing the necessity of using ICT based on their own teaching context. In the same vein, similar training should be continually offered to school teachers. Since influence from colleagues contributes to teachers’ decisions in using ICT (Oncu et al., 2008), peer mentoring programs can therefore be one type of training that may facilitate the teachers’ transition to digital culture. In peer mentoring, the schools can assign teachers who are more experienced users of ICT to train other teachers. This type of learning seems to be more powerful rather than inviting an expert outside the schools to give training to teachers. In addition, through peer mentoring, actual contexts that happen in the classrooms may be discussed and teachers can exchange their ideas on how certain types of technology may work best in those certain contexts.

Second, there should be a stand point which sees teachers and teaching as complex and dynamic. Prensky (2001) highlights that adjusting to this new digital culture is a must for teachers as it may be impossible for students to reverse to teachers’ culture. However, it seems that he overlooks the dynamics of being a cultural member and particularly a teacher. Teachers entering this digital age and trying to acquire the skills should be seen as a ‘language’ learner. The term language here suggests a broader meaning as proposed by Hall (1997) who defines language as any symbolic system which carry meanings and work through the system of representation. In this discussion, ICT skills are also a form of language which may not be proficiently ‘spoken’ by many
Indonesian teachers. They are also ‘immigrants’ who can either quickly adjust to the new environment and culture or resist the changes in contemporary society. Thus, it may be applicable to see teachers’ efforts to learn the new language and transition to the new culture as a matter of investment (Peirce, 1995). In spite of the fact that teachers may be highly motivated to learn the target language “it is their investment in the target language that will lead them to speak” (Peirce, 1995, 26).

Investment should also be seen as related to teachers’ identities which are multiple, changing, and contradictory. A classroom is a site of struggle (Ha, 2012) where paradoxes coincide. Cuban (1986) mentions some paradoxes that teachers may undergo, such as the expectations to socialise students but also promote individual creativity, and the expectations to make students obedient to authority but at the same time foster each student to critically think and question. Those contradictions may place teachers in a difficult position. Demetriadis et al. (2003) contends that teachers’ resistance or adoption to ICT is ‘cultures in negotiation’ in which negotiation occurs not only between teachers and external supporters of ICT such as governmental services but also inside teachers themselves, “forcing them to decisions that accept/adapt/reject modes of ICT based teaching” (33). Although the use of ICT in schools is unavoidable so as to take part in the contemporary society, adopting or resisting the use of technology in classroom cannot be seen as either wrong or right decision but a complex situation in which many factors are intertwined. In addition, as postmodernism rejects the clear cut nature of binary opposition (Carlson & Apple, 1998), seeing teachers’ resistance or adoption cannot be seen as a dichotomy. Rather, a degree of transition in adopting ICT should also be taken into account.

Third, rather than imposing certain policies on the use of ICT in education, the government should be focusing more on how critical pedagogy can be fostered through the use of ICT. According to Tilaar (2005), a meta-narrative of progress and modernity is salient in Indonesian society through globalisation which seems to widen the gap between the poor and the rich as well as to erode local values. What generally happens in schools is that teachers use technology in the classroom without having an in-depth understanding on how the spread of ICT has carried a narrative of progress. In light of this, teachers should help students understand hegemonic practices, and respect all students’ voices as well as their identities as constructed by certain historical and
cultural context (Carlson & Apple, 1998, 25). As the purpose of education is to democratise students (Carlson & Apple, 1998) and “to equalize social and economic disparity within society” (Whybrow, 2008), education should aim to realise forms of oppression, and then empower students to do something about it. Therefore, technology use in classroom should be a tool that can lead to democracy and empowerment as what Auld and Darcy (2008) did when they designed talking books to teach literacy skills to indigenous Australians. Hence, the use of ICT will be beneficial providing that it is well-designed to meet students’ needs and to lead students to change.

Through critical pedagogy, teachers are expected to “be researchers (at least in informal ways) to learn from their students and constantly rethink their pedagogical practice” (Canagarajah, 1999, 194). In the same vein, Nakata (2003) claims that an effective teacher should not be confined to one particular method but should think, reflect, and review their experiences so s/he knows what works and what does not. Through the concept of visible learning, teachers can research what works in the classroom through the use of feedback and monitoring (Hattie, 2009). Thus, it is the pedagogy which should be the basis of teachers’ decision to adopt ICT. Osweld (2003) in Wang & Reeves (2003) states that “it is the pedagogical issues rather than the technological changes that are essential to technology integration in classrooms” (55). Similarly, as Oncu et al. (2008) argue, too much focus only on technology will not be able to completely portray the relation of technology and learning. Therefore, learning is central to the decisions on technology integration into classroom instruction and any use of ICT in classrooms should lead to a more effective learning process.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, this paper has elaborated the issues of teachers’ resistance to ICT by taking Indonesian schools as a context. From the elaboration, it can be seen that teachers’ decisions to resist the use of ICT may be rooted in many interlinked factors. Indonesian teachers are, to some extent, digital immigrants who face numerous challenges in this digital culture. In addition, the positive expectations around ICT in education may conflict with some pedagogical issues that teachers deal with in classroom interaction. Therefore, in order to solve the problems, peer mentoring should
be undertaken to help teachers in the cultural transition. Besides, teachers should be seen as having complex and dynamic identities, which make it difficult for them to position themselves in certain circumstances. Most importantly, pedagogical processes are what should be considered rather than focusing too much on technological processes. This paper also has attempted to shed light on teachers as moral agents whose decisions cannot be seen as either wrong or right but depend on their beliefs (Johnston, 2002). After examining this issue, there are some questions that may be useful for further research: (1) How do Indonesian teachers as digital immigrants negotiate their both professional and personal identities in regard to ICT adoption? (2) Has ICT use to some extent promoted democracy as the heart of education?, and (3) How do Indonesian teachers appropriate the use of ICT in teaching their subjects?. By examining those proposed topics, it is hoped that the complexity of the interlinked factors among Indonesian teachers, ICT, and pedagogy will be elaborated more thoroughly.

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Islam and Sukarno’s Foreign Policy, with reference to Indonesia-Pakistan Relations 1960-1965

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to investigate whether it is Islamic solidarity or the elite’s material interests that shaped Indonesia-Pakistan relations during the final years of Sukarno, 1960-1965. The argument is that the primary cause of Sukarno’s foreign policy was his political interest which extended into the state’s international posture. However, the changing geopolitical landscape opened up the space for Islam to entrench policy agenda, especially when Jakarta favoured Islamabad during the 1965 Kashmir war. The discussion is divided into two sections. First, it demonstrates the context in which Sukarno redirected Indonesia’s relations with India and Pakistan to serve his ideological foreign policy objectives. Second, it examines how Jakarta used the language of Islamic identity to pursue strategic interests in the event of war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. This discussion is followed by concluding remarks.

Keywords: Indonesia, Pakistan, Sukarno’s Foreign Policy, Islamism, Secularism.

Introduction

Similarities existed between Indonesia and Pakistan in terms of the formation of their respective states and foreign issues faced by them. Indonesia and Pakistan were born out of post-colonial countries with their anti-colonialism vision. Both countries were struggling to maintain their territorial integrity from external aggression. Hence, Indonesia should have a sense of tenacity to build strong relations with Pakistan. However, after the transfer of power in 1949, Jakarta pursued policies ignoring the historical importance of Pakistan. Formally, Indonesian and Pakistani ties were consolidated by the signing of the Treaty of Friendship on 3 March 1951 in Jakarta, laying the foundation of mutually beneficial relations between the two nations. Despite the fact of Islam being the religion of the majority in Indonesia and Pakistan, it was not mentioned as the basis of the two countries’ relationship in the text of the treaty, but it
did contain universal values such as social justice, respect for sovereignty, mutual cooperation and peace (Sutardjo, 1951, 3-10).

While playing down the relevance of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy towards Pakistan, the Sukarno Government was eager to foster stronger relations with India with its pronouncement of Asian African solidarity. The high noon of the relationship was the holding of the 1955 Asian African conference in Bandung (Agung, 1973, 222-4). Another Afro-Asian conference was scheduled in June 1956 in Cairo but had to be postponed due to the unstable situation of the Middle East caused by the Suez crisis. By 1960, Indonesia intended to revive the proposal, but met with little success. This was mainly because of the strong opposition from India which had felt that Indonesia would rival its leadership role in Third World affairs. Pakistan, on the other hand, supported the Indonesian proposal (Burke & Ziring, 1990, 310-11).

This article proceeds to focus on the development of Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Pakistan between 1960 and 1965. Sukarno was the centre of the politics of foreign policy in the country. The argument is that the primary cause of Indonesian foreign policy at this time was Sukarno’s political interest, which extended into the state’s international posture. However, the changing geopolitical landscape of Jakarta’s South Asian outlook opened up the space for Islam to become entrenched in policy agenda, especially when Jakarta favoured Islamabad during the 1965 Kashmir war.

**The Changing Context**

During the 1960s, Indonesian foreign policy was centralised in the figure of President Sukarno whose ideas and interests dictated the state’s external relations. Ever since the installation of ‘Guided Democracy’ in 1959, Sukarno had assumed complete direction of Indonesia’s foreign policy; gradually giving it an ideological ground as the struggle of the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) against the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOSS), which mostly referred to the West. Modelski (1963) and Legge (1972) explain that Sukarno considered an international conflict theory between the new and the old powers as the determining feature of world society. This conflict would, in his view, lead to the ultimate and inevitable destruction of the old. In Sukarno’s view, the root cause of international tensions lay in imperialism and colonialism and not the Cold War ideological enmity. This worldview was the radicalised form of the discourse of
anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in Indonesian foreign policy with the confrontational character of Sukarno dominating the state’s international relations in the 1960s.

The changing dynamics of regional and global settings also influenced Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Pakistan. Jakarta had viewed with alarm the emergence of Malaysia with the help of Britain and India and considered it to be a potential threat to Indonesia. It was also suspicious of India’s improved relations with Washington after the Sino-Indian border war in 1962. Meanwhile, Jakarta had improved military ties with the Soviet Union, particularly during the dispute over West Irian against the Dutch, and had remained aloof from Washington. After the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, tensions escalated between Indonesia and India. Jakarta allied with China against the perceived expansion of the British Empire and Indian power in Southeast Asia. This contributed to the improvement of qualified relations between Jakarta and Islamabad.

The strengthening of Indonesia-Pakistan ties can be divided into three phases. Firstly, between 1960 and 1962 Indonesia and Pakistan tried to identify common views and policies. Secondly, during 1963-1964 the two sides were keen to show reciprocal support and develop mutual cooperation based on common interests. And, finally, Jakarta and Islamabad actively collaborated in the creation of a strategic front against India when the Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir broke out in September 1965.

The first phase of the improvement of ties between Jakarta and Islamabad took shape during Pakistani President Ayub Khan’s visit to Jakarta in early December 1960. The meeting of the two countries’ leaders was not planned to discuss serious matters related to bilateral relations. It was like a friendly exchange of views between Sukarno and Ayub Khan. Nonetheless, they agreed to forge a more cordial relationship; as indicated in the joint communiqué issued at the end of the talks, the two sides committed to review economic and cultural ties, which over the last decade had not shown much progress, aiming to discover ways and means to progress them to a more satisfactory degree (Text of Joint Communiqué, 1960).

The sign of improvement in the relationship was further evident when Sukarno and Ayub Khan expressed in front of cheering crowds at Bandung their full support for the rights of self-determination of all peoples. Sukarno was happy with Ayub Khan’s
statement that Pakistan would continue to endorse Indonesia’s position on the West Irian issue. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released an official announcement saying that Pakistan was a true supporter of Asian peoples struggling under foreign domination (Bintang Timur, 6 December 1960).

Despite this growing amity, the two states differed on certain foreign policy issues. Though they agreed upon the rights of self-determination for all peoples, Indonesia did not mention specifically the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India - a silence that slightly disappointed Ayub Khan (Times of Indonesia, 8 December 1960). Pakistan’s membership of the US military alliance also remained a point of disagreement: Ayub Khan tried to explain Pakistan’s position by arguing that his country required an umbrella against communist expansionism. Indonesia disagreed with Pakistan’s position. Sukarno, in reply to Ayub Khan’s clarification, maintained Indonesian policies of non-commitment to either bloc of the Cold War, saying that Asian African powers would become the victims of the bloc opposition if they submitted to them (Times of Indonesia, 8 December 1960). The two leaders also differed on the plan to convene the second Asian African conference. President Ayub Khan had not yet supported Indonesia’s plans to hold this conference by stating that “…the gathering of Asian and African nations might not be needed urgently…” (Times of Indonesia, 12 December 1960). Pakistan’s position was perhaps a reaction to Indonesia’s unwillingness to support Islamabad’s Kashmir policy.

The nature of Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan changed as Jakarta’s friendship with New Delhi deteriorated. The setback in Indonesia-India relations was primarily caused by Nehru’s open refusal to Sukarno’s proposal for convening a second Asian-African gathering. Ever since the Bandung conference, Indonesia was keen to host such a meeting by which Jakarta had attained tremendous international prestige. Nehru argued that a second Asian-African conference would do more harm than good to Afro-Asian states by reiterating publicly that Asia’s and Africa’s problems would sharpen dissimilarities amongst them. Nehru’s actual reason was an unwillingness to see Indonesia earn more credit from the forum. On the other hand, China ardently endorsed the Indonesian proposal. India, with its old allies Yugoslavia and Egypt, both of whom resented Indonesia, hindered the proposal of a second Bandung-type meeting, and
instead planned a conference of nonalignment countries that eventually took place in Belgrade in September 1961 (Singh, 1967, 658).

On his journey to Belgrade, Sukarno declined Nehru’s invitation to visit New Delhi. Instead, he chose to have a short stop-over at Karachi Airport. At the airport, the Indonesian leader expressed his fondness for the people of Pakistan by admitting that he liked Pakistan and its people (BintangTimur, 1 September 1961). In spite of the remaining different views and policies between Indonesia and Pakistan, this episode demonstrated that parallel to a certain degree of coolness between Jakarta and New Delhi, due to Sukarno’s disappointment with Nehru, Indonesia had asserted its preference for Pakistan. It was to provide an important path towards the improvement of relations between the two states.

At the Belgrade conference, Indonesia strongly challenged India’s preeminent position. Sukarno insisted and was allowed to deliver his major address after Tito’s welcoming speech. The Indonesian daily BintangTimur (2 September 1961) reported that in the group photo of the participants Sukarno was at the centre, accompanied by Tito, Nasser, and Nehru. It could be interpreted as suggesting that Sukarno wanted to eliminate the prevailing notion that Nehru was the originator of nonalignment stand in the Cold War. However, India had succeeded in ensuring that the declaration of the non-alignment position subordinated all issues to its ideological commitment of being neither pro-Western nor Eastern Bloc for averting threats to world peace. The outcome of the Belgrade conference upset Sukarno since no mention had been made for the cause of the West Irian issue, while the twenty-seven-point Belgrade Declaration mentioned nationalists’ issues in Algeria, the Congo, Angola, Palestine, and Iberia (Indonesian Observer, 10 September 1961). Hence, the Belgrade conference had furthered tensions between India and Indonesia, opening up a wider space for Indonesia and Pakistan to promote each other’s interests.

Pakistan overtly supported Indonesia’s challenge to the nonaligned group. The editorial on 1 September published in a prominent Pakistani English daily - Dawn - expressed doubt if the non-aligned forum could play a crucial role in the resolution of the world’s problems. The editorial was critical of Nehru’s idea of neutrality as not being based on sincerity and honesty. Specifically, it criticised India’s response to Indonesian preference for a second meeting. It reported that previously most Afro-Asian states had
approved Indonesia’s demand for a second gathering, but India endeavoured to impede it due to a fear of China’s and Pakistan’s attendance. *Dawn* alleged India never had a sensitivity towards the plight of Asian and African peoples (Arora, 1975, 231-2). Such coverage was in line with the harsh criticism of the Belgrade conference in the Indonesian press. The editorial entitled ‘The Betrayal of Anti-colonialism’ in a pro-government daily *AngkatanBersenjata* (4 September 1961) pointed out that ignorance of the preponderant anti-imperialism struggle in West Irian by the Belgrade conference was the bias of nonalignment policy. It suggested the Indonesian Government review the friendship with India. Another daily *Siasat* (3 September 1961) even more asked the government to freeze ties with India. Importantly, the *Indonesian Observer* (2 September 1961) identified similarities between the Pakistani policy in Kashmir and Indonesian struggle for integrating West Irian. It identified the two cases as evidence of anti-colonial powers’ policies against foreign aggressors.

During the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962, India expected Indonesia to condemn China. But, Indonesia remained impartial. Public opinion in India reflected considerable annoyance at Indonesia not taking a firm stand against China that was portrayed as the aggressor. India reminded Indonesia of the solidarity founded earlier in Colombo, Bogor, and Bandung. However, Indonesia confirmed its neutral position when in the six-nation-Colombo conference in December 1962 the Indian proposal for joint action against China was refused by Indonesia, Burma, and Cambodia (Singh, 1966, 172).

The Sino-Indian war of 1962 also had a profound impact on Pakistan’s foreign policy, which made it possible for Islamabad and Jakarta to stand side by side against New Delhi. The war had created an interest between India and the United States in their common desire to contain China. India, which had long rejected Washington’s offer of military aid and refused to adopt a friendly attitude towards the West, was compelled by its military debacle in 1962 to seek military assistance from the Anglo-American alliance. New Delhi’s request for military aid was favourably received in London and Washington which in addition promised long-term military aid. This formed an informal alignment of India and the Western military powers. The improvement in Indian-US relations affected Pakistan’s relations with the US; realising that Islamabad’s strategic importance for the US had declined, Pakistan reacted to the altered environment by forging closer relations with China. Beijing and Islamabad shared an interest in retaining the balance
of power in the region vis-à-vis India, and containing the possibility of Indian aggression (Hyder, 1966, 20).

Still in 1962, Jakarta rejected the Indian role in the transfer of power from the Dutch to Indonesia in West Irian. The New York Agreement concluded on 15 August 1962 had provided for the Netherlands’ administrative power to be reassigned to Indonesia within seven months beginning on 1 October 1962 to conclude on 1 May 1963. In the meantime, West Irian was to remain under the authority of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). To assist with the task, UNTEA invited India to provide the services of six military officers who would be led by Brigadier General Inderjeet Rikhey. Indonesia preferred Pakistan’s participation to that of India. Hence, at Indonesia’s request, Pakistan was appointed as an alternative to India to form the United Nations Security Force (UNSF) for West Irian, with a 1500 strong contingent commanded by Major General Said Uddin Khan (Indonesian Observer, 2 October 1962). This was a clear sign of Indonesian preference for, and recognition of, the importance of Pakistan, paving the way to improve their qualified relationships.

Between 1963 and 1964 the relations between Jakarta and Islamabad improved within the context of a triangular relationship involving Pakistan, Indonesia and China. The triangular relationship was directed against the emerging alliance between India, the US and the Soviet Union. Jakarta was interested in countering the Indian efforts to block its plans for the Afro-Asian world. But, it also sought support for its ‘crush Malaysia’ policy which included elements of confrontation without going to war with Malaysia. As elaborated by Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Subandrio, in his speech before the Resimen Mahakarta in Yogyakarta on 20 January 1963, the policy towards Malaysia was guided by the Indonesian commitment to “pursuing confrontation against colonialism and imperialism in all its manifestations”. But since Malaysia had unfortunately ‘let itself become the proxy of colonialism and imperialism…[Indonesia was] compelled to adopt a policy of confrontation….’ (Djiwandono, 2001, 2). Malaysia was depicted by Jakarta as the extension of Western colonialism, especially of the British in Southeast Asia.

Pakistan, on its part, sought a new patron after reduced US support in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war. It also looked for endorsement by Asian and African states of
its Kashmir policy that was always couched in terms of the rights of the Muslim population to become part of the Islamic state of Pakistan. China needed Afro-Asian countries to stand by its efforts in countering the perceived American domination as well as Soviet communist revisionism expressed in its fear of encirclement. These interests brought the three states together (Singh, 1980, 44-5), and Indonesia and Pakistan discovered common interests. This was a step in the direction of closer relations than had been the case so far.

The emergence of the triangular relations of Indonesia-Pakistan-China marked a more radicalised worldview proposed by Sukarno. On many occasions, Sukarno had been more outspoken of the necessity for the Third World countries to ally with NEFOS. At the Cairo meeting of nonaligned states in September 1964, Sukarno challenged India’s peaceful coexistence policy by arguing how NEFOS and OLDEFOS could coexist peacefully in situations such as the conflict in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Vietnam (Bintang Timur, 7 October 1964). Still in the same month, Sukarno took Indonesia out of the UN, severely criticising the world organisation as being a stronghold of the OLDEFOS. In its place, Sukarno wanted to establish the conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFOS). When Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Malaya, proposed the joining together of conservative Malaya, with the British colony of Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak, and build a new more powerful nation called Malaysia, Sukarno felt it was an onslaught of the OLDEFOS. For Sukarno, Indonesia should have been consulted about the disposition of colonies around its borders. Further for Sukarno, the creation of Malaysia was designed to encircle and control the revolutionary NEFOS, Indonesia (Tan, 2007, 155).

Pakistan’s position on Indonesia’s NEFOS discourse was unique: Pakistan was a member of CENTO and had been beholden largely to American economic and military aid for nearly 15 years. But, it had also come to realise the significance of an alliance with Jakarta and Beijing under the guidance of the then Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. However, during the height of the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation in 1964-1965, Pakistan remained neutral with its proposal for mediation to resolve the dispute. Indonesia did not respond to this peace initiative, but Malaysia did (Times, 25 February 1965). However, Pakistan’s failure to side with Indonesia did not affect its strengthening of ties with Jakarta.
President Sukarno paid a visit to Pakistan in June 1963 where he was warmly welcomed. On his arrival, the Indonesian leader urged Pakistan and all NEFOS sympathisers to rally against the OLDEFOS order which retained domination, exploitation, and suppression of peoples around the world. President Ayub Khan praised Sukarno for his tough diplomacy and determination to advocate for the liberation of West Irian, and hoped that Indonesia would lend its remarkable support for the similar struggle of freedom being undertaken by the peoples of Kashmir. Sukarno did not pronounce Indonesian support for Pakistan’s position on Kashmir (Indonesian Observer, 24 June 1963). Nevertheless, in a speech in Murree on 25 June, Sukarno emphasised the need for more solid cooperation and real friendship between Indonesia and Pakistan. Furthermore, Sukarno declared that the tumultuous welcome he was receiving reflected spontaneous brotherly feelings the Pakistanis had for Indonesians (Bintang Timur, 26 June 1963).

At this event too, there had emerged a mixed context within which Indonesia viewed its ties with Pakistan. Secular and Islamic discourses emerged as common ground on which it became possible to promote the relationship amidst the strategic shift in Indonesia-India relations. This was an important modification in Indonesia and Pakistan relations, by which the former had indicated greater willingness to recognise the role of its Islamic identity, albeit the dominant theme remained the struggle of NEFOS and Bandung spirit. It can be discerned in the way Sukarno approached relations with Pakistan as stated in the joint communiqué that, on the one hand, reaffirmed that the Asian African solidarity was the main basis for the two countries relations, and, on the other hand, mentioned Islam as the bond of societal friendship between Indonesians and Pakistanis (Text of Joint Communiqué, 1963).

Pakistan committed to favour the Indonesian plan for the holding of the second Afro-Asian meeting and was prepared to take part in the NEFOS Games to be held in Jakarta in 1964 instead of the Asian Games (Indonesian Observer, 1 July 1963). By confirming its support of a second Bandung-like forum, Pakistan was able to place its relations with Indonesia on a better footing than the deteriorating Indian-Indonesian ties. Foreign Minister Subandrio - when accompanying President Sukarno on his visit to Karachi – was assured that Indonesia had formed a promising friendship as was clearly
shown by the sincerity of the people and Government of Pakistan, and that this was very meaningful for the struggle of NEFOS (BintangTimur, 28 June 1963). Indonesia felt more confident with its closer relationship with Pakistan, which was sending a signal to India that the Jakarta-Islamabad collaboration was entering a new phase.

The conflict between India and Indonesia was meanwhile widening. Sukarno, eager to convene the second Asian African conference, hoped to seek recruits to his proposed NEFOS grouping. Nevertheless, India was determined to stall the holding of such a Bandung type meeting. The Shastri Government of India, on the diplomatic front, made a concerted attempt with Yugoslavia, Egypt, and Ceylon, to host a rival conference, the second nonalignment meeting. It was quite likely that a meeting between nonaligned states might render unnecessary a second Bandung-like conference because most Afro-Asian countries were taking part as well. At any rate, India considered a conference of Asia and Africa would have been delayed had the nonalignment group held their gathering in 1964 earlier than the planned Bandung gathering (Singh 1980, 45).

At the meeting held in Jakarta, the two blocs vainly opposed each other’s position. Controversies centred on the Indian proposal to invite Malaysia and the Soviet Union. For Indonesia, Malaysia did not exist. China could not accept the attendance of the Soviet Union at the conference which Peking had been long expecting to dominate and able to gain a good image. Indonesia at the time was close to the Soviet Union in the military field since its dispute over West Irian with the Netherlands. However, Jakarta was inclined to favour China, and Sukarno saw this as more helpful to his ‘crush Malaysia’ campaign. The trio Jakarta-Beijing-Islamabad put up a strong fight against the proposed Malaysian and Soviet participation. This issue further strained relations between Indonesia and India. The national media, controlled by the Indonesian Government, accused India of insulting Indonesian sensibility through the controversial initiative of trying to bar the Afro-Asian conference (Singh, 1967, 663).

Again, Indonesia felt hindered by India and likeminded parties. Indonesia, with the support of China and Pakistan, wanted to convene the second Asian-African conference in an Indonesian city, which was to be held prior to the nonalignment meeting at the end of 1964. Once more India struck at the very root of the Indonesian bid. To the great disappointment of Indonesia, Pakistan and China, India succeeded in
confirming support of African delegations, in that not only the second Afro-Asian
gathering would be held in 1965 after the nonalignment conference, but also the venue
would be in an African country, to be decided by the Organization of African Union
(OAU). Algiers was identified on 10 March 1965 as a likely venue for the conference. To
give more time to Algiers to make preparations, the schedule of the meeting was
changed to 29 June 1965 (Millar & Miller, 1965, 311). By this time, Indonesia and India
were engaged in a contest in respect to the ideas, venue, and participants in the
convening of the Bandung-like meeting.

Amidst growing tensions with India, in September 1964 Sukarno visited Pakistan to
seek a more solid commitment in support of Indonesia. The joint statement issued at
the visit established the framework for a stronger relationship between Indonesia and
Pakistan. It was on this visit that, for the first time, Sukarno asserted his political support
for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Sukarno openly acknowledged that the Kashmir
issue was of the Indonesian Government’s concern from now on, so that the people of
Indonesia were called to support the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination. Any
actions by an external ruler – the reference to India – to thwart the efforts of the majority
of Kashmiri peoples was opposed in line with Indonesia’s continuing fight against
imperialism of the OLDEFOS (ANTARA, 22 September 1964). Indonesia had made it
clear that it was leaning towards Pakistan.

While Indonesia and Pakistan were fostering ties, further tension arose with India.
Observers were convinced that the split between Indonesia and India within the Asian-
African powers was a considerable factor in the failure of that second Bandung-type
gathering (Weinstein, 1965, 335). Beside this, unsettled situations in Algiers following
the overthrow of President Ben Bella on 19 June 1965 had paved the way for India to
work actively with Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt, and Japan to reschedule the conference to 5
November 1965. In fact, the conference never took place (Singh, 1967, 664). The year
1965 witnessed the height of Indonesian hostility towards India.

This development served as a fresh opportunity for Indonesia and Pakistan to further
consolidate their political relations. Foreign Minister Subandrio of Indonesia made a
three-day visit to Pakistan beginning on 19 February 1965. In Pakistan, Subandrio
assured the people of Pakistan that his government would carry on working with
Pakistan for the strengthening of their relationship. An Indonesian press correspondent
in Karachi wrote that the Pakistani media gave wide coverage of Subandrio’s visit. Indonesia – especially President Sukarno – was symbolised as the champion of freedom in Asia, and the greatest leader of the Indonesian nation and Muslims. Moreover, under the leadership of the revolutionary Indonesia, the NEFOS movement was identified as the denominator of changes in the neo-colonised world. India, in contrast, was illustrated as the perpetrator of “brown imperialism” in the region (BintangTimur, 20 February 1965).

Since Indonesia was improving relations with Pakistan, Islam began to be relatively more present than was the case before in Sukarno’s rhetoric. Sukarno used the language of Islamic identity in an inaugural address at the Asian-African Islamic conference held at Bandung in the first half of March 1965. He exhorted “…to seek freedom from colonialism in all its forms [as] it had oppressed and suppressed the Muslim world…colonialism has put Islam in the chains against which Muslims are obliged to oppose…” (Indonesian Observer 15 March 1965). Sukarno attempted to construct an image that the struggle against colonialism featured in his worldview and policies were congruent with the Islamic duties.

Islam was used to gain favour for Indonesian political interest in humiliating India. In a reception for the participants of the Asian African Islamic conference, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, said “…Islam should be the basis of worldwide human revolution…”. Despite complaints from the Indian delegates, the Indonesian foreign minister called upon the worldwide Muslims “…to present a united front against non-Muslim aggressors, and provide all assistances for Muslims being attacked by non-Muslims such as what happened in Kashmir…” (BintangTimur, 17 March 1965). This statement indicated that Indonesia had been willing to adopt Islamic language in the foreign policy more openly, although the change was not simply due to a heightened awareness of Islam as the bond with Pakistan and others in the Muslim world.

In any case, Pakistan benefited from this change. During the mid 1960s, the Islamic identity was more obviously and strongly applied in Indonesia’s approach to describe its relations with Pakistan. For instance, Indonesian Ambassador to Pakistan Brigadier General RoekmitoHendraniggrat wrote in Pakistan Horizon (1965, 142) “…the people of Pakistan had shown to us (Indonesians) an amount of goodwill and affectionate feelings to their brothers in Islam, a kind of relationship that would be hard to find in any other
bilateral ties...”. The ambassador added “...it is true that Islam makes indestructible bonds for the two nations...”. As the Pakistan Horizon published by the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs was a significant space where foreign policy issues were discussed in the country, the publication of the opinion of the Indonesian ambassador in the space indicated that he wanted to engage Pakistani opinion and policy makers with Indonesian Muslim identity.

The 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and the Indonesian Response

In September 1965, India and Pakistan fought their second war on Kashmir. Prior to the war, the two armies had clashed over the Rann of Kutch, a piece of marshy land along the border of India and adjoining Sindh. The issue was settled through an accord signed between the two states on 30 June 1965 (Choudhury, 1972, 242). One of the points in the agreement mentioned that the Kashmir dispute, if unresolved, would be submitted for arbitration by an international tribunal. Pakistan expected that this principle could be applied to the Kashmir issue in the future (Sayeed, 1966, 8). The Rann of Kutch fighting was perceived by Pakistan’s leadership as a solid demonstration of its strength. This encouraged Pakistan that an uprising could be spurred on in Indian-governed Kashmir. The Pakistani Government’s assessment was that India, having lost the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, would not be confident enough to risk an all out war, especially after its experience in the dispute over the Rann of Kutch. Additionally, Pakistan was confident that the well equipped military personnel as a result of the American aid it received over the last ten years would be able to thwart Indian moves. Only four months after the clash in Rann of Kutch, Pakistan commenced an underground operation – called ‘Operation Gibraltar’ – to send Mujahideen infiltrators across into the Indian-held Kashmir area to incite insurgence (Burke & Ziring, 1990, 333).

Pakistan’s provocative actions worried India, and New Delhi retaliated by mobilising troops to seize Kargil. It was followed by Indian advances along the ceasefire line between Pakistani and Indian-occupied Kashmir. Events started moving at rapid speed. Pakistani tanked troops moved up to occupy the Chamb sector of South-western corner of Indian-occupied Kashmir on 1 September 1965. India was concerned that if the
Pakistani troops took over Aknur and Jammu, New Delhi’s communications with Srinagar would be cut off and Indian troops would be bottled up between the ceasefire line and the valley. Thus, on 6 September 1965, India positioned troops to cross over the international borders between India and Pakistan. A full scale armed conflict was fought between India and Pakistan on the outer edges of Lahore and Sialkot in West Pakistan during the next two weeks. The war ended on 23 September 1965 without any side achieving a decisive breakthrough (Sayeed, 1966, 9).

Indonesia supported Pakistan during the 1965 War thus marking the third phase of the improvement in their relations. Indonesia declared readiness to militarily support Pakistan. According to the former Chief of Pakistan’s Air Force, Air Marshall Asghar Khan (1979, 44), he went to Jakarta and carried a personal letter from Ayub Khan for Sukarno, explaining the situation Pakistan was facing. Responding to the Pakistani plea for military aid, Sukarno said that Pakistan’s terrible need was Indonesia’s as well. Sukarno considered Indian attacks on Pakistan as though it was an aggression to Indonesia, and pledged, upon the ground of Islamic solidarity, to provide all assistances necessary for Pakistan. The Pakistani emissary was told to regard Indonesia as his own country and take from it whatever might be helpful to Pakistan in the emergency circumstances. This commitment materialized into Indonesia’s military support for Pakistan.

Indonesia went so far as to ask Ceylon permission to use its airports for transferring military aircrafts for Pakistan, which were manned by personnel of the Indonesian Staff College. In fact, it was reported that Ceylon rejected this request on account of its neutral policy towards India and Pakistan. In mid September, Sukarno sent the Indonesian Chief of Staff, Vice Marshall Omar Dhani to China for a secret mission to obtain spare parts for military airplanes as Indonesia was arranging to dispatch them for military assistance to Pakistan. Then, Indonesia gave eight MiG-19 jet fighters to Pakistan without asking for permits from the Soviet authority (Khan, 1979, 47).

In addition to air force aid, the Indonesian Government agreed to give naval aid. Indonesia, at Pakistan’s request for aid, was ready to take over the Andaman group of islands. The Chief Commander of Indonesian navy believed that India did not deserve
to be there in Andaman and Nicobar islands since they are an extension of the Indonesian territory of Sumatra, and are located between Indonesia and East Pakistan. Therefore, the Indonesian navy commenced patrols and undertook inspection of these areas to see what India had done there (*Bintang Timur*, 10 September 1965). An observer even said that India had postponed launching its sea strikes on Pakistan after realizing that the Indonesian navy was already in Pakistan’s seas⁴ (Wahyudi Purnomo, interview February 2012). The Indonesian military aid to Pakistan illustrates that Indonesian support was not confined to sheer rhetoric.

The Indonesian elite gave statements suggesting that they viewed India as an aggressor in Kashmir and the perpetrator of conflict in the state. Assertive language backing Pakistan was heard in Jakarta during the war. Sukarno gave a press conference expressing the fellow feeling and prayers of Indonesians for Pakistanis who were fighting sternly against aggression to the sovereignty of their country and people (*Pakistan Horizon*, 1965, 364). The Chairman of the Indonesian Parliament, Arudji Kartawinata, and Chairman of Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) D. N. Aidit, shared similar views and depicted Indians as the representation of neo-imperialists in Asia. They also advised the Sukarno Government to devote more humanitarian assistance to Pakistanis in need (*Bintang Timur*, 8 September 1965).

It may be argued that the Indonesian support for Pakistan was extended within the context of the China-Pakistan-Indonesia triangular alliance that had evolved since the turn of the 1960s. Jakarta was willing to cooperate with China in supporting Pakistan during the war both diplomatically and militarily. But, the explanations of Indonesian policy on Pakistan located the support within the context of Indonesia’s struggle against imperialism, and its Islamic identity. In explaining the Indonesian government’s policy on supporting Pakistan, the Minister of Communication Ruslan Abdulgani spoke to journalists in Jakarta, saying that India was in doubt about anti-colonialism, endorsing the birth of the colonial puppet Malaysia, as well as betraying the Bandung Spirit. On the other hand, Pakistan had developed friendship and solidarity with Indonesia in the struggle against colonialism, faithful in respect to the rights of self-determination, and compliant with the Bandung Spirit. Therefore, Indonesia decided to support Pakistan’s

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⁴ Wahyudi Purnomo is an expert of Indonesian foreign policy in South Asia under Sukarno.
struggle for the Kashmiri people’s rights of self-determination (ANTARA, 7 September 1965).

Generally, media in Indonesia was in favour of the government’s policy towards Pakistan. For instance, an editorial of the nationalist daily Kompas (10 September 1965) wrote an appraisal of Indonesia’s tangible support for Pakistan which was of help in fortifying the struggle of the Kashmiri people. The daily expressed that every nation has an inalienable right to self-rule. In the case of Kashmir, its people’s rights were denied by India due to the latter’s selfish national interest. The policy adopted by Indonesia was correct because it was aimed at defending the rights of self-determination for peoples in Kashmir. Based on the Bandung Spirit of Asian and African solidarity, the Government of Indonesia was urged to help heighten Pakistan’s bargaining position in international diplomatic arenas.

Ambassador Hendraninggrat –when inaugurating the Indonesian consulate in Dhaka on 19 September 1965 – stated that the Indonesian Government and Muslims gave Pakistan their full political and moral support without reservations. Emphasising solidarity in the name of Islam, Hendraninggrat mentioned “…no power on earth that could disturb Islamic bonds binding Indonesia and Pakistan...” (ANTARA, 20 September 1965). With this statement, it is clear that the Indonesian Government had offered its support for Pakistan by both acknowledging the need for the pursuance of Muslim solidarity and the struggle against imperialism manifested in Kashmir; a dual-approach that admitted - even if to a limited extent - the importance of Islam in Indonesia and Pakistan relations.

Societal groups in Indonesia also supported Pakistan with reference to their common Islamic identity. As the war started on 6 September, an angry, 2,000 strong mass organised by the youth wing of NahdlatulUlama Party demonstrated in front of the Indian embassy in Jakarta, mouthing anti-India and pro-Pakistan slogans. Two days later, another bigger mass rally took place, and on 9 September massive gatherings turned violence. The Indian embassy was stoned and ransacked, three cars belonging to the embassy were burnt out, and the Indian information service office was occupied through force by angry Indonesian mobs (Sayeed, 1968, 236). It was reported that in
West Java the property of Indians was placed in custody. In Medan North Sumatra, the Indian consulate and Khalsa English School were seized by rowdy elements. The Gandhi Memorial School and office of Air-India in Jakarta were also attacked. In this troubled atmosphere, the Indian Embassy in Jakarta decided to evacuate the wives and children of its staff (Singh, 1966, 174).

NahdlatulUlama pledged a readiness to send volunteers to Kashmir to fight against Indian forces there. The former leader and founder of Laskar Hezbollah and LaskarSabilillah, affiliated mostly with NahdlatulUlama, KiaiMasykur expressed his great sympathy to Pakistan. He said that he was called upon to do that by the history of his and other Muslim fighters who had struggled hand-in-hand with Pakistani Muslim soldiers to defend the freedom of Indonesia during the 1940s. Therefore, it was his duty to pay back those services given by Pakistani Muslim brothers by supporting them against the attacks of foreigners - the reference was to Indians (Kompas, 11 September 1965).

Despite its professed secularist identity, the Sukarno Government, represented by Foreign Minister Subandrio, appreciated the commitment and actions by the Islamist activists of Nahdlatul Ulama. He claimed “…the show of solidarity by the Indonesian masses is highly appreciable…it reflects the genuine feeling of support of Indonesian peoples for Pakistanis who are fighting powerfully to safeguard their independence and territorial integrity…” (Indonesian Observer, 10 September 1965). Although there was no report suggesting that the Indonesian Government facilitated volunteers to go to Kashmir, the events taking place in Jakarta and other cities where mass protests against Indians continued violently, with no effort made by the security authorities to control or stop them, indicated that the government favoured the violent actions.

Conclusion

What can be learnt from the case study is that foreign policy conducted by Sukarno over the 1960s was not always a set of rational official actions toward external environments. There were both material and ideational factors influencing the making and implementation of Jakarta’s foreign relations. As a country with the world’s largest Muslim population, Indonesia’s politics and international affairs had something to do with Islam. Although Islam is not the primary cause of foreign policy, it played the roles
in strengthening Jakarta’s strategic interest, exemplified by its responses to the Kashmir war of September 1965.

With regard to the ongoing debate on the role and position of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy, the case study has demonstrated, firstly, that investigation through case study of bilateral ties between Indonesia and Pakistan (1960-1965) can provide an understanding about the presence of Islamic ideas in foreign policy, including the dynamics of Jakarta’s attitude toward Islamic-related issues, and its implication to the Muslim community. Secondly, Islamic features have not been entirely absent in Jakarta’s participation in international affairs of the Muslim world. Islam has proven to be an important consideration of the governmental policy when there has been a congruent interest between the ruling elite and Islamic groups in response to a specific issue.

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Digital Inequalities and Young Adults in Greater Jakarta:
A Socio-Demographic Perspective

Ariane Utomo, Anna Reimondos, Iwu Utomo, Peter McDonald, & Terence H. Hull

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ABSTRACT

Using data from a representative survey (N=3,006) and in-depth interviews (N=80), this paper examines the socio-demographic nature of the digital divide among young adults in Greater Jakarta. Results from the 2010 Greater Jakarta Transition to Adulthood Survey indicate that 85 per cent of respondents owned a mobile phone. Access to Internet and its purpose of use were strongly differentiated across socio-demographic lines including gender and education. Although 60 per cent of respondents had never used the Internet, 85 per cent of those who use the Internet access it on a daily basis, with mobile phones being the most common access point of the Internet. In support of the normalisation thesis, our multivariate analysis indicates that the gaps in access to mobile phones and the Internet between male and female are significantly smaller among younger respondents. Education, rather than gender, plays a pivotal role in explaining digital inequalities among young adults in our sample.

Keywords: Young adults, Asia, Indonesia, Digital divide, Internet, Mobile phones

INTRODUCTION

Young men and women around the world are experiencing the transition to adulthood in the midst of a global revolution in new technologies and methods of communication. In countries like Indonesia, the digital age presents a web of intricate challenges and benefits both for policy makers and the large cohorts of young people whose socio-demographic and political importance is often linked to the term ‘the youth bulge’ (Fuller, 2011). In theory, with the largest cohort of adolescents and young adults who have the highest literacy, command of the national language, and achieved schooling of any in history, Indonesia’s youth bulge is conducive for a rapid uptake in the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Such demographic perspective is in line with the popular assumption that new technologies such as mobile phones and the Internet are changing the way young Indonesians communicate, form relationships, network, conduct business, and work.

Recently, international media have paradied the eccentricities of the digital revolution in Indonesia. The Economist (2011) noted that Indonesia hosts the world’s second-largest number of users of Facebook and the world’s third largest users of Twitter. The striking popularity of online social networks in Indonesia paradoxically occurs against the country’s relatively low ranking of Internet penetration in Southeast Asia. The Jakarta Post reported that only 21 per cent of people aged 15-49 in Indonesia
use the Internet (The Jakarta Post, 2011). While young urban middle-class
Indonesians are increasingly portrayed by international media as proficient users of
mobile phones and Internet technology, relatively little is known about the patterns of
use of new media, and the ensuing potential for a digital divide and information
inequalities among different socio-economic segments of young people in the country.

This lack of empirical insights on the nature of the digital divide in Indonesia
reflects the state of knowledge in the broader literature on the international variations of
within-country information inequities (Cheong, 2007; Miller, 2001). Although research
on digital and the ensuing knowledge divides among young adults in the US and OECD
countries is relatively well-developed (Hargittai & Hinnant, 2008), less is known on the
patterns and gaps of ICT uptake among young adults in developing societies with
deeply-entrenched socio-economic inequalities.

In Asian countries where computer ownership is relatively low, mobile phones
have proven to be important points of access to the Internet (Quibriaa et al, 2003).
Therefore, any study of digital inequalities in Indonesia must also consider mobile
phones ownership. Using data from a representative sample of 3,006 respondents
aged 20-34 in the 2010 Greater Jakarta Transition to Adulthood Survey and its in-depth
interviews sub-samples (N=80), this paper examines to what extent age, gender,
education and employment status explains the patterns in mobile phones ownership,
and access and use of Internet among young adults.

We begin our paper with a brief literature review outlining previous studies on the
digital revolution and social change in Indonesia. Here, we identified that so far, there
has been little discussion on the socio-demographic aspects of access and use of the
new media in the country. To examine the nature of digital divide among young adults
in Greater Jakarta, our conceptual framework is centred on theories of the
normalisation and the social stratification of technology adoption (Norris, 2001).

First, we build upon the argument that the so-called digital divide is a reflection of
the deep-rooted patterns of socio-economic stratification in modern societies (Norris,
2001). We extend critiques against framing the digital divide as a bipolar division
between those with and without access to information technology (Hargittai, 2002;
Warschauer, 2003), and proceed to adopt the framework used to examine the
secondary digital divide. Here, to establish whether socio-economic stratifications underlies ICT adoptions in Indonesia, our framework questions to what extent socio-demographic proxies of education, age, gender and employment status are related to access to mobile phones and the Internet, and to Internet’s patterns of use.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3 outlines the target population, data collection and methodology. In section 4, our results are organised into three major themes. The first part provides an overview of mobile phone usage and an analysis of the demographic and socio-economic determinants of mobile phone ownership. Here, we highlight the importance of mobile phones as an Internet access point. Second, we examine the so-called second order digital divide through three different aspects of Internet use: frequency, point of access and purpose. Here, we draw on a multivariate framework to examine the relationship between gender, education, and employment to determine the purpose of Internet use. Lastly, we present a graphical depiction of the preceding multivariate analyses to better understand what is happening to the magnitude of the digital divide across gender and education groups across the respondents’ age groups.

In section 5, we discuss our results and reflect upon the implications of our findings for the broader scholarship on digital divide and development. Qualitative insights are interspersed in the discussion of our survey results. Should social stratification play a large role in explaining the gap in new media adoption and use, we argue that addressing the digital divide through provisions of equipment and its associated technology for young people without addressing its underlying drivers is a rather simplistic approach for policy makers to adopt. Section 6 provides a conclusion to our paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Young adults at the centre of the digital revolution and social change

In the field of Indonesian studies, the dominating discussion concerning ICT is on examining the relationship between the digital revolution and social change in Indonesia. Lim (2003, 284) noted the “coincident” role of the Internet and Internet cafes in greasing the momentum of the Reform movement that saw the end of Suharto’s 32 year reign in 1998. Despite the fact that only 1 per cent of the population were using the Internet in 1998, the emergence of the Internet and Internet cafes facilitated their users to connect with the wider civil society. Lim highlighted the transformative role played by Internet cafes (Ind: warung Internet) which not only provided a virtual space for the exchange of information, but also offered a physical space where people could meet and networks could be built. In line with Lim’s argument, Hill and Sen (2007, 133) also highlighted the Internet’s role and “its articulation into the political democratisation” in Indonesia. They proposed that the Internet offered a novel and effective way to communicate with the public, making it a useful tool to opposition groups wanting to challenge the New Order regime and to subsequently foster electoral democracy in the country. Liu (2011) critically examined the notion of the Internet as a ‘democratic enclave’ that was left uncontrolled by the New Order Regime through a comparative lens alongside the case of Singapore and Malaysia. These studies have been pivotal in understanding the role of the Internet in Indonesia’s recent development.

While the symbolic relationship between the digital revolution and masses of youth in fuelling socio-political change has been extensively reviewed (Hill & Sen, 2007; Kluver & Banerjee, 2005; Wong, 2001), there has been no attempt to specifically frame the demographic aspect of Indonesia’s current age structure against the coincidental appearance of the digital revolution and political reforms. Having a large proportion of young people in the population serves to accelerate the spread of new vectors of communication because they are relatively more adept in embracing such technologies than are older generations (Abbot, 2011; Fuller, 2011; Kalathil & Boag, 2003; Wheeler, 2009). As demonstrated in the case of the Middle East, having a youth bulge has enhanced the enabling power of the World Wide Web to facilitate social and political change.
In Indonesia, the socio-demographic characteristics of the 61 million strong cohorts of young adults aged 20-34 (Statistics Indonesia, 2011b) are conducive for ICT adoption. The strategic importance of these cohorts is underlined by their marked achievements of literacy and education relative to the older cohorts. Being an archipelago consisting of diverse ethnic groups and languages, the degree to which members of a particular cohort are able to communicate in a common language might be interpreted as a sign of their potential to be ‘wired and ‘connected’. Figure 1 illustrates that relative to older cohorts, the ability to communicate in Bahasa Indonesia among our cohorts of interest is almost universal. On the contrary, however, the experience and extent of engagement of individuals in different segments of the cohorts in the new participatory space facilitated by ICT is unlikely to be universal. This condition mirrors the situations in the many parts of the developing regions of the world where within-country information inequities remain pervasive.

Figure 1 Population Census 2010: Population of Indonesia by Age Groups and Indonesian Language Ability

Source: Population Census 2010 (Statistics Indonesia 2011c)

To date, studies on digital divide concerning Indonesia have focused primarily on its inter-countries or its inter-regional dimensions. For example, Srinuan et al. (2010)
examines the role of GDP per capita, the urban proportion of population, the
competition level of the telecommunications market, and the independent regulator, in
explaining the digital divide for a group of ASEAN countries, including Indonesia. Large
country-wide initiatives, such as the Meaningful Broadband Project of the Indonesia
Group against Digital Divide organisation, also tend to operate at reducing inter-regional
inequality in access to ICT via infrastructure investment and development (Digital Divide
Institute, 2013). Primarily because of the lack of large representative survey data, very
little is known about the socio-demographic nature of the digital divide and the ensuing
information and knowledge divide within Indonesia.

Only a few studies have examined the characteristics and usage patterns of
Internet users within Indonesia from a socio-demographic perspective. These studies
tend to be limited in scope, for example using only a university student sample (Wahid,
2007), or focusing only on users of Internet cafes (Wahid et al., 2006; Furuholt et al.,
2008). Young people’s use of new media has also been investigated by a number of
anthropological studies. In a study of 56 young Internet users in Yogyakarta, Slama
(2010) examines how Internet chatting has become an integral part of the urban youth
culture. Young women’s engagement with both online media and mobile phones in
Muslim Southeast Asia, was also investigated by Nillan (2012). While these studies
have generated important theoretical insights on the dynamic relationship between
young people, the digital revolution, and social change in Indonesia, they still involve
little discussion on the nature and the extent of the digital divide among the millions of
young people in the country.

Conceptualising the digital divide among young adults in Indonesia

The literature on digital divide has evolved since it was first conceptualised in the
early 1990s. The term digital divide was initially used to describe unequal access to
computer and Internet among individuals, communities, and countries (Warschauer,
2010). Since its first inception, the scholarship on digital divide has moved away from
the simplistic binary measures of individuals with or without access to ICT (Riggins &
Dewan, 2005; Warschauer, 2007; Warschauer, 2010). For example, in analysing
information inequality among American youth, Lenhart and Horrigan (2003) argue that
the divide is better conceptualised as a spectrum with a continuum of both frequency
and patterns of access and use of digital technology. This ranges from very frequent
users, through intermittent users, to those who have little access or have never used
digital technologies. Along this line, there is a subsequent shift in focus in the literature:
from one that heavily concentrates in examining whether people have physical access
to ICT (first order digital divide), to another where the focus is examining whether
people have the skills and knowledge to be effective users of digital information and
technology (second order or secondary digital divide, and digital/knowledge inequalities)
(Hargittai, 2002; Amoretti & Casula, 2009; Warschauer, 2010). Such shift in
concentration is attributed to the so-called normalisation of the Internet, a gradual
process whereby mobile phones and the Internet become more affordable, easier to
access, and are adopted widely across societies (Norris, 2001; Amoretti & Casula,
2009).

Studies that measure how proxies of social divide underlie information inequalities
are predominantly based on data from the US and other industrial countries (Hargittai,
2002; Cheong, 2007; Galácz & Smahel, 2007; Martin & Robinson, 2007). These studies
identified common socio-demographic factors behind the first and second-order digital
divide, such as, age, gender, income, education level, race and geographic location.
However, the level of significance and magnitude of influence of each of the variable
tend to vary across countries. For example, in the US in 2006 where normalisation of
the Internet was already well under-way, the gender gap in Internet adoption was quite
small at 2 per cent. But in Singapore, another country with relatively high Internet
penetration, the gender gap was larger at 14 per cent (Galácz & Smahel, 2007).

Given the dearth of data-driven perspectives on the socio-demographic nature of the
digital divide from developing nations, the objective of our paper is to examine the
nature of first and second-order digital divide among young adults in Greater Jakarta –
the most urbanised region in Indonesia. Our conceptual framework is built upon the
theories on the social stratification and normalisation of technology adoption (Rodgers,
2003; Norris, 2001). Specifically, we test the proposition that the differentials in
technology and new media adoption and use in our target population is essentially a
reflection of the underlying social divide (Warschauer, 2001). Under this hypothesis,
digital technologies have influenced the lives of many, but young adults in different
segments of the society will be exposed to very different experiences depending on the
resources at their command. To measure the extent of normalisation, we test whether
the size of the gender and education gap in mobile phone ownership and weekly internet use is smaller among respondents in younger age groups than those in their mid 30s.

**DATA AND METHODS**

**Data**

This paper stems from an ongoing project that examines numerous dimensions of transition to adulthood in Greater Jakarta, a metropolis of nearly 10 million people (Statistics Indonesia, 2011a). Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 3,006 men and women aged 20-34 living in Jakarta and in the adjacent cities of Bekasi and Tangerang. The interviews used a standardised questionnaire to collect a wide range of information on young adults’ demographic and social characteristics, as well as information about their past and current education and work experience. In addition, information was also collected on attitudes and values, as well as use of Internet and other media.

To ensure a representative sample, the sampling procedure involved a two-stage cluster sample using the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) method. Firstly, sixty Kelurahan (Urban Villages) were selected using PPS and then five neighbourhoods (Rukun Tetangga) were chosen within each selected Kelurahan by systematic random sampling. The 300 selected RT were then censured and a sample of eligible respondents (aged 20-34) was selected by random sampling from this census.

In the second stage of the survey, one year after the initial survey, a quota sample of survey respondents was randomly selected to participate in further in-depth interviews. This qualitative data collection was carried out under a primary objective to obtain further insights into the dynamics and life patterns of young adults. The underlying research themes in this data collection revolved around challenges relating to education, employment, social relations, marriage, sexuality, religion, politics, digital technologies, and migration that young adults face in their life experiences. The initial sample design involved randomly choosing 126 respondents representing each sex, three age groups, and three education categories. For this particular paper, we
analysed interview findings for the 38 male and 42 female respondents who were successfully interviewed.

**Methods**

We employ a range of methods to analyse digital divide (in terms of access) and second order digital inequalities. We use descriptive statistics to examine the broad patterns in mobile phone ownership, weekly access of Internet via mobile phone owners, access to Internet via any location/devices, frequency of Internet exposure among all Internet users, and Internet access points among our respondents.

We test the bivariate relationship between the socio-demographic groupings of respondents against 1) mobile phone ownership and 2) weekly Internet access via mobile phones. Chi-square statistics are employed to test the strength of the relationship between these measures and the socio-demographic correlates of age-group, gender, and educational attainment.

To follow, we measure the extent in which age, sex, education, and current activity predicts ICT adoption in a multivariate framework. Here, we use step-wise logistic regression models to examine the same dependent variables as in the bivariate exercise: 1) the likelihood of mobile phone ownership, 2) the likelihood of accessing the Internet at least once a week among mobile phone owners.

To delve deeper into the issue of second order digital divide, we model likelihood of accessing the Internet for a list of purposes. Here, we ran the regression to predict Internet use for a total eleven purposes. Out of the many potential uses of the Internet, the eleven reasons that we asked respondents were shortlisted to best represent the broader research themes of how young adults navigate their transition to work (for example using Internet in job search), their transition to marriage (dating, online social networks), and how religion affects their daily life. We acknowledge that there are other important potential uses of the Internet that we did not cover in our survey, such as online games, which is rather popular among students, downloading music, visiting pornographic sites, online shopping, online chatting such as Yahoo Messenger, and Skype just to name a few.

Finally, we use results from our multivariate analyses to graphically depict the variations in mobile phones ownership and weekly Internet access adoptions between
respondents in different socio-demographic segments. These two measures may be used as proxies for the first order digital divide. To gauge into the variations in the predicted probability of ICT adoption across socio-demographic groupings, we first add an interaction term between age and sex, and on a separate regression, another interaction term between age and education. Plotting our multivariate analyses in such a way helps to understand the extent to which how the competing theories of normalisation and stratification of ICT adoption may apply among young adults in Greater Jakarta.

RESULTS

Mobile Phones: Ownership and Access to the Internet

A relatively high percentage of respondents, 85 per cent, indicated that they owned a mobile phone. However, as shown in Table 1, there was considerable variation in phone ownership according to sex, age, and highest education level. Males were significantly more likely to own a mobile compared to females, and younger respondents were also more likely to own a phone compared to their older counterparts. Ownership of mobile phones was strongly related to education. For example, only 60 per cent of respondents educated only up to primary school owned a mobile phone, compared with 97 per cent of those with post-school qualifications. Although ownership of mobile phones increases with education, it is clear that mobile phone usage is widespread even among those in the lower socio-economic groups. Having a mobile phone is no longer a unique privilege of the urban middle class.

Surprisingly, the majority of mobile phone owners, two thirds, never accessed the Internet through their phones (Table 1). This low percentage could either be because their phones do not have Internet capabilities, or because they do not access Internet despite having 3G mobile phones. As the likelihood of Internet access via mobile phones increases with education level, it is plausible that young adults from lower socio-economic backgrounds tend to have the cheaper and more basic types of mobile phones with no Internet capabilities.
Table 1 Percentage of respondents who own a mobile phone and who access Internet via a mobile at least once week, by sex, age and highest level of education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Own a mobile phone</th>
<th>Access Internet through mobile at least once a week (among mobile phone owners)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
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<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-35</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest education level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school or less</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior high school</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior high school</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Differences significant at p<0.05 using a chi-square test

Source: Greater Jakarta Transition to Adulthood Survey 2010

Table 2 describes mobile phone ownership and access to Internet via mobile phones in a multivariate framework. We utilise a step-wise logistic regression to model two outcomes. In Model 1, we estimate the likelihood of respondents owning a mobile phone. In Model 2, the dependent variable is the likelihood of Internet access via mobile phones among those respondents who owned a mobile phone. We run five sub-models for each outcome. For example, Model 1a examines how sex influences the likelihood of owning a mobile phone. In Model 1b, we add age into the regression along with sex. Unlike the bivariate analysis in Table 1, where age was grouped into three categories, here we use single years of age as an explanatory/control variable. In Model 1c, our three control variables are sex, age and highest completed education. In Model 1d, we control for sex, age, and current activity. In Model 1e, we estimate the effects of sex, age, education, and current activity on the likelihood of owning a mobile phone.

In the first three models (1a-1c) we find that men are significantly more likely to own a mobile phone. However, once we control for the current activity, sex is no longer
a significant predictor of mobile phone ownership. Such results could be explained by the correlation between sex and age with the activity variable. For example, the vast majority of those who are not in the labour force (90 per cent) are women.

Age is a significant predictor of both mobile phone ownership and Internet use via mobile. As expected, even after controlling for sex, education, and activity, younger people are more likely to own a mobile phone, and among mobile owners, are more likely to access the Internet via their mobile phone.

Both Model 1 (owning a mobile) and Model 2 (using Internet via mobile) show a strong education gradient in the odds of owning a mobile and of using it for accessing the Internet. In Model 1c, holding everything else constant, the odds of mobile phone ownership for a university graduate is almost twenty seven times greater than the odds for someone with primary school education or lower. Among those who own a mobile phone, the odds of accessing the Internet via mobile phones is forty nine times greater for university-educated respondents relative to those with primary school education.

Adding activity into the model slightly reduces the effects of highest education level on mobile phone ownership and use of Internet via mobile phones, but the effects of education remain significant. Not surprisingly, controlling for sex, age and highest education, students stand out as the group with the highest digital attachment as measured by these two outcomes.
Table 2. Predictors of owning a mobile phone and of using Internet via mobile phone (Odds ratios)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1a</th>
<th>Model 1b</th>
<th>Model 1c</th>
<th>Model 1d</th>
<th>Model 1e</th>
<th>Model 2a</th>
<th>Model 2b</th>
<th>Model 2c</th>
<th>Model 2d</th>
<th>Model 2e</th>
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<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Male (ref)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td>0.58***</td>
<td>0.69***</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.36***</td>
<td>1.21*</td>
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<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
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<td>0.93***</td>
<td>0.96***</td>
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<td>0.87***</td>
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<td>0.89***</td>
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<td><strong>Highest education level</strong></td>
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<td>Primary school or below (ref)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junior secondary school</td>
<td>1.74***</td>
<td>1.83***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior secondary school</td>
<td>5.79***</td>
<td>5.67***</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.95***</td>
<td>7.93***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Certificate/Diploma</td>
<td>22.64***</td>
<td>20.14***</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.03***</td>
<td>26.27***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>26.61***</td>
<td>21.92***</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.99***</td>
<td>39.25***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Activity status</strong></td>
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<td>Employed (ref)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.76*</td>
<td>0.72*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.08***</td>
<td>1.97***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Not in the labour force</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline</strong></td>
<td>8.33***</td>
<td>55.75***</td>
<td>7.16***</td>
<td>36.94***</td>
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<td><strong>N</strong></td>
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<td>2,987</td>
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<td>2,987</td>
<td>2,985</td>
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<td>2,543</td>
<td>2,541</td>
<td>2,543</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Source: Greater Jakarta Transition to Adulthood Survey 2010
Internet: Exposure, Purpose of Use, And Access Points

In this section, we examine the exposure to Internet, access points, as well as the purpose and of Internet use among users in our sample. Our survey indicates that a large proportion of young adults remain disenfranchised from the Internet. About 50 per cent of male and 65 per cent of female respondents had never accessed the Internet.

At large, the variance in the exposure of young people in different segments of the society to the Internet technology is influenced by their age-group and education. Younger cohorts are more likely to be exposed to the Internet than the older ones. For example, among the youngest age group in our sample of 20-24, about 35 per cent accessed the Internet on a daily basis but a considerable 41 per cent admitted to never accessing it. In comparison, among the oldest age group of 30-34, the proportion of daily users is significantly lower (16%) while the corresponding figure for non-users is much higher (74%). As was the case with mobile phone ownership, education, a proxy of social class and upward mobility also acts as a strong predictor of Internet exposure. Among those who have only completed primary or junior high school, over 90 per cent never used the Internet. In contrast, 70 per cent of respondents with university degrees reported using the Internet on a daily basis. Our multivariate examination of how age, education and sex predict weekly Internet access will be discussed in the next section.

Aside from looking at the variance in exposure to Internet among young adults, we also briefly explored whether recent developments in mobile phone technology have altered the landscape of Internet access points, and ultimately reduced the demand for Internet cafes. Indeed, our survey indicates that the access point used by most people to access the Internet was their mobile phones, with around 28 per cent using this means at least at some time. Internet cafes were the second most popular access point, although the frequency of access here was typically less concentrated.

Among the Internet users in our survey, we examine how the Internet is used— that is for what purposes. Figure 2 shows the frequency of using the Internet for various purposes, by order of popularity. The three most popular uses were for online social networking, e-mail and to search for general information. Our findings are in line with
the aforementioned popularity of online social networks in Indonesia as reported by the media. A number of IT observers have attributed the popular acceptance of online social networks to several factors. These include a receptive social culture that highly ranks solidarity, mutual aid, sharing and openness (as opposed to privacy), the related tendency for young Indonesians to eagerly follow social trends, the rise of affordable mobile phone technology, and the technical features of online social networks such as Facebook that is free and user friendly (Masna, 2011; Safitri, 2011; Putra, 2011).

Figure 2 Frequency of using the Internet for various purposes (among Internet users in the sample)

In our subsequent analysis on the purpose of Internet use, the determinants of using the Internet for the various reasons as listed in Figure 2 were further explored using logistic regression (Table 3). In each of our models, the dependent variable was equal to 1 if the respondent indicated that he/she used the Internet for that specific purpose at least on a weekly basis, and zero otherwise. Note that nine out of the eleven models are significant at the 1 per cent level. Note that we limit our sample to Internet users.

The model predicting the effects of socio-demographic characteristics on using the Internet for dating purposes was significant at the 5 per cent level, while the model predicting use of Internet for Religious purposes was significant at the 10 per cent level. Due to the small number of individuals with junior high school, or below, education who
used the Internet, the education variable was regrouped into three categories so that the lowest category encompassed all those educated up to senior high school or below.

The results from Table 3 show that holding everything else constant, among Internet users there were little or only weak differences in the purpose of using the Internet among male and female respondents. As explained earlier however, this could be partly due to a gender effect being subsumed by the activity variable, but even bivariate analysis (not shown here) confirms the absence of a gender effect. The only case where a strong gender effect was evident was that women were less likely to look up general information.

In terms of age, the strongest age difference was that younger people were more likely to be using the Internet for social networking, job searching, and also for study related reasons.
Table 3. Logistic Regression of Purpose of Internet Use (among Internet users)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>E-mail</th>
<th>Social networks</th>
<th>Religious websites</th>
<th>Western news and opinion</th>
<th>National news</th>
<th>Job searching</th>
<th>Stock market, economic trends</th>
<th>Work-related projects</th>
<th>Study related</th>
<th>Other general information</th>
<th>Dating</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Male (ref)</td>
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<td>--</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.80*</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.70*</td>
<td>0.78*</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.73**</td>
<td>0.62*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
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<td>1.00</td>
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<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.02</td>
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<td>0.91***</td>
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<td><strong>Highest education level</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior high school or below (ref)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Certificate</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>2.49***</td>
<td>2.57***</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>2.28***</td>
<td>1.64***</td>
<td>1.79***</td>
<td>1.73**</td>
<td>1.37*</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>2.01***</td>
<td>1.21</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Activity status</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed (ref)</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>5.58***</td>
<td>1.79**</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.76***</td>
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<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>2.64***</td>
<td>3.96***</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1.58**</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.64**</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>18.82***</td>
<td>3.16***</td>
<td>1.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not in the labour force</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.63**</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.65**</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
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<td>19.05***</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.34**</td>
<td>2.52**</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.33**</td>
<td>4.08***</td>
<td>2.22*</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
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<td>1,233</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>1,233</td>
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<td>1,233</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall model significance</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>&lt;0.027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Source: Greater Jakarta Transition to Adulthood Survey 2010
In terms of education, those with higher education were more likely to use the Internet for every purpose although there was only a weak relationship for looking at religious websites, for study-related reasons, and for seeking romance. One of the strongest effects was for email usage. The odds of someone with a university degree using the Internet for email were nearly seven times the odds of someone with senior high school education or below.

Another variable that was related to the purpose of Internet usage was a person’s activity. Not surprisingly people who were unemployed were significantly more likely to use the Internet for job searching compared to others, and students were more likely to use the Internet for study related purposes. Relative to respondents in the rest of the activity categories, students also stood out as being significantly more likely to use the Internet for emails, for online social networks, and to seek other general information.

Visualising the digital divide

Are younger people across different segments of the society exhibiting signs of normalisation in ICT adoption? Indeed, our preceding multivariate analyses have established a negative relationship between age and ICT adoption. A graphical representation of these analyses gives a clearer depiction on the magnitude of the first order digital divide across age groups.

In Figure 3, we plot the predicted probability of owning a mobile phone based on a logistic regression with age, sex, education, and an interaction term between age and sex as control variables. The lines in the graph depict how the interaction between sex and age predicts mobile phone ownership among respondents of an average education qualification. Here, we can see that the gender gap in mobile phone ownership has somewhat disappeared among younger respondents. A 20 year old has statistically equal probability (about ninety per cent) of owning a mobile phone whether the individual is male or female. In contrast, the difference in the probability among a 34 year male and female is about 10 percentage points.

While the pattern of mobile phone ownership has seemingly undergone the process of normalisation among males and females in our younger respondents, the
patterns of inequalities of mobile phone ownership by education are showing a weaker convergence (Figure 4). For a 20 year old, the probability of owning a mobile phone is reduced from almost certain if he/she possesses tertiary qualifications, to just 70 per cent if he/she did not complete junior high school.

Figure 3 Predicted probability of mobile phone ownership: interaction between age and sex

![Figure 3](image)

Figure 4 Predicted probability of mobile phone ownership: interaction between age and education

![Figure 4](image)

Source: Greater Jakarta Transition to Adulthood Survey 2010

The patterns towards normalisation evident in mobile phone ownership are quite distinct to the patterns of Internet adoption. We model the likelihood of weekly Internet assets via any location/device with interaction terms between age and sex (Figure 4) and between age and education (Figure 5). As in the case of mobile phone ownership, Figure 5 shows that the probability of internet access for a 20 year female is not significantly different to her male counterparts. However, as opposed to the relatively little variations in mobile phone ownership across men and women across the age span in Figure 2, there is a much sharper decline in the probability of weekly Internet access as age increases. On one hand, similar to the amount of the
gender gap in phone ownership, the gender gap in the probability of weekly internet access at age 34 is also around 10 percentage points. However, the predicted probabilities for weekly Internet access for both males and females in this oldest age category are much lower than their corresponding probabilities for mobile phone ownership.

The results of our analysis in Figure 6 are in line with the stratification thesis. Across age groups, the gap in weekly Internet access between respondents with senior high schools and tertiary qualifications are declining, but the gap between them and those of lower education attainment is persistently large. At around 10 per cent, the probability of someone with junior high school qualification or lower to access the Internet on a weekly basis is low and constant at any age. Considering that respondents with junior high school qualifications or lower, made up one-third of our sample, these statistics suggest that a large segment of young adults in Greater Jakarta remain disenfranchised from the information revolution associated with the Internet.

Figure 5 Predicted probability of using Internet at least once a week: interaction between age and sex
DISCUSSION

Our survey findings suggest that in spite of near universal ownership and use of mobile phones, 60 per cent of young adults have never accessed the Internet. Among those who did use the Internet, either through a mobile phone, an Internet café, or through an office or home computer, the majority, 85 per cent, used it very frequently, either daily or several times a week. Our findings also indicate that mobile phones were the most common access point for using the Internet among young adults. Among these users, the most common purpose was for social networking. The reasons were similar by sex or age, but education and employment were decisive factors for turning to the Internet for information. Just as education is a strong predictor of mobile phone ownership, higher levels of education are also associated with increasing likelihood of Internet usage.

From our in-depth interviews, we found cases supporting a picture often portrayed by the popular media: that of Indonesian young adults as avid and proficient Internet users. Yet, on the other end of the spectrum, we were also confronted by the stark contrast of respondents with very little knowledge of the Internet and its applications. We found that women in the 30-34 age bracket with lower education and economic status were the least likely to have used mobile
phones and Internet technology than their younger, better educated cohorts. But even respondents at the lowest end of use on the spectrum, are very aware of mobile phones and Internet technologies. Even when they hardly access these technologies personally, they are exposed through other people in their households and among their friends and neighbours:

No, don’t mention computers, I have never even touched a mobile phone. Rather, I hardly touch one; I don’t like pressing the buttons. My child is normally the one who presses the buttons. On Saturdays, when my husband is off work, he asks, ‘do you want to make a phone call?’... (so he would make the phone call and) when it is connected, he gives the phone to me (Lasmini, 33, female, married, primary school graduate, housewife).

I now can use a mobile phone. Thanks to my child who taught me (how to use it)...Some people call me but not every day. I also make phone calls but very rarely. I don’t call someone every day, only when I need to. My credit would be finished and I would rather use it (the money) to buy snacks for my poor child (Ijah, 32, married, junior high school graduate, housewife).

At the policy level, results from our study highlight the deficiencies in the current initiatives to combat information and knowledge inequalities in the country. For example, the major initiative of Meaningful Broadband Project reflects heavy technological determinism undertones (Habibie, 2012). But as illustrated by the above quotes, simply giving someone a mobile phone does not warrant that he or she will know how to use it effectively or will be able to afford to use it on a regular basis.

At the theoretical level, our findings from both the survey and in-depth interviews are in line with the literature suggesting that young, male, and highly educated individuals are the first in line when it comes to adopting new technologies (Rogers, 2003). Despite deriving a sample from Greater Jakarta, the most urbanised part of Indonesia, our study suggests that the digital and the ensuing information/knowledge divide remains prevalent even among the age groups who are most likely to be the early adopters of technology. On one hand, when measuring the gender gap of mobile phone ownership, our results are in support of the normalisation thesis. On the other hand, although there is weak convergence, the gaps in mobile phone ownership across young adults in different education segments remain considerable. Measuring the digital divide in terms of weekly access to the Internet further supports the social stratification thesis. Although the gender gap is smaller among younger respondents, large and persistent gaps in
Internet access continue to occur between people in the lower end of the education spectrum to those in the mid and higher range. In sum, education, rather than gender, plays a pivotal role in digital inequalities among young adults in our sample.

On this note, we reflect upon the limitations presented by our findings. First, due to the cross-sectional nature of our dataset, we cannot ascertain how much of the observed decline in digital inequalities is due to period or cohort effects. Second, while social inequalities affect the degree of access to and use of ICTs, the causality also goes the other way. As proposed by Mossberger et al. (2003), differential use of ICTs may exacerbate social inequalities and create new forms of disadvantage in society. The limitations of our datasets imply that we cannot measure such reverse causality. We advocate for future longitudinal research into digital inequalities in both urban and rural Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

Indonesia presents an interesting case study of how globalisation, the digital revolution, and rapid socio-political change are altering the transition to adulthood in unexpected ways. Through online social networks, young adults build new dimensions of social capital. Their use of the Internet, but perhaps more importantly the messaging capacities of inexpensive mobile phones allow them to build and maintain networks, efficiently conduct job searches, seek romance, and even carry out business to generate income through commercial transactions. Through opening up such gateways of information, the Internet facilitates their ability to navigate school-to-work transitions by tapping into study-related and employment-related information. By facilitating direct access to information, the Internet breaks down person-to-person cultural taboos. It is being used to disseminate information on topics such as reproductive and sexual health but it is also a tool for religious proselytising and the promotion of conservative moralities. By diminishing geographical boundaries and facilitating a culture of instant communication the Internet and mobile phones change the way young adults engage with the world, but there is no assurance that their engagement will be either liberating or healthy. All sorts of messages are crowding the virtual worlds of ideas, beliefs and connectivity. What seems incontrovertible though is that the young adults of today have a very different relation to information than did their parents, and it is equally clear that their
children will be exposed to technological innovations that are beyond our capacity to imagine. That can only mean that the impacts we see today will grow with time.

What is seen today as a socio-technological innovation seems to be well on track to live up to the concept of a ‘digital revolution’ remembering that the digital age is younger than the respondents in this survey since it is generally believed to have begun with the second millennium when computers became a ubiquitous part of production, commerce and communication across the globe. Young Indonesians are still coming to grips with the potential unleashed by such access to information and communication. Every day sees innovations in their personal and social behaviour as they tap the deep pools of information in their management of their learning, working, partnering and spiritual lives.

As evident through the results of our study, most important in this change, though, is the fact that a large proportion of young people are still disenfranchised from the socially important benefits that the technologies offer. Digital technologies have influenced the lives of many, but young people in different segments of the society will be exposed to very different experiences depending on the resources at their command. The challenge for the nation is how to open the door wider to allow all young adults to enter and participate in this new social space. By examining the socio-demographic drivers of the digital divide, our study advocates the calls for a more holistic approach in addressing information and knowledge inequalities (Warschauer, 2010; Hargittai, 2002). Simply ensuring that everyone in the country has the physical and technical access to ICT, through say PC and broadband provisions, without advocating for training and educational support at the same time, is likely to be a futile policy option.

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Some Traditional Javanese Values in NSM: From God to Social Interaction

Elisabet Titik Murtisari

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines a number of central traditional Javanese values in social interaction and explicates some of them into cultural scripts using the Natural Semantics Metalanguage (NSM). This explication method, developed by Anna Wierzbicka, relies on the use of basic universally lexicalized concepts termed ‘semantic primes’ to break down complex concepts into simpler ones and is useful to avoid ethnocentricism. With this approach, it is shown how intricate Javanese notions, such as narimo ‘accepting’ and ethok-ethok ‘dissimulation’, may be effectively described using simple vocabulary without lacking in rigour, which would be very helpful for outsiders to understand more about the culture.

Keywords: Javanese values, cultural scripts, social interaction, NSM.

Introduction

This paper examines a number of central traditional Javanese values in social interaction and explicates some of them into cultural scripts using the Natural Semantics Metalanguage (NSM). The Javanese have a life philosophy that heavily emphasizes peace and harmony. For the sake of being tentrem (‘peaceful’) and rukun (‘in harmony with others’), they often conceal and deny themselves, and this has often been understood as something ‘hypocritical’. The values we shall pursue here include narima/trima ‘accepting’, the ‘self-awareness’ value cluster (eling ‘mindful’, waspada ‘alert’ and sadhar ‘aware’, alus ‘refined’), the ‘sensitivity’ value cluster (such as tanggap ‘able to read signs’ and tepa salira\(^5\) ‘sensitive to others’ feelings and act accordingly’), ngalah ‘to give in’ and ethok-ethok ‘to

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\(^5\) Also spelled as slira, which is an abbreviated version of salira.
dissimulate/pretend⁶. All these concepts are fundamental to the traditional Javanese worldview which centres around God and the quest to keep a balance with the cosmos. For this reason, I will first discuss this underlying system of beliefs, before attempting to transcribe the values into cultural scripts.

The NSM technique, which was developed by the Polish-Australian scholar, Anna Wierzbicka, would help articulate the cultural norms in a way that is ‘clear, precise, and accessible to cultural insiders and to cultural outsiders alike’ (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004: 153). It relies on the use of basic universally lexicalized concepts termed ‘semantic primes’ to break down complex concepts into simpler ones. This technique allows one to explicate cultural concepts without using ethnocentric terms (e.g. the use of English ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ in defining politeness). The NSM method, as Riemer (2006: 3) has pointed out, cannot guarantee the success of its definitions. However, such a pitfall can be avoided with adequate cultural information and proper analysis.

The following is a list of words whose meanings are considered to be semantic primes (Goddard 2002: 14):

Substantives: I, YOU, SOMEONE/PERSON, SOMETHING/THING, PEOPLE, BODY
Relational substantives: KIND, PART
Determiners: THIS, THE SAME, OTHER/ELSE
Quantifiers: ONE, TWO, SOME, ALL, MUCH/MANY
Evaluators: GOOD, BAD
Descriptors: BIG, SMALL
Mental/experiential predicates: THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR
Speech: SAY, WORDS, TRUE
Actions, events, movement: DO, HAPPEN, MOVE
Existence and possession: THERE IS/EXIST, HAVE
Life and death: LIVE, DIE
Time: WHEN/TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME TIME, MOMENT
Space: WHERE/PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE, TOUCHING
Logical concepts: NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF
Augmentor, intensifier: VERY, MORE
Similarity: LIKE (AS, HOW)

In addition to the semantic primes, I will also use more complex expressions, such as ‘make’, ‘give’, and ‘lose’ as ‘semantic molecules’. A semantic molecule is ‘a complex lexical meaning which functions as an intermediate unit in the structure of

⁶Ethok-ethok may also indicate a state and thus may behave like an adjective.
other, more complex concepts’ (Goddard, 2006: 1). I shall not explicate any particular molecule, as this study is more concerned with the definition of Javanese cultural values.

In developing the cultural scripts, I will also use my own knowledge as a Javanese and a native speaker of the language. I lived as a Javanese monoglot until I learned Indonesian at school when I was seven and have lived among traditional Javanese people most of my life in Salatiga, Central Java. I therefore consider myself a reliable informant for the culture, especially of the Javanese who live in Yogyakarta and Central Java (excluding areas such as Tegal and Banyumas). I will also make substantial use of Geertz’s (1976) work. While his division of traditional Javanese society has been abandoned by many, his explanation on their traditional values, especially as related to social interaction, remains indispensable.

**God: The Centre**

Basically a religious people, the Javanese have welcomed various different beliefs from other parts of Asia into their life. Hinduism, Buddhism and finally Islam were the major religions that helped shape the basic indigenous values. So central is the belief in God to the traditional Javanese culture that Mulder (1985: 19-20) points out that it becomes the main source of the people’s spiritual values. The Javanese have a holistic view that whatever exists in the world is a part of a larger unit. This unit is in harmonious existence in which all the parts exist and happen following a fixed formula called *ukum pinesthi* (Mulder, 1985: 19), which literally means “law of destiny”.\(^7\) Further, in this whole unit, there is a centre that covers all the parts called *Hyang Suksma*, which Mulder (2005: 33) has glossed as ‘The All-Soul’. This central spiritual being is seen as the cause of the existence of everything, and is the most secret and basic among others. It is this centre that is often called ‘God’ (1985: 20).

With *ukum pinesthi*, all entities have to move in a particular way that has been designed to maintain harmony. Life is seen as an inevitable thing each human being has to endure with the particular *titah* ‘destiny’ God has designed for the individual. This philosophy is clearly manifested in the expression “*Urip kuwi kudhu dilakoni, sapira abote*”, which roughly means we have to live/endure our life, no matter how

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\(^7\)My own translation. It is also glossed as ‘law of necessity’ in Mulder (2005: 3), but this translation does not really reflect the meaning of *pinesthi*, which refers to ‘something that determines’. 
hard it is. Another expression that echoes this wisdom is ‘Urip kuwi mung sakderma\(^8\) nglakoni’ – life is but a duty, to live what is already given to you. In addition, *ukum pinesthi* also applies to things. There are reasons why a river or a mountain exists at a particular place and not somewhere else people would prefer them to be. Therefore, to make numerous changes to nature is discouraged because it may disrupt the cosmic balance and may invite a disaster. On this basis, *ukum pinesth*i can be transcribed as follows:

**Ukum pinesthi**
(a) God wants people and things to exist/live in a particular way
(b) People and things have to exist/live in this way because of this
(c) Something bad will happen if things and people do not exist/live in this way

Everyone also has the moral responsibility to maintain the harmony and the existence of the whole larger unit, and therefore they have to accept their ‘destiny’. A good Javanese, therefore, must also be able to be *narima/trima* ‘accepting’.\(^9\) He who is *narima/trima* ‘accept[s] his station in life and his fate with an attitude of grateful acceptance’ (Mulder, 2005: 53). Here fate, class, hierarchy, gender and events are seen as inevitable (Geertz, 1976: 241).

The concept’s significance as a “compliance” with God is strongly reflected in the common Javanese saying “narima ing pandhum”, which means “accept what God has given to you sincerely/without resisting”. The attitude of *narima/trima* is often associated with adversity, for instance, when someone is mistreated or suffers from a misfortune. In such a situation, one who is *narima/trima* would be reconciled with what has happened to him/her without grumbling (although he/she may have complained before achieving this state of heart). *Narima/trima* “brings peace through the acceptance of the envitable” (Geertz, 1976: 241).

An example of the attitude of *narima/trima* is strongly reflected in the following story of Sujud Sutrisno, a street busker whose profile has been uploaded to the

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\(^8\)The expression *sakderma* consists of *sak*, which means ‘as much/little/big as’, and *derma/darma*, which means ‘duty’, which is derived from the place God has given them in life.

\(^9\)Geertz (1976: 241) glosses *narima/trima* as ‘to acquiesce’. However, a caveat must be made with this translation, as while both concepts mean ‘to comply or accept without protest’, *narima/trima* does not have any connotation of ‘reluctance’ as the English verb may indicate. The Javanese expression also indicates more of a state rather than an action, which seems to strengthen what it refers to: a state of the heart, an attitude and often a disposition.
Indonesian Wikipedia. With his belief in “narimo in pandum”, he accepts whatever is given to him for his 'gig' without grumbling:

*Sujud sangat dihormati oleh pengamen jalanan dan seniman lainnya. Sujud berkata bahwa kendala utama dalam karir bermusiknya (mengamen) ialah hujan. Setiap kali hujan turun maka itu akan menghambat dirinya dalam “bekerja dari pintu ke pintu” karena bermain kendang sambil memegang payung adalah hal yang sulit. Mantan anggota Teater Alam ini terbilang sebagai seniman yang cukup kondang. ia pernah tampil sepanjang dengan musisi kelas dunia.*

*Sudagaimana orang Jawa sejati, Sujud percaya akan salah satu Falsafah Jawa yaitu "nrimo ing pandum" yang berarti menerima suratan takdir dengan kesabaran dan kerendahan hati. Menurut Sujud, takdir atas dirinya berada di tangan Tuhan. Setiap kali mengakhiri permainan musiknya, dia tidak pernah berharap bayaran, namun menerima apa yang orang lain berikan secara ikhlas. (my own emphasis)*

(Sujud is highly regarded among other street singers and artists. He said that the main problem in his musical career is rain. Everytime it rains, it makes it difficult for him to "work from door to door", for playing drums while holding an umbrella is difficult. This former member of ‘Teater Alam' {a local theatrical community} can be considered a relatively famous artist. He has performed on stage with world class musicians.)

*Asa true Javanese, Sujud believes in the Javanese philosophy "nrimo ing pandum" which means accepting destiny with patience and humility. According to him, his destiny is in God’s hands. Each time he finishes his musical gig, whenever expects to receive payment, but just sincerely accepts what others give. (my own emphasis)*

On the basis of the previous considerations, the expression *narima/terima* can be explicating into the following cultural transcript. Note that point (i) is to represent the socio-cultural evaluation of the value as something encouraged to be done all the time.

**Narima/trima**
(a) A person can think something like this:
   (b) God wants me to live in a certain way and not in any other way
   (c) I have to live in this way because of this
   (d) It is bad if I think something like this:
      (e) I don’t want this
      (f) I want something else
   (g) When something bad happens to a person, it is good if a person can think something like this.
   (h) This person will not feel something bad because of this. It is good if someone can think something like this all the time.
   (i) It is good if someone can think like this all the time.
Further, in order to be able to be *narima/trima*, one also needs to be *sabar* ‘patient’ and *lila/rila* “to truly let go” in ‘enduring’ his life. According to Geertz (1976: 241), the concept of *sabar* ‘patient’ refers to the absence of eagerness, impatience and passion.¹¹ *Rila/lila*, on the other hand, is based on the view that everything belongs to God and everything that happens in life is His will. One should be *lila/rila* “to truly let go” when he/she loses something or someone or gives things to people. In this sense, the concept *rila/lila* is interchangeable with *ikhlas*, a borrowing from Arabic which means ‘sincere’ or ‘sincerity’. As everything happens according to God’s will, Javanese people also believe that none of them are part of his action or effort, and, hence, *ikhlas* (and likewise *rila/lila*) is a detachment from the material world (Geertz, 1976: 241, see also Mulder, 2005: 66). Here, *rila/lila* also includes one’s attitude towards ‘worldly’ life events and one’s causes. For instance, when I was really concerned because an influential person at my workplace said something not true about me, my mother said “*Lila’na wae. Mung masalah kaya ngono... Ora sah dipikir mengko ndak lara ati*” (‘Let it go. Just a little problem like that.... No need to worry about it – it will only make you feel hurt’). By saying “a little problem”, she did not mean to underestimate the effects of what the person had said about me, but simply because problems in life are not worth being too stressed about, as they are worldly temporary circumstances. The sense of detachment from the worldly is further confirmed by Hadiwijono (1983: 132) on the significance of *rila/lila*:

*Rila* [...] adalah kesediaan untuk berkorban dan menyangkal diri. Barangsiapa yang [rila] ia tidak dibelenggu oleh apa pun yang fana, yang berubah. Sebab ia sadar, bahwa segala sesuatu berada di tangan Sukma Kawekas. Ia dapat kehilangan segala sesuatu tanpa prihatin. [Rila] ialah tindakan ego yang menjauhkan diri dari segala sesuatu yang fana [...]. (To be *rila* [...] is to be willing to sacrifice and deny oneself. Whoever is [rila] is not bound to anything worldly, anything temporary (lit. which can change). Because he realizes that everything is in the hands of God. He can lose anything without feeling sad. *Rila* is the action of an ego who distances himself from anything worldly [...]. (my own translation).

¹¹For the explication of sabar, please see Goddard’s (2001) explication of the concept of *sabar* in Malay culture, which seems to have the same meaning in Javanese.
On the basis of all the above aspects, I could explicate *rila/lila* into the cultural transcript below. Note that point (f) represents its status as a positive value which is encouraged among the traditional Javanese. As we can see later, this point will also be included in other virtues set out in this paper.

### Lila/rila

(a) A person can think something like this when someone loses someone/something, gives something to people, or something bad happens to this person:

(b) All things belong to God and all things happen because God wants them to happen.

(c) This thing/what just happened to me is also not important after I die.

(d) Because of this, it is good if I do not feel bad at all because I do not have this thing any more/because this just happened to me.

(e) If I feel bad because I do not have this thing any more/this happened to me, it is good if I do not think about it any more so I will not feel bad any more.

(f) It is good if a person thinks like this every time this kind of thing happens/one gives something to people.

Geertz points out that the combined values of *ikhlas* (hence *rila/lila*), *sabar* and *narima/trima* are central in order to avoid potential disharmony (1976: 240-1). These three values can lead one to ‘emotional equamity, a certain flatness of affect’ (p. 240). These values work in two ways – inwardly they are an action to control one’s emotions, while outwardly they act as a defence (p. 241). For example, when someone is mistreated by a neighbour, the concept of *narima/trima* and *rila/lila* would help the person to calm down, protect him/her from feeling frustrated or sad and from more troubles (e.g. worsened conflict with the neighbour) by pursuing his case further.

### Values related to ‘awareness’

In order to arrive at the value of *narima/trima*, a sense of ‘awareness’ is crucial. In the first place one needs to *rumangsa* “be aware of/realize” his *titah* ‘destiny’, which includes his or her given place in the community. Those at the lower level of the hierarchy are expected to respect those in a higher position and be subservient to them. The latter, on the other hand, must also realize that their power and position actually belong to God, and therefore they must be humble and strive
not to misuse them. A good person is expected to be able to be aware of himself/herself (biša rumangsā), and this also reflects humility, rather than to be aware of his abilities (rumangsā biša), which reflects pride (Suratmin et al., 1991: 24).

Self-awareness is indeed central in Javanese traditional culture, as evidenced by the frequent use of words such as eling ‘mindful’, waspada ‘on one’s guard/alert/vigilant’ and sometimes sadhar ‘conscious/aware’, which is a borrowing from Arabic and often used interchangeably with eling.12 Quinn summarizes these three expressions as ‘to keep alert and keep one’s guard up’ (1992 : 115). This summary, however, does not clearly reflect the meaning of eling as an awareness of the self. In this case, being eling means that one is mindful of one’s own self, especially in relation to one’s titah ‘destiny’ and God, which entails a large number of moral responsibilities. This significance is clearly reflected in the following excerpt in a blog about people’s lust for power at the blogger’s work place (Alger, 2009):

*Deloken kae wayah gentian posisi ndek kantor, wong bareng padha kasak-kusuk golek gantholan, golek jabatan, golek cedhak karo wong neng duwur pamrihe ya kaduman jabatan. Wis cukup tho nek ngono kuwi, iso dijongko bareng nyekel jabatan sing diarep-arep ora nganti seminggu pingin sing luwih duwur.*

*Wong urip ki mbok eling lan waspada [...].*

Look at what’s happening with the position reshuffles at the office. Everyone is going around secretly trying to gain influence, looking for alliances, looking for positions, [and] approaching heavy-hitters to make sure they’ll get a position. That is enough for one to know they’ll want a higher position not even a week after they get what they want now.

Why can’t you people be eling and waspada in living your life [...].

There is a well-known saying about eling which comes from the highly regarded, legendary, poet, Ranggawarsita (1802-1873): *Begja-begjane kang lali, isih begja kang eling lan waspada*, which literally means, ‘However lucky those who forget may be, those who are eling and waspada are (actually) luckier’. Quinn (1992: 115) has translated it more idiomatically as, ‘However happy those who are lulled into forgetfulness may be, it is always better to be alert and vigilant’. We shall only explicate eling and waspada, as these concepts are more specific to the traditional

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12The expressions eling, waspada and sadhar are also used in their first day to day sense, i.e. ‘remember’, ‘on one’s guard’, and ‘conscious’.
Javanese rather than Arabic-origin *sadhar* ‘conscious/aware’. The concept *eling*, ‘mindful’, may be represented in the following cultural transcript. Point (g) reflects the positive socio-cultural evaluation of *eling* as a value:

*eling*
(a) A person can think something like this:
(b) God wants me to live in a certain way
(c) I have to live in this way because of this
(d) It is good to live in this way
(e) If a person can do this all the time, this person will not want something else
(f) This person will not do something bad because of this
(g) It is good if a person thinks like this all the time

The expression *waspada*, on the other hand, can be explicated as follows. Note that, unlike *eling*, it presupposes a continued action with some duration, which is reflected in the phrase ‘all the time for some time’ by point (a).

*waspada*
(a) A person can think like this all the time for some time:
(b) Things happen.
(c) Something can happen to me and because of this I can think like this:
(d) I don’t want to live like God wants me to live.
(e) I want something else.
(f) I can do something bad because of this.
(g) I don’t want this to happen.
(h) I have to think this all the time so this won’t happen.
(i) It is good if a person can think like this all the time

The Javanese World: Alus and kasar

Javanese people believe that the world consists of the phenomenal *kasar* and the essential *halus/alus* (Mulder, 1980: 15-8). To become a moral and enlightened (*adiluhung*) person, one should move away from the material and phenomenal to one’s essential capacities by training one’s *rasa* (lit. ‘feeling’), which refers to one’s ‘intuitive inner feelings’. For the traditional Javanese, therefore, *rasa* knowledge is superior to rational understanding.

From the above phenomenal-essential notion, the concept of *alus* and *kasar* is further elaborated into the distinction between ‘refined’ and ‘unrefined’ qualities (see Errington, 1988: 249). Gestures, facial expressions, body postures, intonation and loudness of speech indicate what is happening inside a person. Hence, a good Javanese has to be *alus* ‘gentle’ in doing things, for instance, never banging the door or not making noises when eating. To be *alus*, a person also cannot show strong
feelings, such as wailing when a beloved person dies, or showing excitement over getting a rare opportunity. Such traits are seen to only belong to children, peasants and working people. Consequently, one needs to be able to control one’s emotions by being sabar ‘patient’. In this sense, as Geertz (1976: 239-40) rightly points out, alus is a manifestation of ‘flatness of affect’:

The spiritually enlightened man guards his psychological equilibrium well and makes a constant effort to maintain its placid stability. His proximate aim is emotional quiescence, for passion is kasar feeling, fit only for children, animals, peasants, and foreigners. His ultimate aim, which this quiescence makes possible, is gnosis, the direct comprehension of the ultimate rasa. To feel all is to understand all. Paradoxically, it is also to feel nothing [...]. Emotional equamity, a certain flatness of affect, is, then, the prized psychological state, the mark of a truly alus [refined] character.

We can see an example of how a Javanese may be alus from the following extract of a short story, in which Mudjinah is devastated by her father’s plan to get her married to a man she does not love. One day, however, Abas, comes in disguise to rescue her. She recognizes him and feels happy, but she can quickly conceal her feeling so that no one could see that something is happening. This quality is called being alus ‘refined’.

Sareng dumugi in pandapi manahipun geter sanget, djalaran sumerep Abas wonten ingriku. Nanging sarehning Mudjinah wau lare estri ingkang alus bebudenipun, getering manah kenging dipun sajuti, satemah boten angatawisi. (Suwignjo, 1958; 85) – my own emphasis

(As soon as they got to the reception hall, her heart trembled from seeing Abas there. However, as Mudjinah was an alus-hearted girl, she was able to conceal the pounding of her heart so that it was not obvious – my own translation)

A trained rasa ‘feeling/intuition’ will also help an alus person to empathize with and understand what others feel and think, although they may not express it. Some expressions that reflect this cultural aspect are pangerten ‘understanding’, tanggap’ able to read signs’ and tepa salira ‘being sensitive to others’ feelings and acting accordingly’. In a culture in which people do not openly express their thoughts and feelings, these social skills are highly valued and are crucial to maintaining harmony. Being tanggap’ able to read signs’ is very useful in communication, as a Javanese is very ‘indirect’. An example of this is offering a neighbour some guavas when he says ‘What nice guavas!’ when seeing you picking guavas from a tree in front of your house. An example of tepa salira, on the other hand, is offering to help your sister
out with house chores when you are staying at her place, as she may have less time but more work because of your presence. From its etymology, the expression *tepa salira* comes from *tepa* ‘measurement’ and salira, ‘body’ – which means that the ‘measurement’ for the sensitivity and actions is your own ‘body’ or self.

On the basis of the previous consideration, I would suggest the general explication of an *alus* quality of a person as follows:

*Alus* (of a person)

(a) It is good if people do not know what a person feels/thinks/wants
(b) Because of this, if a person feels/thinks/wants X, it is good if this person does not do something like saying X or doing something else so people know this person feels/thinks/wants X
(c) Other people cannot know that this person feels/thinks/wants X because of this
(d) Because of this, it is good if the person can think like this at the same time:\[13\]
   (e) I know if a person feels/thinks/wants something, this person doesn’t have to say it; This person can say something else.
   (f) I think I can know what this person thinks/feels/wants if I do something.
   (g) I can think about what I would feel/think/want if I were the person or ask if this person wants X.
   (h) I can do something good for this person because of this.
   (i) It is good if a person can do something like this all the time.

*Ethok-ethok*: The Javanese dissimulation trick

*Ethok-ethok* refers to ‘pretending’, giving the appearance of or acting the part. This word may function as a noun, adjective (to indicate a state) or verb. For instance, in a movie or play, people only *ethok-ethok* because they are just acting things out. Within the Javanese ‘indirect’ communication system, *ethok-ethok* has a more specific meaning, i.e. ‘pretense’ or ‘dissimulation’, and is commonly employed to hide one’s desires, thoughts or motives for the sake of politeness and to discover about other people’s communicative motives. For instance, when the neighbor comments on your guavas, you may *ethok-ethok*, offering some of them out of politeness.\[14\] If the neighbor happens to want some, he would also *ethok-ethok* by saying no. If you do not repeat your offer and insist that he should have the guavas, the neighbor would normally understand that you are not really serious with your

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\[13\] The expression ‘at the same time’ is used to refer to ‘also’.

\[14\] A short cordial answer such as ‘Yes, they (the guavas) are (big)’ and a quick switch to another topic, for instance a greeting, would also be very appropriate.
offer and have just made it out of politeness. With this strategy, no one would lose face, for either not offering or feeling rejected. Ethok-ethok, as suggested by Geertz (1976: 246-7), is indeed pervasive in traditional Javanese culture:

... *one must call out to any passerby* one knows inviting him to stop in, even though he may be the last person on earth you wish to see. *One must refuse* food (unless the host persists in offering it) even if one is dying of hunger ... One should never *refuse* outright people’s requests to do something for them ...

*Ethok-ethok* is very common among the Javanese to maintain unity and save face. If someone feels, thinks, knows, does or has something, but feels this may disrupt harmony, he would normally try to hide it by ethok-ethok. For instance, when Ani is with a group of neighbours who are complaining somewhat about not being able to manage to save, one might say ‘Yen Jeng Ani ngoten gampil mawon yen ajeng nyisihke, nggih?’ ‘But it would be easy for Jeng-Ani to set aside (money), wouldn’t it?’. While perhaps this is the case for Ani, she might say instead that she struggles, too. Not responding to the remark would give the impression that it was true, and this might make the neighbors feel that A is more fortunate. Thus, ethok-ethok seems to be a good strategy in this situation. Here she has shown her empathy and also solidarity for not positioning herself higher than the rest of the group. One could also ethok-ethok non-verbally. For instance, I might ethok-ethok not having just accidentally seen someone showing affection to his girlfriend. I could ethok-ethok ‘pretend’ I was looking in a different direction. This would help the couple not to feel embarrassed, since, for the traditional Javanese, showing affection to a partner should not be displayed in front of other people. One could also ethok-ethok in the following situation:

*For example, you are working. Then I come to visit. ... I come and call out at the door. Then you act as though you were not working, not doing anything.’Ethok-éthok you are not working. (Geertz, 1976: 246)*

Geertz (1976: 246) suggests that such ethok-ethok is to hide ‘one’s own wishes in deference to one’s opposite’. However, it is important to add here that an alus Javanese would employ such ethok-ethok because he (A) does not want the person who just comes (B) to feel reluctant to visit, thinking that A is busy. This is because his relationship with people, especially his friends, relatives and elders, is
more important than his own interests. When my mother and I visit our relatives in the village (without any appointment), for instance, my uncle would leave whatever he is doing at once to meet us. Although perhaps it is important for him to fix his motorcycle, for instance, he would say he could always do it later, wash his hands and would happily sit and chat with us.

It is important to note that while *ethok-ethok* is normally used to preserve social harmony, one might also ‘abuse’ it for one’s own interest. For example, someone, say Parman, might *ethok-ethok* that he did not know that people were gathering at a neighbour’s place to help repair this neighbour’s house, so that he (Parman) could just stay at home relaxing. Another example of the misuse of *ethok-ethok* can be seen in an illustration by Geertz’ informant:

He said: Suppose I go off south and you see me go. Later my son asks you: ‘Do you know where my father went?’ And you say no, étok-étok you don’t know. I asked him why should I étok-étok, as there seemed to be no reason for lying, and he said, ‘Oh, you just étok-étok. You don’t have to have a reason.’ (Geertz, 1976: 246).

The person in the illustration uses *ethok-ethok* without any reason and can mislead his son. Such ethok-ethok is considered goroh/ngapusi ‘lying’, which is very much discouraged in the Javanese culture. With this possible misuse of *ethok-ethok*, it seems necessary to include its proper function in the transcription of the pragmatic strategy, which is represented by point (f):

*ethok-ethok*

(a) I think/feel/know/do/haveX
(b) I don’t want people to know this
(c) I can do something so people will not know that I think/feel/know/do have X
(d) I can say something else than X to do this
(e) It is good to do something like this if:
(f) People do not have to know that I think/feel/know/do/have X and they might feel bad if they know this.

The above transcript is far more representative of the *ethok-ethok* concept than the one attempted by Wierzbicka (1991: 100), which is based on very limited information:

(a) I don’t want to say what I think/know
(b) I don’t have to say this
(c) I can say something else
Referring to ‘pretense’ and ‘dissimulation’ as explained in my transcription, *ethok-ethok* is often used lightheartedly (G. Quinn, personal communication, 20 May 2013), often to show humility or to maintain a low profile. One good example suggested by Quinn is when one compliments a friend for his cleverness, “Kowe kok pinten banget” (‘How smart you are’) and this friend responds to it by saying “Mung ethok-ethok kok. Jane bodho banget” (‘Just ethok-ethok-pretending [to be smart]. [I’m] actually very stupid’).

Further, traditional Javanese are very well aware of the frequent practice of *ethok-ethok* in their social interaction. Therefore, they often question the truthfulness of what people say to them by asking *tenane*/*saestunipun* (‘Is it really true?’) or *Kuwi* tenan apa ethok-ethok? ‘Is it something true or just ethok-ethok?’ To convince people that they have been truthful they would also say that what they have said is *tenan*/*saestu’ture’. For instance, in offering guavas to a neighbour, one could say ‘Mangga njenengan mendhet jambune. Saestu.’ (‘Please, take some of the guavas. I’m serious’).

**Conclusion**

At this stage we can see how the belief in God has become a core source of values among the traditional Javanese people and how they are further developed into their daily norms of conduct. Believing that the central spiritual has designed the people’s cosmos in a particular balance, which should be maintained to create peace, a harmonious relationship with other people and their surrounding environment is crucial. This quest for harmony is manifested in their manner of social interaction, which put great emphasis on awareness of oneself and his/her place in the society in relation to God, and sensitivity and empathy towards each other. This study, however, is only a preliminary attempt. Further research is necessary to see if any meaning component has been left out in my cultural transcripts and to examine other values not explained here. Apart from this, I believe this paper seems to suffice to explain that what many Javanese do to maintain ‘harmony’ is not meant to be something ‘hypocritical.’ This is not to say that Javanese cannot be *lamis* ‘not sincere’ – anyone can. However, at least it is apparent here that the English term

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15Traditional Javanese people also use this strategy to find out if someone has lied (*goroh/ngapusi*), using the expression as a euphemism. The purpose is to avoid making any offense, which is important to preserve harmony.
‘hypocritical’ – if it can be applied to traditional Javanese values – would be something very much discouraged. They are very much aware that ‘harmony’ is not just something lair, ‘physical/superficial’.

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Authority Perspective: 
Javanese Men’s Talk on Domestic Violence

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Abstract
This paper discusses Javanese men’s perceptions, opinions and attitudes towards domestic violence. Sixteen Javanese men were invited to talk about domestic violence in group discussions, as part of a qualitative research conducted in the southern part of Central Java. The responses collected had different emphasis as given by the male speakers but all engaged in a perspective that reflects their dominant position in the family. While admitting that some men behave badly, the Javanese participants had greater concern about women’s behaviour, seeing this as provocation to violence. Women’s attitudes that were perceived to be a challenge to men’s authority was seen to be the most common form of provocation. The analysis examines the men’s perspective in relation to the dominant discourse of masculinity that preserves men’s identity and identification with power in marital relationships.

Keywords: domestic violence, masculinity, men’s identity, Java.

Introduction
Why do married men commit violence at home? While most married men do not commit violence, what do they think about other men’s violence against their wives? What can we learn from men’s view of other men’s violence? In Indonesian cases of domestic violence, women victims have become the main concern, whereas very little analysis has focused on men’s perspective and attitudes to domestic violence. We know very little about what Indonesian men think of violence at home against women and how they respond to the issue. Of these, we know from a report published by The National Commission on Violence Against Women in Indonesia that male perpetrators typically showed a range of behaviours toward their
wives and to themselves (Poerwandari et al., 2002). These include: a) denying, 
minimising, underreporting his violence; b) justifying, normalising, and rationalising 
their violence; and c) insisting on loyalty, obedience, and submission of their wives 
(Poerwandari et al., 2002). They also seemed very sensitive to perceived disloyalty, 
as such that abusive actions may be triggered by trivial matters (Rowe et al., 2006). 
This can be that the wife is not doing the household work ‘properly’, when the wife 
disobeys the husband; when the wife questions the husband about girlfriends; the 
wife refuses to have sex or the wife expresses suspicion of infidelity (Hakimi et al., 
2001). What can we learn from this information to understand the links between 
men’s will to violence and their practices of marriage in an Indonesian context?

To understand violence against women within men’s position is to assess the 
interrelation of violence with masculinity and men’s identity (Whitehead, 2002). This 
means we look at violence as a practice that produces and re-produces certain 
social discourses that establish men’s place in the society (Hatty, 2000). The main 
question is then, what does violence mean to men as subjects of social discourse?

This paper aims to outline men’s perspectives, perceptions and attitudes towards 
domestic violence in the Indonesian context. It is part of a larger study I conducted to 
understand the link between masculinity, Islam and the issue of domestic violence in 
a Javanese context. The study brings forward a specific case of Javanese men, 
aiming at proposing masculinity as a framework to understand the issue of domestic 
violence in Indonesia.

Literature on masculinity in Indonesia and Java especially is very limited. The 
attention to the field is slowly growing with few studies being underway. Hasyim et al 
(2007) is the first book on the subject; it is written in Indonesian. Another study by 
Nilan et al (2007) interviewed Indonesian students in Australia in an attempt to 
approach Indonesian masculinity among Muslims. A broader study was undertaken 
by Clark (2010) who suggested that Indonesian masculinity has persistently been 
adopted from a Javacentric model and has been centred in Soeharto over thirty 
years during the New Order period. The Aristocrat Javanese culture provides the 
prototype of idealised men as being refined, self-restrained, mystical, spiritual potent, 
controlled and sexualised in a repressed way (Clark 2010). Over eight years of his 
presidency, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY) displays a similar version of aspects 
of Javanese masculinity of being self-restrained, controlled, refined, mystical and
charismatic. Clark’s (2010) book is a literary critique and offers limited sociological grounding. It has a short section on violence, but it is not intended to address the issue of domestic violence.

**Violence and masculinity**

While most men are not involved in and disagree with it, violence is deeply related to masculinity as a social discourse that provides the understanding about violence as a way of expressing men’s identity (Anderson & Umberson, 2001; Barker, 2005; Hatty, 2000). The individual capacity and the social possibility to act and react violently and aggressively are intimately linked to the meaning of becoming a man in a larger social arena (Whitehead, 2002). A component that crucially contributes to the dominant discourse of men’s identity is power over women (Connell, 1995; Hearn, 1998). We can analyse violence as a practice intended to sustain or obtain power (Hautzinger, 2003). Power may be associated with interpersonal control (Katz, 1988), social control (Black, 1983), self image (Felson, 1993), peer approval (Bandura, 1973), social status (Besag, 1980; Felson, 2002), or to coerce compliance in sexual satisfaction (Felson, 1993). In the case of marriage, analysis of violence against women needs to address power as its main motive (Dobash & Dobash’s, 1994, 1998). Men’s ‘will to violence’ is enforced by a social narrative that attributes violence as a sign of power, authority, and control, which are crucial components of masculinity itself (Dobash & Dobash, 1998). When men exercise violence to claim, sustain or regain power at home, they subscribe to a particular discourse of power in the marital relationship (Dobash & Dobash, 1994). In the dominant discourse of masculinity, men’s identity is pervasively perceived in hierarchal relation to women. This hierarchy comprises a sense of control, ownership and authority over wives (Dobash & Dobash, 1994).

Control as a way of domination has been of considerable issue in the analysis of men’s violence against female partners (Browne, 1987; Dutton, 1998). The motive to control is particularly relevant for the setting of violence against women (Felson, 2002). This implies men’s privileges and authority of material resources and services, including domestic and sexual services. Male perpetrators and those who justify their acts do not consider that women deserve the same rights to speak, argue, or negotiate in family affairs and violence is frequently used to weaken women’s voices.
The idea of power is also expanded in men’s sense of the right to punish the perceived wrongdoing by wives, to express their possessiveness and jealousy, and to insist on expectations concerning household work and resources (Dobash & Dobash, 1994). Violence is often exercised under the sense of self-righteousness where the male actors believe that they are upholding justice (Felson, 2002).

The authority perspective

The data for this paper resulted from talks on domestic violence in two group discussions attended by sixteen Javanese men for a research project conducted in 2008. The male participants were mostly married with an average 10 years marital life experience, aged between 20 and 60, and mainly farmers; a few were businessmen and village governmental officers. They lived in the southern part of Central Java. They were selected considering different marital life experiences, not acting as religious leaders in the communities and having no criminal record of committing violence. The discussions asked their opinion about the issue of domestic violence, as parts of the research activities that explored discourse of masculinity amongst Muslims men in Java. The term ‘domestic violence’ in this study refers to physical assault against wives. Following group discussions, unstructured interviews were conducted with ten of the participants to develop themes that occurred in the discussions. All of their names quoted here are pseudonyms.

Javanese men in the talks were aware that men have committed most violent actions. But they believed that violence is a temporary outburst and does not necessarily characterise men’s attitudes towards women. Violence may correspond to a heated tension and anger during conflicts but only occurs in a short specific moment. The male speakers also admitted that men do, or may, behave badly. But this is largely due to women’s behaviour that provokes them. Their observation indicated excuses for the violence, by which they placed the blame on the actors but not the responsibility (Hearn, 1989). As violence becomes unaccountable, their views directed the responsibilities towards other objects outside the male actor. They implied that the man was not active, but rather a victim of forces beyond his individual control, this may be financial difficulties, social pressures, drugs and even the evil spirit, that drives him to commit violence.
The larger part of the talks demonstrated much greater concern about women’s behaviour, accounting it to be a more significant factor for the violence. The Javanese men’s perceptions of this issue reflect a perspective from their traditional position as the head and leader of the family. I would call this perspective the ‘authority perspective’. This perspective operates by mainly focusing on women and their manners as the object of men’s authority. Most of the male speakers were concerned about the state of women’s devotion, attitudes, behaviour and responses to men that may pose as a provocation to men’s violence. They judged women acting within this category of behaviour as being arrogant, rude, improper, disobedient, recalcitrant, disrespectful, insulting or contesting. Male violence is then a response to this provocative behaviour.

How did the Javanese men define an act by women as being provocative? The participants of the talk mentioned a wide range of examples of provocative women’s attitudes that can be classified into two major categories: a) those that challenge men’s authority and b) those that put pressure on men by demanding increased wealth in families. The first category, which covered a wider range of behaviours, was reported more frequently and seemed to be the most common provocation for male violence. For these reasons, I will pay more attention to this category. Responding to my question – ‘why men commit the most violence’ – the following opinion best illustrates how the authority perspective works in perceiving this challenging female behaviour:

[Why do] Husbands commit most of the violence? [That is because] Husbands have a long vision for the future, [and they] make decisions [with] careful. Like Mr. Romsi (one of the participants) has said about [a husband should] be thorough in making decisions. The decision is thoughtful and rightly gives direction [for the family] which is for good purposes for the communities and for the families. That will bring happiness and wealth. But the wives [commonly do not know and] reject that. So [in that situation], the men feel [that they are] in the right [position and have the valid reason to defend that]. [Like me] I am a man with a low blood pressure (the participant ended his comment with laughing). (Mulyadi, 58)

The quote above displays the basic scenario of domestic violence according to the authority perspective: men play a dominant role in marital relationship (which, in their opinion, is correct and valid), making decisions and directing the family, while women challenge this role. Women’s challenging behaviour appeared in two main forms:
female disrespect towards men and women disagreeing with men about particular household issues. Participants placed strong emphasis on the first form.

**Disrespectful behaviours**

A very common challenge for men is when women behave disrespectfully towards them. I would suggest that the sense of being disrespected by wives is the main tension that may lead men to commit violence. In the men’s experience women may behave disrespectfully in many situations and the meaning can be personally different among men. The most serious one is unfaithfulness by women. From the perspective of men’s authority, unfaithfulness is not merely a betrayal to the marital commitment but a further attack on the men's authority. Unfaithfulness and adultery demonstrates a women’s breach of devotion towards her husband and exhibits her noncompliant attitude to the marital bond.

If a woman engages in a relationship with another partner and [that means behaving] disobediently to her husband, that is the situation where [domestic violence] will likely break out (Handoko, 54).

For some men, the issue of their wife having another lover is not simply a matter of money and wealth. Deeper than that, it is a serious slight on their affections and emotions.

In fact, unfaithfulness is not merely a matter of money and prosperity, but also the feeling [of being hurt] that is caused (Handoko, 54).

The Javanese men described women who are unfaithful or commit adultery as being ‘disrespectful to the man’ and ‘damaging for families’. They were condemned as causing a serious issue, since they endangered family unity, which may drive men to act cruelly.

Sometimes men become cruel and come to think cruelly, and arrive at the point where they dare to beat their wives, lose their mercy and heartlessly torture the wife. In my opinion, indeed this is because [the wife who is unfaithful] is damaging the family (Anggoro, 56).

Adultery is a direct insult to a man’s core identity and principles. It causes men to suffer severe emotional break downs.

That's what I call against the core of men [values]. Here, people would see that as an insult to a man’s honour (Handoko, 54).
From my own experience, in fact I have been married twice. What happened in the past with my former wife [was that] she had another lover. That hurt me deep down in my heart. She was resistant to my command. Well, what else can I do? Then I divorced her (Handoko, 54).

However, an accusation made against a man by his wife of being unfaithful also means a serious challenge against his authority. In the final week of the interview period, just before the last interview, a case of violence against a wife occurred in the Pasiran village. A villager living close to some of the participants’ houses struck his wife following her accusation that he had an affair with their widowed neighbour. One of the men in the talks summarised the case to me, saying that the victim confronted her husband and the widow on the spot, ‘shouting loudly’ and ‘astonishing their surrounding neighbours’. I was very interested in knowing how the last participant, Arief (50), who was a highly respected figure in the village, would respond to this case. He understood the case to have occurred because of the wife’s allegation and decision to confront her husband. This case indicated his automatic intention to examine the manner through which the woman’s action had influenced this situation.

Yeah, the wife accused the husband [of being unfaithful] and gave no supporting evidence. Indeed she could not judge and execute the problem in her own immediate way like that. It required supporting evidences. She probably needed witnesses and procedures before she made a judgment. But if [she] did all of this irrationally in her own way [without thinking], it produced a bad image of the family. You see, it didn’t turn out well. And that was actually improper for a wife to accuse [the husband] in a sudden manner without having very convincing evidences. Surely she could not do that (Arief, 50).

The wife was deemed to have judged and confronted the problem in an impetuous way. Arief (50) considered this manner of conduct unacceptable. In acting in such a manner she did not anticipate the results and the impacts, but she instead breached the family’s honour. This participant suggested that the wife did not solve the problem, and instead made the situation worse.

From the authority perspective disrespectful attitudes come about in different ways, many of which seemed to be part of women’s habitual conduct in daily life. The way women talk to their husbands, not necessarily during fights, was a common indicator of disrespectful behaviour. Some participants observed violent incidents that flared because the woman talked to the man in an ‘improper’ manner. Here,
disrespectful women were accused of being grumpy, rude, coarse, disruptive and impulsive.

Those women who talk in a fiery temper do not realise that they themselves are grumpy (Waluyo, 55).

But since they do not have a better knowledge in etiquette, both men and women speak irrationally without thinking [when they are in a dispute]. [The woman would shout] ‘I don’t care whether I am doing wrong or not’ to the husband. [This is the kind of women who like to] yell at the man very rudely (Arief, 50).

Wives were also seen as causing feelings of disrespect amongst Javanese men if they acted in a self-centred manner, thought only about their own needs and interests, were rude, or accused the husband of doing bad things.

[Often in a conflict] Women behave like an egoist and self-centred, talk rashly without thinking. [Such attitudes make] the husband loses his temper easily, because the wife is unable to make him happy, often says something rude to him, [or] accuses him of adopting others’ [men] wrongdoing (Jasman, 50).

Feelings of disrespect were also likely to arise when wives challenged their husbands in arguments or always wanted to win debates or show up their husband. Several participants associated disrespectful attitudes with the character of women who lack knowledge, a shallow understanding of moral teachings and, therefore, act without thinking.

There are those wives who never stop insisting on winning arguments when they talk, [or those] wives who crave a standing position at the front [of their husbands]. They are making the men disrespected. These [attitudes] are actually forbidden by religion (Islam) (Jasman, 50).

But because the woman has never been told about the correct moral teachings, she acts rashly. She gets into a habit of swearing at the man even for some silly problems (Arief, 50).

A common form of disrespectful conduct is disobedience. Participants perceived disobedience to be an action mostly practiced by women, and temporarily occurring during spousal clashes. Disobedient conduct included women challenging the men to debates or fights. When a man was involved in a spousal conflict, he would likely see her as being disobedient.

Yeah, it (violence) breaks out in that situation (in quarrels). [The man would think] ‘No matter what, if my wife is not obeying me’ [he will attack her]. [That is the situation where] Both sides argue persistently (Sujono, 41).
Men appeared to give orders, admonitions, and commands. Women’s attitudes, in these situations, were seen as neglectful, obstinate and recalcitrant towards those orders. Handoko (54) suggested, ‘if the wife is obstinate and rebellious, violence may take place.’ By this perception, participants described women as being ‘noncompliant’, ‘arguing back’, ‘challenging back’, ‘talking rudely’ or ‘replying with a harsh voice’.

According to my experience, for example, when I am directing my wife, if after the first order and second order I gave to her she remains noncompliant, I may raise my voice. For example, when I am speaking harshly to my wife, she replies harshly as well. That is the situation when violence may happen (Handoko, 54).

In my position as a man, if a wife is ignoring [the husband’s] commands and arguing back against the man, and talking rudely, or, as our ancestors said, speak in very harsh voice that is the moment when violence may happen (Anggoro, 56).

Male violence occurred as a way to counter this challenge and to regain men’s authority.

If a conflict happens between couples it should be the wife who stops arguing and gives in. If she does that [violence] then certainly will not happen (Handoko, 54).

Participants believed that male violence may occur against wives when these behaviours persist. If that happens, women were blamed for conduct which may initiate the family conflict.

The narratives of disrespectful women seem to cover a wide range of women’s attitudes towards their husbands: loyalty and devotion, trust, ethics in communication, understanding and submission to men’s authority. This involves women’s conduct within a broader context of marital relationship and also implies how men expect such conduct should suit their position in the home. To this extent, women might be blamed for challenging men’s authority and in doing so not complying with the behaviour that men have come to expect from their wives.

“Women’s disagreement with men”

Another behaviour which according to the authority perspective is challenging was when wives disagree with their husbands about particularly big issues within the household. While still involving fights between couples, this scenario is rather different to the issue of disrespectful conduct. In these cases, men are not dealing with women’s attitudes toward their husbands generally, but the wives’ contrasting
approach in handling of situations in particular issues in the family. I found one distinct example given by a participant describing how this disagreement may take place: in his example it was about naughty children.

As an example, the parent (husband) is trying to educate the children, but the wife defends the children. Such situations involve a husband and a wife arguing. If they both argue each other and claim to be right there won’t be a point of understanding, but violence instead (Mulyadi, 58).

Children’s education, either at home or at school, was a big issue for participants. This participant, Mulyadi (58), imagined a case where a woman insists on contradicting the man, which probably indicates different interests as well. He saw the wife’s action in this case as an opposition to the husband’s decision. While calling the husband’s decision ‘rightful’, he considered the wife’s opposition to be unwise and incorrect. The participant suggested the woman should keep silent, stay away and support what the man has done.

It’s better when the husband educates the children, which is rightful. The wife keeps silent and after the man has gone the wife can give the kids additional advice. The wife adds, ‘that was surely correct what your Dad told you,’ say it that way. That will be better (Mulyadi, 58).

In such situations, the woman’s involvement may possibly lead in the wrong direction and would therefore interfere with the man’s job and result in more problems.

But with [the wife] adding extra affairs into the conflict, like defending the wrongdoing by children, this will inflict violence (Mulyadi, 58).

Certainly, other settings of spousal conflict that lead to male violence also involve a situation where women disagree with men. Previously, in the cases of disrespectful women, participants used more hostile expressions in reporting different attitudes of women that, in their view, lead to violence.

Women demand more money

The second category of female provocative behaviour does not challenge men’s authority; rather, it places men under pressure by demanding increased wealth in families. The issue of income is important here, but more importantly, how a wife responds to the issue in relation to a man’s effort. Concerns regarding economic issues are fairly common amongst Indonesians. Yet, many participants mentioned
the effects the lack of economic resources and wealth had on spousal conflicts. Women were perceived as typically demanding men for higher incomes and more prosperity for the family. They were seen as ignorant or not sensitive to men’s efforts and difficulties in the work place. In a scenario like this, violence is a response to annoying demands made by a wife for more money or material goods.

If perhaps the husband earns a small amount of money, and the wife is not sensitive about her husband’s problems and asks for more money, this may breed domestic violence (Wahyudi, 35).

Some participants stressed the importance of acceptance and understanding of family conditions more so than money and wealth. This is particularly the case for women, which then results in family conflicts.

 [...] if the cause of domestic violence is economic, should this have been happened to me (because my family is poor) (Pambudi, 46).

Although the husband earns only a little bit of money for the family, and the wife is still willing to understand her husband’s situation, be aware of her husband’s difficulties, we (the men) still have the chance to undertake other efforts (Wahyudi, 35).

The issue of income and family wealth seemed sensitive for Javanese men. This is intimately connected to their responsibility and identity within the family. If a wife fails to understand and appreciate a man’s efforts in this matter, she will likely be blamed for creating conflict in the family.

The men that participated in the talks did not have a record of being illegally involved in a domestic violence incident. However, they demonstrated similar views to those found amongst male perpetrators of domestic violence. The National Commission on Violence Against Women in Indonesia reports that Indonesian male perpetrators showed tendencies to demand services, total submission and the loyalty of their wives. They also tended to lay claim to their rights to educate, teach, rule, and discipline their wives (Poerwandari et al., 2002). The men’s talks on domestic violence signified a tendency of blaming the victim, and thereby justifying violence. In contrast to excuses, justification places the responsibility on the man, but the blame belongs to women (Hearn, 1998). Justifications for male violence also lead to the discourse about the man’s right to possess the woman (Hearn, 1998). In such a discourse, violence might be seen as a way of asserting or reinforcing this possession. This is particularly relevant to the discourse of disrespectful wives. For a
Javanese husband, a woman’s challenging attitude may relate to her loyalty and trust for him, ethics in speaking and dialogue, understanding and acceptance of his decisions and awareness of her traditional position as a wife. This also relates to the wife’s responses to men’s decisions or rules, whether she is paying attention or is neglectful, whether she supports or disagrees and whether she is compliant or recalcitrant.

Conclusion

The wide adoption of the authority perspective in men’s talk on domestic violence presumes that men hold the superior role in holding the authority to observe, evaluate, judge and control undesirable situations within marital relationships. The perspective itself did not examine the authority, thereby assuming this is something necessarily underlying men’s powerful position. This was a sign of how intensely male participants considered domestic violence in relation to their authority by focusing more on women. This concern denotes a multilayered understanding of women’s attitudes in a marital relationship through which a Javanese husband may perceive his wife for being challenging his authority, identity and masculinity. These findings signify a discourse of masculinity in Java as a naturally given, acceptable, and perhaps expected structure within the family unit, upon which men’s identity is deeply linked to men’s authority and power at home. The men’s tolerance to violence indicates masculine values that uphold a hierarchical model of gender relationship in marital bounds. The ideology that a man’s best value is to rule the family involves demands on specific forms of women attitudes towards their husband. The men’s identity and masculinity themselves are hidden, unexamined, allowing men to set the standard of morality, what is acceptable and not, and use it to manage family affairs and control the dynamic of marital relationship.

This assessment on men’s perspective suggests that men’s violence at home is enabled by an imagined broader discourse of manhood that produces power imbalance between the sexes that men are entitled leadership authority, and that women are to submit in one form or the others to men’s position. Efforts in dealing with domestic violence in Indonesia would not adequately approach the issue without any attempt to address the dominant masculine discourse underlying it. The question

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on gender in domestic violence should begin to be more addressed towards the questions of men and masculinity.

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References


Decoding *Basa Walikan* - A preliminary analysis of Yogyakarta ‘reverse’ language

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**ABSTRACT**

Although there have been several recent studies in non-standard registers of Indonesian, little has been studied about similar varieties of regional languages spoken in Indonesia. This preliminary study aims to provide a brief description of a social register of Javanese spoken around Malioboro, Yogyakarta, and Central Java, known as *basa Walikan* (Javanese: reverse language). Qualitative interviews about its form and usage were conducted with a small sample of street traders from Malioboro over a period of a few weeks. Our preliminary findings were consistent with other studies of social registers in Indonesia. The primary function of *basa Walikan* appears to be socio-pragmatic. In some contexts it may also be used as a speech disguise code.

**Keywords:** Javanese, Basa Walikan, Indonesia

**Background**

Indonesia is one of the most linguistically and culturally diverse nations in the world. Over 550 languages are spoken throughout the archipelago and in 1945 Indonesian was selected as the official language of government, mass media, and education. Although Indonesian is rapidly becoming the first language of many Indonesians, especially in urban centres, many Indonesians still learn and speak regional languages and their dialects (Sneddon, 2003). Social and regional varieties of Indonesian and regional languages are dynamic and constantly developing. Despite language purists lamenting these varieties as a degradation of correct and proper
forms, these non-standard registers, or stylistic variations, are a very real reflection and representation of Indonesia’s diverse communities and their members.

Recent studies of non-standard Indonesian registers include colloquial Indonesian (Errington, 1986; Ewing, 2005; Sneddon, 2006), bahasa prokem (Collins & Chambert-Lois, 1984), Jakarta Backwards Youth Slang (Dreyfuss, 1983), bahasa gay (Boellstorff, 2004; Oetomo, 2003) and bahasa gaul (Smith-Hefner, 2007). With the exception of colloquial Indonesian, these registers have also been described as codes and secret languages (Collins & Chambert-Lois, 1984; Dreyfuss, 1983; Boellstorff, 2004; Oetomo, 2003; Smith-Hefner, 2007). Although some of these varieties may have emerged as speech-disguise codes, the above studies all suggest that the primary role of these different registers is to promote and foster a shared identity and sense of community among their speakers.

Although there is significant scholarship on regional and social varieties of Indonesian, less has been studied about similar varieties in other languages spoken in Indonesia. In this paper, the authors present a brief linguistic description of a social register of Javanese spoken in Yogyakarta, Central Java, known as basa Walikan that is synonymous with the street traders of Malioboro.

**Javanese**

Javanese is an Austronesian language and is the largest regional language spoken in Indonesia, with around 80 million speakers (Oglobin 2005). Javanese is primarily spoken in central and eastern Java, but there are also large Javanese speaking communities in Banten, West Java and in Lampung, South Sumatra as well as in countries outside of Indonesia such as Surinam and New Caledonia (Robson, 2002; Wedhawati et al., 2005).

Early Dutch and English linguists were intrigued by Javanese’s complex speech levels that can be broadly categorised into two main registers: ngoko and krama. Robson (2002) defines ngoko as “the style in which one thinks to oneself and uses to one’s intimate family and friends of the same age or younger” and krama as the speech style one uses to speak to and talk about “a stranger or someone who is socially superior” (12). The two styles are used in different proportions to indicate distance, respect and familiarity.
More recent studies, however, have focused on regional variations present in Javanese. Javanese is usually classified into three main regional dialects; East Javanese, Central Javanese, and Standard Javanese that is spoken in Surakarta and Yogyakarta (Keeler, 1992). These dialects are characterised by variations in pronunciation, grammatical and discourse features. However, as Robson (1991) notes “geographically defined variations can also occur on the micro-level of the villagers” (3).

While there has been a lot of research into Javanese speech levels and regional variation, fewer studies have explored non-standard social varieties of Javanese (see Robson, 1991). One non-standard social variety of Javanese that has not been subject to in-depth analysis is a register, or stylistic variant of Javanese known as *basa Walikan*.

**Basa Walikan**

*Basa Walikan* is a register based on the ngoko level of Javanese spoken in Yogyakarta, Central Java. It is encoded using a formula based on the arrangement of the Javanese script *hanacaraka*. There is another register of Javanese also known as *basa Walikan* spoken in Malang, East Java, but its form is different from the *basa Walikan* spoken in Yogyakarta. *Basa Walikan* Malang is derived from Javanese, Indonesian and English words that are reversed, and if necessary, modified to conform to Javanese and Indonesian phonotactics. *Basa Walikan* is not based on the Javanese script.

The origin and current status of *basa Walikan* Yogyakarta are topics of popular legend. One popular view describes *basa Walikan* as a secret code that was created by young Javanese nationalists during the 1940s. It is said that *basa Walikan* was used by young patriots in order that Javanese speaking Dutch government officials would not be alerted to their nationalist activities. Another popular view is that *basa Walikan* was created to serve as a means of secret communication among local criminals in the 1970s and 1980s. However, there is limited evidence to substantially support either view (Ernawan, 2004).

In this pilot study we aim to identify the role of *basa Walikan* in Yogyakarta and begin a preliminary analysis on its use. Malioboro was selected as the location for this pilot
study because it is popularly considered to be the heartland of basa Walikan today. Malioboro is a vibrant and colourful street lined with street hawkers, souvenir and batik shops, malls and a traditional market that leads from the northern city square in front of the Sultan’s palace to Tugu railway station. Due to limited time, the study was conducted over a period of two weeks in Malioboro in early January, 2013. During the two weeks, fifteen speakers, aged between 16-60, were interviewed about their knowledge and their use of basa Walikan. The interviews were conducted by the co-author of this paper, a Javanese academic and native Yogyakartan. The interviews consisted of a series of structured questions and an informal discussion about the participants’ knowledge and use of basa Walikan. The following are our preliminary findings on the patterns of use of basa Walikan by street traders in Malioboro based on our interviews.

**Derivation, usage and function**

Basa Walikan words are derived from a formula that is based on the Javanese script hanacaraka. The Javanese script is an Indic type script that is composed of twenty symbols standing for syllables consisting of a consonant and the vowel –a; this vowel can be changed by the use of other signs (Robson, 2011). The twenty symbol alphabet is usually arranged in four horizontal lines with each line containing five consonant vowel (CV) pairs.

![Figure 7 - Hanacaraka with arrows showing how sound syllables switch with each other in basa Walikan](image-url)
Basa Walikan words are formed regularly from ngoko standard Javanese words by moving each CV pair in a word two lines vertically. Line 1 switches with line 3 and line 2 switches with line 4. The original consonant in each CV pair is replaced by the new consonant, but the vowel (or lack of vowel) does not change.

As an example, the Javanese kinship term mas consists of two CV pairs “ma” and “s(a)”. The first syllable “ma” is in the fourth line and when it is moved two lines vertically it becomes “da”. The second syllable “s(a)” is in the second line and when it is shifted two lines vertically becomes “b(a)”. The final result is the basa Walikan term dab.

Words that begin with a vowel are represented “ha”. For example: ibu (Jv. mother) consists of two sound syllables; “(h)i” and “bu”. The first syllable can now be used in the formula.

ibu → “(h)i” + “bu” → “pi” + “su” = pisu

Although most words are formed regularly using this formula, some of our informants reported forms that deviated from the formula, but are similar in place, or manner of articulation. One notable example was the basa Walikan term for mangan (Jv. to eat). The predicted form is daladh, however, our informants regularly reported that the basa Walikan term was halat not daladh. Our participants explained that the form of basa Walikan words is sometimes altered to help with pronunciation. Another example is the basa Walikan word for wedok (Jv. girl, woman), which is realised as themon, and not themony. Similarly, motor (Jv. motor) is togos/dogos and not dogoy. There were several examples of this appropriation to help with ease of pronunciation.

Many of our informants, however, were surprised to learn that there was a formula for encoding basa Walikan words and almost all informants reported learning basa Walikan by memory. Many of our informants were not local Javanese, but they understood and would use basa Walikan terms themselves. Below is a list of common basa Walikan terms used by our participants.
The above *basa Walikan* words, along with a majority of others used in Javanese or Indonesian utterances retain their original meaning. However, a few *basa Walikan* words have also undergone a shift from their original meaning.

*Dab* is perhaps one of the most well-known and common *basa Walikan* terms. *Dab* is used as a term of address among young males in Yogyakarta. For example:

*Piye kabare, dab?*

*How are you going, bro?*

Dab is the *basa Walikan* form of mas. Mas is a Javanese kinship term that means ‘older brother’. It is often extended and used as a term of address for young men. The *basa Walikan* term dab however, no longer shares the same meaning as the original Javanese term mas. Dab has shifted in meaning; narrowing to roughly mean bro. Evidence of this can be seen in the way dab is used interchangeably with other terms for bro such as coy, mas bro and gan. Further evidence of this shift is the acceptability of dab as a substitution for bro in the common non-standard address term mas bro. The resulting term is mas dab. If speakers still associated dab as

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meaning mas, then this form would be unacceptable since it would then mean *mas mas.

Another popular basa Walikan term that has undergone a shift away from its original Javanese meaning is dagadu. Dagadu, which is derived from matamu, ‘your eyes’ in standard Javanese, is an expletive term. The meaning is dependent on the context, but can mean anything from “Hey, watch where you’re going!” to more strongly “What the fuck are you looking at?” However, the basa Walikan form dagadu does not have the same connotations. Even though our participants knew that it derived from matamu, they almost exclusively associated it with the type of t-shirt produced by the company of the same name, or cheaper lookalike t-shirts. Dagadu is most commonly used by sellers spruiking their products. For example:

‘Dagadu-dagadu, mas, asli Jogja’

Dagadu t-shirts, dagadu t-shirts, mate! From Jogja!

It appears that the use of basa Walikan forms in this manner has a pragmatic function, similar to that described by Boellstorf (2004) in his article detailing bahasa gay. Boellstorf (2004) contends that the use of a few bahasa gay lexemes in Indonesian move the register of conversation to bahasa gay, invoking a sense of sameness and belonging between interlocutors. The same appears to apply with basa Walikan. The use of one or two basa Walikan words in Javanese or Indonesian moves the register to basa Walikan and creates a sense of sameness and belonging for speakers. For example:

“Piye dab saiki socomu kerja nang di?”

Hey bro where is your girlfriend working at the moment?

“Rombongane pelit poya mothik kabeh”

What a stingy group, they have no money

“Piye kowe mrene numpak dogos apa dosing?”

Are you coming here by motorbike or car?

The utterances above are in Javanese except for the basa Walikan terms in bold type. The use of one or two basa Walikan terms moves the register to basa Walikan
and serves to ‘in-group’ both the speaker and the hearer as members of the same social sub-group.

This is in line with the perceptions of our informants who described basa Walikan as a language used to greet someone (basa undang-undang), as a type of street slang (basa ndalanan) or as a language that young people use to joke around with their friends (bahasa anak muda untuk guyon-guyon agar lebih akrab). Basa Walikan is sometimes referred to as bahasa gaul Yogyakarta. It is useful to draw a distinction here between basa walikan and gaul, or the language of sociability as defined by Smith-Hefner (2007). There are some similarities between the two registers; however, there are also some salient differences. Basa Walikan, similar to gaul, is fun and care free. Furthermore, the use of basa Walikan also rejects fixed social hierarchy and formalities. However, unlike gaul the use of basa Walikan marks place membership and is not socially sophisticated or modern like gaul. They are two separate registers and basa Walikan is not a regional register of gaul.

Although its origins appears to be as a code, basa Walikan today seems to be used primarily on Malioboro to index a place identity, that is, ‘Yogyakartan-Malioboro’, and to create a sense of belonging among users. However, some of our informants still suggested that basa Walikan continues to be used in certain environments as a code. There is some evidence that basa Walikan forms are used to ‘censor’ taboo terms.

One example of this is how the basa Walikan term lotse is used. Lotse, which is derived from the standard Javanese word ngombe, meaning ‘to drink’, is used by speakers to refer specifically to alcoholic drinks which are rarely consumed publicly in the predominantly Muslim city.

Similarly, the co-researcher of this study recalls that when he was at high school, the basa walikan terms lajel, lojon and libil were used to replace the Javanese words ngaceng, ngocok and ngising, ‘to have an erection’, ‘to masturbate (of a male,) ’ and ‘to defecate’ respectively.

Woo….. marakke lajel

Ooo… It gave me a hard-on
Bocah suwe banget neng wc, mbokmenawa lagi lojon.

He’s been in the toilet for ages, maybe he’s jacking off.

Aduh wetengku lara, aku tak libil dhisik ya!

Aaah, my stomach really hurts, I need to go to the toilet quickly!

There are a few examples of basa walikan being used in specific contexts to substitute standard Javanese terms. These basa walikan lexemes are used when, for whatever reason, it would be considered inappropriate to use their Indonesian and Javanese equivalents.

**Conclusion**

Our preliminary research indicates that basa Walikan is not a secret language, but a social register of ngoko Javanese that is used to invoke a sense of belonging and sameness between interlocutors. Although there is a regular formula for producing basa Walikan forms, it appears that forms are instead learnt as individual lexical items. The primary function of basa Walikan appears to be socio-pragmatic, but basa Walikan also appears to have a code-like function and can be used by speakers to censor taboo topics in some contexts. Future research conducted with a larger sample size and over a longer research period could provide more accurate and representative data on usage patterns of basa Walikan. Particular attention could be given to the manner in which basa Walikan is used as a means to censor talk. Further studies could also investigate similarities and differences with similar registers in Javanese and related Austronesian languages.

**Reference**


Renungan Agustus
Poem by Yacinta Kurniasih

Agustus tiba menyapa
Ada kehenengan mengusik yang selalu datang bertandang ketika Juli usai
Kata langit di atas kepalaku
‘Apa artinya merdeka?
Apa artinya menjadi Indonesia?’

Kaki berhenti terhenyak sejenak
Menepuk kepala, mata dan telinga untuk tengadah ke atas dan menerawang

Kucoba kususuri tahun-tahun lama yang mengantar kita ada
Sebelum merah putih
Sebelum ada jati diri
Ketika tanah berpijak selalu berlari mengungsi
Ketika goni menjadi baju dan ketela tanpa rasa menjadi penyangga raga
Ketika untuk hidup sehari harus sembunyi dalam ratusan hari
Ada mesiu menyerbu
Ada meriam berdentam
Ada granat yang menyayat
Ada bambu runcing

Lalu lahirlah jiwa raga pemudi-pemuda
Dengan keberanian yang paling berani
Dengan darah yang membuncuh
Dengan kematian yang beribu
Dengan kegigihan yang tanpa batas membawa kita ke tujuh belas Agustus seribu sembilan ratus empat puluh lima.

Agustus masih di sini
Kaki masih terhenyak
Ada rasa bersalah
‘Mengapa dulu aku tak di sana?’
Ada limpahan rasa syukur yang tak terukur
‘Bagaimana aku mengucapkan terima kasihku?’
Ada rasa berdosa karena tanya yang selalu ada
‘Sudah siapkah aku untuk menjadi merdeka?’

Di ujung langit bintang kecil berkedip menggoda seakan bertanya
‘Apa yang terjadi jika seandainya tidak ada tujuh belas Agustus seribu sembilan ratus empat puluh lima?’

Kepalaku menggeleng dalam hening tanpa jawaban
Lalu kaki beranjak pergi membawa janji-janji untuk negeri
‘Harus kumulai dari diri sendiri
untuk mencintai pertiwi dengan apa yang kubisa.
Akan kucintai sesamaku dulu
Karena itulah artinya merdeka’
August reflections
(Translation by Stuart Robson)

August arrives to greet us
There is a niggling sense of awareness that always comes to visit when July is done:
‘What does it mean to be free?
What does it mean to be Indonesian?’

Feet stop short for a moment
Tapping my head, eyes and ears to look up and daydream

I try to trace back the long years that brought us to where we are
Before the red-and-white flag
Before there was a sense of self
When the land where we stand was always running for shelter
When gunnysacks became shirts and tasteless cassava was staple diet
When to live for a day we had to hide for a hundred
There was gunpowder assaulting
There were guns booming
There were tearing grenades
There were bamboo stakes

Then souls and bodies of young boys and girls were born
With a bravery most brave
With alarming blood
With deaths by the thousand
With that limitless perseverance that brought us to the seventeenth of August nineteen forty-five

August is still here
Feet still stop short
There is a feeling of having done wrong:
‘Why wasn’t I there?’
There is a flood of gratitude that can’t be measured
‘How can I ever say thank-you?’
There is a feeling guilt because the question that’s always there
‘Was I ready to become free?’

On the horizon a little star is twinkling as if tempting to ask
‘What would have happened if there had been no seventeenth of August nineteen forty-five?’

I shake my head in silence without an answer
Then my feet move on bearing promises for the country
‘I must begin from my own self
To love mother earth, however I can.
I will love my fellow beings first
Because that’s what it means to be free’