

*Women and Philosophy:
History, Values, Knowledge*

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Abstracts

in alphabetical order

Ross Barham (University of Melbourne) and Chloe Mackenzie (University of Melbourne) **Disabled Reasons**

Is rational discourse capable of heeding the semantic import of oppressed voices? Rae Langton and Caroline West's 'Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game' famously explicated David Lewis's philosophy of language to further reveal how inferential moves of accommodation not only silence certain stakeholders, but also generate oppressive semantic content. In this talk, I consider whether, once such semantic oppression is in play, the traditional practices of rational discourse can hope to recognise and pay due credence to the legitimacy of these subjugated voices. Specifically, I critically examine some of the dialectical moves undertaken by Peter Singer in some of his responses to criticisms levelled against his views on, for instance, neo-liberal eugenics, animal ethics, and charitable monetary donations. I finish by suggesting some strategies that might better mitigate against, if not satisfactorily counteract, trenchant semantic inequalities in rational philosophical discourse.

Kelly Beck (University of Queensland) **The Possibility of Uncovering a History of Feminist Philosophy through the Use of the Literary Text in Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex***

When thinking about the history of feminist philosophy from a contemporary perspective, *The Second Sex* by Simone de Beauvoir is the foundational text through which divergent feminist philosophies have developed. However, if we think about the history of feminist philosophy from the perspective of Beauvoir writing *The Second Sex*, we are faced with the question: does Beauvoir draw on a pre-existing lineage of feminist philosophers, that is, is Beauvoir continuing a tradition of feminist philosophy, or is she situated as a woman in philosophy. As a woman in philosophy we can perhaps think about her through her relationship to the patriarchal model of Western philosophy. However, if she is continuing a tradition of feminist philosophy that perhaps exists outside the patriarchal model, we can think about *The Second Sex* as a text that both produces and extends a history of feminist philosophy. Beauvoir notably relies on an extensive range of literary texts to support and construct her arguments about the lived experience of women including texts from George Eliot, Virginia Woolf and Colette. This paper will consider if it is possible—and if so, how it is possible—to construct a history of women in philosophy through the literary sources Beauvoir uses in *The Second Sex*.

Sandrine Berges (University of Bilkent, Turkey) **Sophie de Grouchy and the Publication of Condorcet's Sketch of Human Progress: a Tale of Exclusion**

In this paper I examine some of the evidence for collaboration between Condorcet and Sophie de Grouchy on the writing of the *Sketch of Human Progress*, but also, uncover the ways in which the

publication and reception of that text worked to exclude a woman who was a philosopher in her own right from a work she clearly contributed to. In 1795, the Convention of the French Republic, regretting its role in bringing about Condorcet's death, commissioned 3000 copies of his last piece, a *Sketch of Human Progress*. Daunou was chosen to edit it and wisely, he asked Condorcet's widow and collaborator, Sophie de Grouchy, to co-edit. This same text was re-edited by Grouchy in 1802 when she brought out the complete works of her husband, but when in 1847 Arago, of the Academie Francaise, decided to publish a new edition of the complete works, he put the Daunou/Grouchy edition of the *Sketch* aside and instead 'went back to the manuscript' provided him by his own co-editor, the Condorcets' daughter Eliza. A look at the manuscript itself shows that it would have been hard to extract a clear text from it – it is hard to decipher, heavily annotated, and clearly waiting further revisions. Moreover, some of the annotations appear to be in Grouchy's hand, suggesting that she may have collaborated with her husband on the manuscript. There are other reasons to suppose that husband and wife may have worked together on the *Sketch*, some relating to the history of this particular work, but also because they had collaborated in the past. If I am right that Sophie de Grouchy had a hand in the writing of the *Sketch*, it seems that we have strong reasons not to dismiss – and indeed to prefer – her edition of that same text in 1795, and again 1802, as she would have been in a much stronger position to make sense of that very messy manuscript than an editor half a century later would.

Ruth Boeker (University of Melbourne) **Catharine Trotter Cockburn on Personal Identity, Consciousness and Sleep**

In debates about personal identity it is sometimes asked whether periods of unconscious sleep undermine psychological accounts of personal identity. My aim in this paper is to show that Catherine Trotter Cockburn made important new contributions to these debates. The debates to which Trotter Cockburn contributes were initiated by John Locke's criticism of the Cartesian view that the soul always thinks. In her *Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding* she responds to criticisms by "the Remarker" (commonly assumed to be Thomas Burnet, though this has been questioned). I will argue that she develops important arguments of her own to show the implausibility, first, of the Cartesian view that the soul always thinks, and second, of the Remarker's assumption that an always thinking soul is required to explain the immortality of the soul. I will end by critically reflecting on how we can account for a person's continued existence during periods of unconscious sleep in light of her arguments.

Michelle Boulous Walker (University of Queensland) **Porosity: Between Teresa Brennan and Hélène Cixous**

Since her untimely death in 2003, there has been surprisingly little engagement with Teresa Brennan's challenging work on the transmission of affect. Brennan claims that, contrary to the illusion established by the "foundational fantasy", individual subjects are not self-contained. Objectivity posits an individual isolated from affective connections with others. Brennan rejects this, arguing that affect (both positive and negative) circulates energetically between one subject and another. In patriarchal cultures, mothers (and "feminine beings") traditionally carry the burden of negative affects - such as anger, aggression, and envy – by becoming passive repositories of projected fear. Brennan's work brings the question of intersubjective boundaries to the fore, arguing that these are porous and that any account of ethical relations between self and other needs to acknowledge this. She develops a new paradigm of intersubjective affectivity. In a positive vein, Brennan offers love – in the form of attention and discernment - as the positive gift of affect that circulates between bodies, enhancing the intersubjective relation. Her work on the transmission of affect offers a bold and very political

philosophical intervention into early twenty-first century ethical accounts. Hélène Cixous's work on the vulnerability of the *entredoux* provides us with an account of intersubjectivity in terms of porosity, permeability, and danger. The *entredoux* charts the dangerous porosity of the vulnerable space of longing between the self and other. While vulnerability is traditionally thought of as a liability or a weakness, Cixous's work offers an account that hovers between a destructive gesture and a regenerative openness. As with Brennan's work, Cixous's investigation of porosity takes us to the limits of the boundary between self and other. In this paper, I explore the porous spaces between Brennan's and Cixous's gestures in order to better engage the legacy of Brennan's philosophical work.

Jacqueline Broad (Monash University) **Mary Astell's Concept of Self: A Malebranchean Feminist Principle?**

The self is a central concept in the feminist philosophy of early modern English thinker Mary Astell (1666-1731). The concept features in her calls for women to cultivate the virtues of proper "self-love" and justified "self-esteem", and to aspire toward the goal of true "self-preservation". Some scholars claim that Astell's feminist philosophy is derived from her Cartesian dualism and her commitment to the Cartesian idea of the self as an essentially thinking thing. Yet, contrary to Descartes, Astell explicitly denies that we can have a clear and distinct idea of the self: 'I have no clear Idea of that which is properly my self,' she says, 'nor do I well know how to distinguish its Powers and Operations.' In this paper, I examine the role that the self plays in Astell's feminist arguments. My contention is that despite her denial that we can have a clear and distinct idea of the self, she allows that we can have intuitive (self-evident) knowledge of the soul and its operations through immediate consciousness. I argue that this direct first-person awareness is a fundamental starting point for many of her central feminist arguments. I further contend that this starting point owes more to the ideas of Nicolas Malebranche and his English follower John Norris than to those of Descartes.

Petra Brown (Deakin University) **Nativity: Arendt's Challenge to the *Kampfsgemeinschaft* (battle-community)**

Hannah Arendt's concept of natality lends itself to a divergent number of interpretations and visions of political community. Natality has been read and interpreted through both a secular political (Villa 1999; Vatter 2006; Schott 2010; Honig 1992, 2010) and a more explicitly religious/theological framework (Bernauer 1987; Jantzen 1998; Bowen-Moore 1989; Gottlieb 2011; Biss 2012). Far from a straightforward 'secular' or 'theological/religious' motif, the concept of natality can be seen to provide a more holistic framework that enables a vision of community that challenges not only the secular/theological divide, but challenges the idea of community as constituted first and foremost on alienation between human beings. This paper places Arendt's concept of natality in dialogue with various concepts of community developed by her contemporaries: Carl Schmitt's concept of the *Freund-Feind-Unterscheidung* (friend-enemy relation), Martin Heidegger's concept of *Mitsein* (being-with) and Dietrich Bonhoeffer's concept of *amor mundi* (love of the world). Through engaging with these political, philosophical and theological thinkers respectively, this paper considers to what extent Arendt's concept of natality challenges and provides an alternative vision to the idea that community always begins with the premise of overcoming radical otherness. Whilst not herself an explicitly feminist philosopher, Arendt's vision for political life, based on the concept of natality, nevertheless envisions a community that is not born out of imperialist or militaristic domination over others.

Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir (University of Iceland) **Misogyny as Dehumanization**

Throughout history, the notion of a human nature has been used to oppress people in various ways. Those who have deviated from the desirable norm have been accused of being 'unnatural' or 'perverse', marginalized and even been subjected to violence. Furthermore, marginalized groups as a whole have been excluded through their failure to live up to the human ideal. This does not entail that ideas of human nature can only be used for pernicious purposes. After all, the notion of a joint humanity has been used as a basis for human rights in an inclusive manner, even for the purpose of enforcing the rights of the very same groups previously dehumanized.

The analysis of misogyny proves difficult from a philosophical perspective for various reasons. One is that without a clear definition of 'woman' or 'femininity' or 'the female', it becomes difficult to spell out what the exact object of misogyny is, presuming that misogyny is something along the line of 'Hostility toward women, (what are considered) feminine traits, or the female'. Another reason is that feminists who are critical of gender may very well have a negative attitude toward womanhood or feminine traits, yet it is by no means clear that this attitude should be collapsed into the same phenomenon as what is more traditionally called misogyny.

I give an analysis of misogyny as a form of dehumanization which saves gender critical feminism from the accusation of misogyny and encourages an inclusive notion of human nature.

Petra Bueskens (University of Melbourne) **Carole Pateman and the Category of "The Individual": the "Fulcrum on which Patriarchy Turns" or the Foundation of Women's Rights?**

Carole Pateman's theory of the sexual contract establishes an argument that "the individual is the fulcrum on which patriarchy turns" (1988: 14). Specifically, she argues that the category of "the individual", developed in the early modern social contract theory of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, modernizes patriarchy around an exclusive concept of fraternity (or brotherhood). The category of "the individual" excludes women and *cannot*, in Pateman's terms, be resolved to include them given its foundation in a cardinal distinction between public and private spheres and its concomitant reliance on women as dependent wives and mothers in the private sphere. This paper summarises Pateman's views while putting forward a challenge to this idea arguing, contra much feminist social and political theory, that Pateman was 'right about rights': "the individual" *is* a fraternal-patriarchal category. However, women have, from the outset, appropriated this category and developed novel, even if initially clandestine, forms of individualized subjectivity. The paper concludes with a defense of the category of "the individual" for women's rights and the assertion of autonomous women.

Megan Burke (Oklahoma State University) **Gender as a Present Absence: Rethinking a Phenomenological Account of Gender**

Judith Butler, like Jacques Derrida, challenges phenomenology for its uncritical assertion of subjectivity and experience as presence. Butler claims that Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir treat the materiality of the body and the subject as self-evident or as presence.¹ Accordingly, a phenomenological theory of gendered embodiment inevitably fails because the body is asserted as an indisputable and given reality that guarantees subjectivity. In this paper, I offer a different reading of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological understanding of materiality, one that not only shows affinities with Butler's view, but also fares better in its treatment of materiality. While I am sympathetic with Butler's project, I think a phenomenological account of gendered subjectivity best discloses the integral relationship between corporeality and the actualization of gender.

I look to Merleau-Ponty's notions of sedimentation, habit and anonymity in *Phenomenology of Perception* to account for materiality and subjectivity as temporal phenomenon that are both present

and absent. For Merleau-Ponty, subjectivity is an affective bodily accrual of the past (habit) such that a subject is generated from a “past that has never been present,” or a past that never will be present as presence.² As I see it, this anonymous character of subjectivity allows us to think about gender in a way that places the materiality of the body as central, but not the cause of, the actualization of gendered subjectivity. Understanding gender as anonymous shows how gender actualizes in the lived body as habit. I suggest that the living body is the receptacle for gender as a present absence, which discloses why gender embodiment is paradoxically hypervisible and yet deeply invisible in everyday lived experience. This reading of Merleau-Ponty provides a denaturalized view of gender and the body, thereby echoing Butler, while underscoring the necessity of corporeality to the actualization of gendered life as an absence.

Charmaine Carvalho (Hong Kong Baptist University) **Private Ethics in Public: Ethics of Care in *Battle for Bittora***

The work of female ethicists offered an important intervention into philosophical discussions of ethics by foregrounding the inevitability of relationality and the role of emotion in moral life. However, the ethics of care perspective attracted criticism for the threat to individuality posed by its unproblematized veneration of relationality, its elision of the question of justice and its universalizing tendency. In the postcolonial context, Uma Narayan has pointed out how the ethics of care discourse bears eerie resemblance to the logic of colonialism.

Interestingly, Carol Gilligan’s essay “In a Different Voice: Women’s Conceptions of Self and of Morality” (1998) cites the psychologist Erik Erikson’s critique of Gandhi for the Indian leader’s failure to uphold in his everyday relations with his family and the children in his ashram the ethic of nonviolence that he was committed to in his public life. Gandhi’s uncompromising morality hovers over Indian public life even today and comes into sharp relief against the more venal on-the-ground realities of contemporary Indian politics in *Battle for Bittora*, a chick lit novel by Anuja Chauhan. Because the novel places its female protagonist in the male-dominated and corruption-ridden arena of Indian politics, *Battle for Bittora* provides an opportunity to test out Gilligan’s schema for women’s moral development. The novel reveals that the colonial care discourse that Narayan alerts us to is ubiquitous among the political class in India, and highlights the tension between the discourses of ethics of care and ethics of justice. The paper points to the problems that arise when one approach must be chosen over the other, providing an argument for a necessary interweaving of the two ethical perspectives to arrive at a fuller moral standpoint.

Ezgi Ece Çelik (Hacettepe University, Turkey) **Overcoming the Externalization of Nature in Western Epistemology**

Although Western science often evaluated by its great achievements, domination on nature is ignored in the process of seeking for objectivity and certainty. But today it is important to consider Western epistemology through the history of exploitation of nature, as the process of self-realization of masculine reason. Masculine reason positioned itself to the center while it externalized nature as an exterior environment. Especially by hierarchical dualism and mechanical view of western epistemology, nature had been seen as a passive object of science and as an external environment that must be under control.

Women are also externalized by this approach which seeking for certainty through the analogy between nature and women. Nature as nurturing mother earth had become a material passive object of science and a resource of technological and commercial activities. As destruction of nature and over-consumption of natural resources for the sake of human power; *wild nature* of women is also dominated and domesticated by tradition and social judgements for the sake of masculine reason.

Both the basis of ecological problems that arising due to over-consumption of nature and the basis of political and epistemological externalization of women, constituted by the habit of hierarchical dualistic thinking and the pursuit of certainty. To overcome the externalization of nature and women in Western epistemology, thinking on “order”, “certainty”, “object-subject dualism”, “nature-culture dualism”; and also being conscious of *interconnectedness*, giving place to multiple positioning and different possibilities is very important today.

From that point of view, this presentation tries to focus on possibilities to undermine epistemological approaches that pave way for depletion of natural resources and the patriarchal domination over women, and to transform different epistemological perspectives in the light of *interconnectedness*.

Jua-hwa Chen (Soochow University, Taiwan) **Gender Awareness in Taiwanese Philosophical Studies**

In 2002, the Taiwanese Feminist Scholar Association organized a workshop on an investigation of textbooks at various disciplines in Taiwan. Focused on gender awareness, textbooks were critically reexamined. The participants of the workshop had made a decision that gender-biased thinking or theories have to be exposed in different disciplines and more gender sensitive knowledge need to be addressed and profoundly produced in every study. My presentation would like to address the gender awareness issue in the used textbooks in Taiwan’s philosophical circle as well as the studies, to consider how far the gender awareness is improved or inhibited and why it is hard for the feminist philosophers to survive in this system.

Eileen Clements (Federation University, Australia) **Situating Love Within Feminist Theory and Philosophy: Conceptualisations of Love as a Political Power**

In 1914, feminist anarchist Emma Goldman, speaking of love in an essay, wrote of the “potentialities of such a force in the life of men and women” (1969). Later, Audre Lorde characterised Eros as a “creative power and harmony” (1984). In the last decade, bell hooks has argued that love is a power that can empower individuals, communities and the oppressed (2000, 2001, 2004). The idea that love can be a powerful force for feminist social change is not a new idea; however, the theorisation of love as a power or energy is lacking within feminist theory and philosophy. When love has been examined, it has usually been situated within the arenas of either sexual politics or care ethics, or, it has been the negative aspects of love that are the focus of the research. Recently, with the developing area of ‘feminist love studies’ the conceptualisation of love as a political force is receiving renewed and reinvigorated theoretical attention. This paper will reflect on the way the concept of love has developed over time within feminist theory and philosophy, focusing on the concept of love as a political force within the feminist movement and in re-imaginings of social justice.

Jane Connell (independent scholar) **The Compulsion(s) to Repeat and Logics of Practice**

Since Freud coined the term the *compulsion to repeat* critics from Strachey to Laplanche and Pontalis have noted the paradox that while the trope is central to the edifice of psychoanalytic theory—it bridges the troubled theoretical water between definition of the *pleasure principle* and of the *death instincts*—its own definition remains elusive. Re-evaluation of Freud’s clinical evidence for it suggests a theoretical fault-line which dissolves this paradox: the term has two distinct, but rarely delineated, meanings.

Its empirical substantiation rests on reference to three patients—all women who left treatment against Freud’s advice. His case study of the Baroness Moser, “Fraü Emmy,” the only developed clinical exegesis of the trope, is marked by inconsistencies that mirror these theoretical tensions. Freud came to see this treatment as flawed and naïve, as “a senseless and worthless proceeding.” The Baroness, a recognised intellectual of her time, independently concluded that the treatment was superficial and repressive. Nonetheless Freud retrospectively attributed her departures from treatment as “a genuine case of the *compulsion to repeat*”.

Freud and the Baroness each separately recognised that her treatment failed due to his incompetence; however Freud’s understanding of his role as a practitioner, his need to maintain a distinction *a propos* the epistemological standing of the opinions of the patient and those of the analyst and his heteronormative perspective precluded any mutual recognition of this phenomenon. Instead, these operations of the logic of his praxis were obscured by his pathologisation of the patient’s departure as an instance of the *compulsion to repeat*. At this point what had been simply the patient’s remembering repressed material in behaviour was redefined as an “inherent,” “instinctual” and thus unanalysable limit. Insofar as this turn in the meaning of the trope remains unrecognised we continue to endorse these operations.

Sharon Crasnow (Norco College, USA) **Contemporary Feminist Standpoint Theory: Tensions, Integrations, and Extensions**

Analyses of feminist standpoint theory during the last decade offer better understanding of how the approach preserves feminist value commitments while at the same time meeting epistemic goals of science. These analyses identify three theses of feminist standpoint theory: situated knowledge, epistemic privilege, and achievement (Wylie 2001, 2004; Intemann 2010; Rolin 2009; Crasnow 2012, 2014). I focus on tension revealed by two trends in these recent analyses and propose a way to address these tensions.

The first approach emphasizes the social and political nature of feminist standpoint theory – the achievement thesis. Standpoint is achieved through “struggling with” others members of an oppressed group in order to understand power structures through which oppression distorts knowledge production (e.g., Pohlhaus 2002). Such approaches remind us that the roots of standpoint theory lie in Marxism, and while the political is crucial, the politics need not be Marxist. Another important element of feminist standpoint methodology calls for “starting from the lives of women” (Smith 1974). And thus the second trend grapples with understanding situated knowledge. Lived experiences are experiences of individuals and the differences among individual experiences are crucial to understanding different forms of oppression. Any account of how epistemic privilege derives from standpoint has to be authentic to the lived experience and situated knowledge of individuals. Earlier misunderstandings of feminist standpoint theory charged the approach with essentializing women, in part because of the tension between the social/political aspects of knowledge and the need for lived experiences as a touchstone. I argue that a fully developed contemporary feminist standpoint theory should address this tension. A better understanding of struggling with will recognize the fluid, dynamic, social and political aspects of individuals. I make use of resources from intersectionality to develop such an account.

Irene Delodovici (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg) **Talking About the Flesh: Irigaray and Merleau-Ponty on (Gendered) Language**

In Luce Irigaray’s work the language of philosophy, as well as the language of ordinary life, appears as a monologue of a solipsistic (male) subject, rather than a possibility for a dialogue between individuals. Language works, in Irigaray’s perspective, as an instrument of selfaffection through which the male

subject can retrace himself, a kind of self-narrative in which no encounter with the other (for Irigaray primary a sexuated other) or real access to the common world takes place. In *An Ethics of Sexual Difference* (1993), Irigaray presents the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty as one of the few thinkers who became aware of this, even if in an unconscious way. Nevertheless, his philosophy remains, according to Irigaray, anchored in the idea of an allegedly neutral „universal word“, which, unable to say the novelty of the other, continues to be trapped in a repetitive circularity.

As for other philosophers, by refusing to assign the female body a different ontological status than the male one, Merleau-Ponty fails to recognise its specificity and relegates it to the fulfillment of a maternal function. In contrast to that, gender is for Irigaray a primary and irreducible dimension of the subject's structure, which is instilled in each subject's act. Furthermore, a revolution in language represents the first and most important step towards a gender-equitable ethics.

Focusing on the problem of language, I will argue against Irigaray that Merleau-Ponty neither neglects the bodily roots of language nor does he underestimate the role of alterity. In his philosophy language is seen as an eminently intersubjective phenomenon. Through this reinterpretation of Merleau-Ponty, I will show that these two authors should be considered closer than Irigaray herself admitted.

Olga Demos (Deakin University) **Stoic Philosophy as Therapy: Facilitating Change in the Lives of Women Experiencing Intimate Partner Violence**

The attachment of victims of intimate partner violence (IPV) to their violent relationships involves, tragically, the normalising of suffering as a way of life: a way of life that denies them happiness and freedom, and makes impossible women's severing of their ties with their abusive partners. Victims of intimate partner violence (IPV) regularly lose interest in caring for their selves, instead becoming caught up in negative emotions reflecting self-destructive modes of cognition which become self-debilitating. On this basis, this paper proposes to bring ancient Stoicism's therapeutic lens to consider how we can hope to improve these women's lives: placing emphasis on the internal/external distinction, and the critique of negative affects; as a means to empower women to overcome their existential crises. I argue that the Stoic philosophy of self-cultivation, far from being a cold and unhelpful therapeutic philosophy, offers us means of transforming the individual's disposition to restore women's moral integrity, confront and overcome their passions, and finally, enable women to rationally detach from their partners.

Marguerite Deslauriers (McGill University) **Lucrezia Marinella and Marguerite Buffet on the Sameness of Souls**

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of a move from the claim that women are superior to men to the claim that the sexes are equal, in the development of the debate about the worth of women in seventeenth century Italy and France. I take as an example of the position that women are psychologically as well as physically superior to men the treatise by Lucrezia Marinella, *La nobiltà et l'eccellenza delle donne co' difetti et mancamenti de gli uomini*, (Venice, 1601), and of the position that "the soul has no sex" – and hence that men and women are equal – the first book of Marguerite Buffet's *Nouvelles observations sur la langue française* (Paris, 1668). Both Marinella and Buffet assert the physical superiority of women, but they differ on the question whether the souls of men and women are the same. Although each adopts an Aristotelian framework for understanding causation, and pursues the question of superiority or equality in terms of that framework, Marinella and Buffet disagree about the nature of the final cause of women. Marinella argues that it is different, and nobler, than the final cause of men, while Buffet rejects that view. This paper explores the details, and the importance, of this debate. In particular, it compares two claims: (i) Buffet's assertion that, although

all individual human souls are the same in principle, their “effects or actions” diverge and (ii) Marinella’s claim that women and men, despite having the same rational soul, pursue ends with different degrees of moral value, which affects the character of their rational souls. The metaphysical and political implications of these positions will be contrasted.

Karen Detlefsen (University of Pennsylvania) **Mary Astell and the History of the Idea Self-Love**

The idea of self-love has a long and interesting history in philosophical thought, including throughout the early modern period. One especially intriguing version of this theme is Rousseau’s distinction between two forms of self-love – *amour propre* and *amour de soi meme* – found in his educational treatise *Emile*. The complex and fascinating account he gives of these forms of self-love are entwined with fascinating ideas on the nature of autonomy, the role of education in the cultivation of autonomy, and the relationship between individuals and communities. But a century earlier, Astell also employs the idea of self-love to address the themes of autonomy, education, individuals and communities, and she does so in a markedly different manner and with markedly different conclusions than what we find in Rousseau. For unlike Rousseau, her philosophical ideas, including those about self-love, are developed not as ideal utopian visions of productive human life, but from within the realities that humans, and especially women, find themselves. And unlike Rousseau, her philosophical theories, including those about self-love, draw upon the importance of community for individuals, as opposed to the relatively isolationist views offered in *Emile*. What emerges in Astell’s work, then, is a way of thinking about self-love that is productive for all members of society – included those traditionally oppressed – and a way of thinking about communities that is realistic and positive.

Seung-Youn Dho (Kwanwun University) **Globalization Generated Female Immigrant Worker’s Issue in South Korea**

This research intends to firstly examine current situation in economical globalization represented as neo-liberalism has strengthened the inequality between the nations, and inner-parts of nation. Secondly, inquiring the system of inequality in South Korean agriculture. Specifically, I will focus on the subject of cultural, contextual inequality restricted as female immigrant workers in South Korean agricultural business, whose poor lives would be brought light into multidimensional element of ‘new poverty’.

While most of researches on poverty in South Korea have gone for centering on income, house holder, city-oriented issues until now, this research would adhere to the global trend of “feminization of poverty” calling on the ‘female immigrant workers’. And then providing an opportunity for critical reflection on the aspect of the poor lives of female immigrant workers in the respect to strategy of governmentality by Foucault.

Madhumita Dutta (Vidyasagar College for Women, Kolkata, India) **Spiritual Feminism: A Discourse on Indian Womanhood**

The contemporary picture of the status of Indian women is quite misleading when seen in relation to the matriarchal tradition of our religio-philosophical historicity. Today women are socially, politically marginalised, sexually victimised and ghettoised within the bounds of domesticity. The ideal of womanhood upheld before us is that of a submissive, subjugated, domiciled wife, daughter, or at best, mother, completely controlled and governed by an all-powerful and all-pervasive patriarchy. This is a misogynic deviation from the true Indian tradition of revering the woman as Divine Feminine. All major philosophies in India regard the woman as the primordial, supreme Power— *Adya Shakti*. Woman, identified with the all-pervading Nature, the Conscious Energy of the universe, as Creator

and Saviour, enjoys equal ontological status with man in the woman-centric theology of India. My paper seeks to explore and explain this Indian tradition of spiritual feminism, which defies all patriarchal logic, and refutes absolutely any idea of male supremacy. This tradition is not all past; time and again have appeared on the Indian front, spiritually virile women, who embody the ideals, values and strength of Divine femininity. My special focus is on two such women, who lived and worked in the heyday of materialist civilisation, in 20th century India. Sri Sarada Ma of the Sri Ramakrishna order, and the Mother of the Sri Aurobindo Ashram were two spiritual dynamos in whom the mighty stream of spirituality flowed, bridging the ancient ideal of *Shakti* and emancipatory feminism of modern times. True to the Indian ideal of Divine motherhood, both these women are revered as 'Mother', and looked upon as spiritual guides, leading the way to suprasensuous and superconscious levels of life. Their advent proclaims the revival of the Goddess cult, where woman is worshipped as the material embodiment of the Absolute, the Spirit.

Sandra Field (Yale/National University of Singapore) **Aristocracy and the Logic of Spinoza's Political Philosophy**

Recent scholarship on Spinoza's political philosophy has stressed its democratic character. Whilst there is disagreement as to whether it is a liberal democracy or a radical democracy to which Spinoza is committed, a focus on certain passages of TTP combined with a speculative reconstruction of the absent final chapter of TP have engendered some degree of consensus that it is as democratic theory that Spinoza's political philosophy needs to be understood. Spinoza may talk about monarchy, but the monarchy is viewed as a crypto-democracy, more powerful in proportion as the king's powers diminish and the king's council rules. Spinoza may talk about aristocracy, but this is often dismissed as a concession to the contingencies of the Dutch political situation at the time, and in any case, it is a bit boring to read.

In this paper, I would like to take Spinoza's theory of aristocracy seriously. I argue that in his model of aristocracy, Spinoza lays out a vision of politics which eminently meets his criteria for a state to be *sui juris* and absolute. Yet the foundation of this absoluteness is not the incorporation of the people's power into the ruling of the state, as is the case in Spinoza's democracy. Rather, the foundation of absoluteness is the thorough disempowerment of the people. In this form of government, one striking feature of Spinoza's political philosophy comes to the fore: he has no a priori commitment to human equality, unlike his supposedly less radical contemporaries such as Locke. If Spinoza is not committed to democratic equality per se, what does this mean for the relevance of his political philosophy? Yitzhak Melamed recently called for readers of the history of philosophy neither to sanitise nor to demonize what they encounter in old texts, directing his remarks most pointedly to interpreters of Spinoza's political philosophy. In this spirit, rather than demonizing Spinoza for the commitments which are revealed in his analysis of aristocracy, I argue that these commitments productively inflect and nuance our understanding of his model of democracy. Furthermore, I suggest that Spinoza's political philosophy can usefully be understood as an early forerunner of the social theory of the 19th century, in which moral concerns may never be absent, but they are subordinated or secondary to an analysis the possibilities of social and political cohesion.

Moira Gatens (University of Sydney) **Lifting the Veil: George Eliot's Theory of Mind and Morality**

The centrality of the role of sympathy in Eliot's theory of mind and morality is well known to readers of her fiction. Less appreciated is the philosophical subtlety of her account of sympathy and her acute awareness of its pitfalls. Over a decade before the publication of her *magnum opus*, *Middlemarch* (1871-72), Eliot wrestled with the complexity of the problem of other minds and the sympathetic imagination

in her novella, *The Lifted Veil* (1859). This presentation will demonstrate why both of these fictional works warrant our philosophical attention.

Federica Giardini (University Roma Tre, Italy) **For a Feminist Political Economy: a Topological Approach to Value**

In recent years international feminist debate is confronting the relations between women's liberation and neoliberal order (e.g. Nancy Fraser's *Fortunes of Feminism* and Aihwa Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception*). The focus of such analyses seem to draw on power relations, that is to say, neoliberalism as a form of governance and values as social norms are including and excluding the "in/appropriate" subjects. Therefore exploitation and unfair wages are considered as economic fallouts in a more general social and normative framework.

This paper sketches a new approach to value that overcomes the duality between the economic and the ethical-political dimensions, in other terms, between monetary value (wages, prices, incomes, etc.) and normative criteria to establish what a worthy life is. The proposal will take advantage from the rereading of the Italian debate - between Marxist-Postoperaist (Fortunati, Del Re, Federici) and Symbolic feminism (Lonzi, Muraro) - and the French feminist debate between the Materialist (Delphy, Guillamin) and the Sexual difference feminism (Fouque, Irigaray) in the 70-80 decades. The research shows that the opposition between quantitative money-value and qualitative worth and norm, between exploitation and domination can be overcome and addressed following the displacement of the *line of valorization*.

Joan Gibson (University of York, Toronto) **Women in the History of Philosophy: a View from the Early Modern Period.**

The history of philosophy can be told in many different ways. The role of women in this history is largely absent in canonical research guides and textbooks in the field, in spite of increasing numbers of studies of individual women and communities of women. When women do figure in the narrative, the same few figures recur, thus appearing to be the sole representatives of philosophical women. I suggest three ways in which we might select a different approach to telling the story of philosophy that would open more space for women outside the master narrative.

One approach is to bring greater historical depth to discussions of issues which are now understood to be fields for philosophical enquiry, such as the structure of the family, ethics and sexuality, situational virtue, reason and education, or critiques of masculinist norms. Feminist philosophy is too often taken to begin with Wollstonecraft.

A second avenue accords greater appreciation of multiple philosophical genres. Women will have greater prominence if we include their contributions through then contemporary philosophical forms such as dialogues, letters, or philosophical poetry. Too often, it is literary scholars who explore these works, in studies that fall outside philosophy's general purview.

A third way is to ask whether the model for the history of philosophy need be only one told almost entirely in terms of professional philosophy, as a narrative of cumulative correction and improvement to previous positions. Such an approach privileges schools of philosophy and lines of transmission, leaving little room for a more inclusive vision of what philosophy is in the world. This approach might ask about the philosophical culture of the period. Who studied philosophy, why, in what context, how was it used?

Women doing philosophy were neither extraordinarily rare nor common. I will illustrate my discussion with a range of less well known figures across the 16th and 17th centuries.

Evangelia Aikaterini Glantzi (National Kopedestrian University of Athens) **Autonomy Competency, Gender Internalized Oppression and the Authentic Self: Exploring Diana Tietjens Meyers' Contribution to the Procedural Approach to Personal Autonomy**

This paper explores aspects of Diana Tietjens Meyers' important contribution to the procedural approach to personal autonomy. Meyers argued against her predecessors, that procedural conditions of autonomy cannot reveal a true self, if the latter is to be conceived, as intact from socialization. As a result, personal autonomy cannot be construed as a special case of free will. Alternatively, Meyers proposed a procedural approach, according to which, the authentic self emerges from the exercise of autonomy competency, that is, a repertory of coordinated skills which makes self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction possible.

In the first part of the paper, I interpret autonomy competency, as comprised of two categories of skills, that is, basic skills such as introspection and analytical skills and subsidiary skills, such as communication, interpersonal and introspection skills. The role of subsidiary skills is to support the effectiveness of basic skills. Against critics, I argue that implied values, in what I call subsidiary skills, do not render Meyers account weak substantive but shift our conceptual understanding of procedural autonomy, so that, minimal normative conditions of the effectiveness of procedure are included, in the notion of procedural autonomy.

In the second part, I refer to Meyers' influence to M. Friedman's account of personal autonomy and I explore which of the two procedural approaches responds better to the feminist concern of gender internalized oppression. Friedman sees autonomy competency as a causal condition of autonomy, that contributes to the realization of the procedural condition of self-reflection. I argue that Friedman's procedural approach is, conceptually, too thin to capture how gender internalized oppression causes heteronomy, through self-deception. On the contrary, Meyers' rich notion of procedure ensures that the authentic self, who emerges from the exercise of autonomy competency, is as free as possible, from the undesirable influences of gender internalized oppression.

Augusta Gooch (independent scholar) **Why Edith Stein is not a Feminist**

One of the foremost individual philosophers of the 20th century, Edith Stein wrote on women's education, on empathy, on community, on faith and commitment in addition to several large, metaphysical works. Born at the end of the 19th century in Poland, Edith Stein's early life is described in her memoir of growing up in a Jewish family. She showed enormous talent at the university, choosing the life of a philosopher and scholar. Studying with von Hildebrand and Heidegger under Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein's phenomenology matured spanning both early realist phenomenology and later idealist phenomenology. Her life inspiration grew through her catholic faith while her death at Auschwitz was a reminder of her Jewish heritage.

I shall explain three reasons her work seems out of favor with the contemporary feminist ear. Phenomenology is burdened by a narrow essentialism. This is not a new criticism. Such an essentialism distances the philosopher from difference, embodiment, and cultural context. From her later Thomistic *weltanschauung*, definitions of act and potency limit her insights into the importance of temporal lives. Finite lives are pre-defined as not fully significant in contrast to infinite divine life. They have borrowed value, and as such are diminished even before we describe them. Finally, her intense religious fervor seems out of place within a philosophical framework. Her personal religious choices seem to isolate her work from mainstream influence.

I also propose one avenue of reviving interest in her work: that of value response. Edith Stein ultimately sees value in faith, family, individuals, community. This aspect of her work can help overcome the abstract isolationism within her methodologies, both phenomenological and Thomistic.

Sylvaine Gourdain (Université de Nantes) **The Im-possibility of Evil: Considerations on Evil in the Wake of Hannah Arendt**

In this talk I propose to examine the notion of evil in Hannah Arendt—especially in her lecture course *Some Questions of Moral Philosophy*—in order to clarify what I call the im-possibility of evil. This concept of im-possibility comes from the late Derrida and means a possibility which by happening – if it happens – overcomes its own impossibility.

Even if Arendt’s concept of evil opposes Kant’s notion of “radical evil”, I argue by referring to Derrida’s im-possibility that her approach doesn’t lead to a relativisation of evil. On the contrary, it shows the real scope of evil, because it emphasizes its pernicious character and the danger lying in its banality: since evil has no roots, it can extend without limits. It turns out that evil cannot be thought through norms or values, and every attempt to grasp evil on the basis of a moral law fails, because it cannot reach the power of evil. Another kind of ethics is required, which is not grounded on the normativity of criteria, but on the binding force of the responsibility of human beings as persons. This responsibility is based on the duty incumbent upon every individual to think, which allows him to distinguish evil from good and to act accordingly.

Furthermore, citing the example of the crimes committed by the Nazis, Arendt explains that it should not have happened because human beings will not be able to punish it or to forgive it.

In this connection I would like to show that the concept of im-possibility not only applies to the immoderate character of evil beyond every limit, but also to the measurelessness of good. We have to think the good itself as the im-possible event of forgiving the unforgivable in order to think the extreme character of evil in its rootlessness.

Helen Gramotnev (University of Adelaide), **Gender Interplay in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Floral Still Life**

The seventeenth century witnessed changes in society and politics, the developments in science and medicine, and the religious changes in the Netherlands. This was accompanied by an increasing demand of specialised genres of paintings, such as portraits, landscapes and still life. Still life paintings were valued for their degree in realism and often represented *vanitas*, or reminders of fragility and shortness of life.

Despite the fact that women artists were gaining the respect of their colleagues and patrons they were still greatly outnumbered by male artists. Only through family connections women could gain access to training and develop networks necessary for artistic success. Rachel Ruysch (the daughter of a botanist who encouraged her artistic talents) enjoyed a splendid career, which spanned seven decades, and accompanied her very demanding domestic duties (she had ten children). Despite this over a hundred paintings are attributed to her, and she achieved immense popularity and international recognition as a still life artist.

Ruysch's still life paintings are known for their asymmetrical arrangements and for creating an alluring sense of intimacy. This paper explores the interpretations of Ruysch's work, focussing on their masculine symbolism of political influence and of man's mastery of his physical environment. It will explore the microcosm of a floral arrangement as a representation of a nation's influence.

Social conventions constrained women's activities, and they lacked the opportunities given to their male colleagues. Ruysch presents an exceptional example of a female artist, who, in her portrayals of soft, feminine objects achieved recognition equal to men, over a very long spanning career. In this paper I will explore the interplay of the femininity and masculinity in her still life work and demonstrate her influence as a woman artist in a male dominated world of the Dutch Golden Age.

Fiona Vera Gray (Durham University) **Towards a Phenomenology of Violence Against Women and Girls**

Building a hitherto undeveloped phenomenological framework for understanding violence against women and girls (VAWG) creates unique opportunities to deepen our understanding of the embodied consequences of men's violence, as well as opening a space for philosophy within feminism's fourth wave. Employed within the context of an empirical research project, a phenomenological perspective on violence against women and girls has the potential to assist a feminist reframing of men's violence and intrusion, seeking to dissolve the hierarchical divisions used in policy/criminal framings and illuminate women's experiential realities.

This paper will explore the ways in which the recent resurgence of Beauvoirian scholarship seeking to reclaim her distinct philosophical contribution, enabled the activation of her phenomenology within an empirical research project on women's experiences of men's intrusion in public space. It will outline how such an approach offers us useful conceptual tools to bring to some of the most challenging debates in the movement today. Feminist debates based on appeals to women's freedom of agency over their bodies, such as those of pornography and prostitution, could be deepened through a phenomenological account seeking to conceptualise women's ambiguous embodiment. In particular, there are benefits in developing the concept of 'situated agency' in relation to women's body forming a situation itself – one that both limits and expands our possibilities for action. In addition a phenomenological frame for VAWG enables us to speak about connections and commonality, without collapsing the ways in which women experience men's violence differently based on embodiments and social and personal histories. It provides us with a theory of embodied selfhood that also accounts for the different meanings given to the individual and generated by the individual through their socio-historical location, opening up a theoretical space to talk about the realities of VAWG as a constraining context for women without denying our 'space for action'.

Karen Green (University of Melbourne) **Reconsidering Beauvoir's Hegelianism**

The observation that, with regard to their political status, married women are apparently no better than slaves, harks back to before Mary Astell's rhetorical, 'If all men are born free, how is it that all women are born slaves?' In *The Second Sex*, Beauvoir implicitly extends this metaphor, by borrowing Hegel's analysis of slave consciousness, in order to argue that women experience themselves as objects, as other, in a manner analogous to the Hegelian slave. In one form or another, whether through her somewhat critical feminist daughters, or via the wide dissemination of Sartre's existentialist application of the Hegelian account of oppressed consciousness, to the case of anti-semitism and racism, the idea of the oppressed as the other, and the language of objectification, have become commonplaces of radical philosophy. In this paper I argue that this widespread Hegelian legacy is highly problematic, and that feminists, in particular, should be suspicious of philosophies of history, and histories of philosophy that take Hegel seriously. Any such history or philosophy fails to take into account the deep roots of women's comparatively equal status in the west, in the long history of women's political, ethical, theological, and philosophical theorizing since the fifteenth century.

Tamsin Green (Monash University) **Disinterment; Methods in Contemporary Art Practice**

When Linda Nochlin posed the provocative question, *Why have there been no great women artists?* (1971), she introduced a challenge to the institutions of art history and the figure of the artist. Nochlin sought to balance her desire to recover the lost history of women's art, against the restrictions of the existing criteria of the field of art history. Nochlin concluded that 'greatness' was never an innate quality of the artist; hierarchies of access had systematically, if not completely, excluded women from the category of 'greatness'. The curatorial project *Disinterment* brings together a range of contemporary practices that

can, from a methodological perspective, be considered feminist – in particular through the use of historical material within contemporary works. I will argue that the artworks in *Disinterment* function as a critical correction to the institutions of art and to the histories of representation within the field. Feminist art practices cannot be delimited by their formal qualities. Feminist practices have often operated to challenge existing aesthetic categories. For example, Louise Lawler's photographic practice revealed how the social and economic context of the museum object contributes to the meaning and interpretation of that object. In her recent work Lawler has returned to her own archives to re-draw the situations she had previously uncovered. Fiona Macdonald's *Solo Project* revisits the unrealised solo exhibition of Eva Hesse through an archive of Hesse's plans and drawings. Macdonald presents us with a new perspective on the works of Eva Hesse, expanding from the existing fragments in the archive. Both Macdonald and Lawler work into the history of art, reviewing and contextualising the reception of existing artworks. This paper presents the curatorial rationale of *Disinterment* and posits the exhibition itself as the experimental field of the paper.

Ruth Hagenruber (University of Paderborn) **The History of Philosophy Told by Women Philosophers**

The history of philosophy as written by women philosophers parallels many aspects of the commonly known history of philosophy. We face a history of references to familiar concepts and methodologies, but also encounter a history of critique. Women philosophers have shaped a history of their own, uncovering idolatry and partisanship and the misuse of philosophy for dominance and corrupt reasoning. Rewriting the history of philosophy to include the philosophies of outstanding women thinkers will provide the material for a history of new ideas, reviewing metaphysics from Diotima to Du Chatelet and politics from Aspasia to Arendt and beyond.

Sally Haslanger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) **Ideology and Knowledge of What Matters**

In spite of substantial legal and institutional changes in the past several decades, actions that wrongly target women and members of other subordinated groups continue apace. No doubt, these actions can be at least partly explained by the false beliefs and other faulty implicit attitudes that agents harbor. However, the agents in question don't just happen to have these problematic beliefs, or just happen to respond in extreme ways to minor incidents. In this paper I argue that ideology is an important tool for explaining the patterns of unjust and wrongful thought, emotion, and behavior. However, when it comes to ideology critique, certain traditions resist normative, especially moral, commitments. By considering additional resources for moral epistemology, the lecture challenges the critical tradition of relying entirely on contradiction to ground immanent critique and explores alternative contextualist and naturalist options.

Rebecca Harrison (University of Melbourne) **Epistemic Injustice and the Testimony of Sexual Violence Victims**

Recent work on epistemic injustice has drawn attention to the role epistemic norms play in shaping our judgments of who is a credible source of testimony. Many people have argued that when responding to an accusation of sexual violence, we ought to presume the innocence of the accused person. In this paper, I will investigate the implications of the presumption of innocence as an extra-legal epistemic norm. I will argue that by promoting an epistemic framework in which many and perhaps most sexual violence claims will go unacknowledged, the presumption of innocence functions to exclude the claims of sexual violence victims from our social processes of normative articulation and enforcement, thus

denying victims the social recognition they deserve. This causes a kind of dysfunction for our moral communities – which impacts both the victim, and the community as a whole. A gap appears between the moral values we claim to endorse, and our social practices for enforcing this morality. The harm which has occurred is socially erased. This, in turn, forces a kind of social invisibility onto sexual violence victims – they are not accorded the status of victim through the ways others relate to them, and the person who wronged them is not treated in accordance with their status as a wrongdoer. This denial of social recognition in the aftermath of sexual violence, I argue, is particularly destructive as it reinscribes the initial denial of recognition experienced in the act of sexual violence.

Deborah Heikes (University of Alabama, Huntsville) **Rationality as an Epistemic Virtue**

Feminists are understandably ambivalent about modern moral concepts. On the one hand, such concepts are grounded in moral theories that have, in the real world, had highly destructive consequences for those who are neither male nor white. On the other hand, these concepts are absolutely necessary for the success of any feminist project. After all, anyone concerned with exclusion and oppression needs to be able to assert the injustice of such practices. This tension is nothing new, but it stands in need of resolution. The solution stems from the nature of the problem itself: rationality must overcome the inherent exclusivity that emerges from the moderns' attempts to overcome epistemic threats of subjectivism. The solution, in other words, lies in identifying an inclusive and substantively normative rationality. To conceive of rationality as a virtue is to understand that there are a multiplicity of ways to be rational while retaining a justificatory ground for evaluating better and worse ways of comporting our lives. That is, virtue rationality allows for a meaningful defense of equality while insisting on a recognition of diversity. In the end, it is a concept that allows us to defend the claim that exclusionary practices are wrong.

Julian Honkasalo (University of Helsinki/New School of Social Research) **From Pathologization to Coerced Healthification: a Genealogy of Contemporary Trans Sterilization Legislation**

Historical research on public health in 20th century European nation-states has revealed the centrality of eugenic ideology and consequent medico-political practices in all European countries, most notably Sweden. Unlike the popular perception of eugenic sterilization as an invention of World War II Nazi laboratories, the early American and European eugenic movement supporters included hereditary biologists, scientists, penologists, social workers, educators and even first wave feminists. According to government reports and scholarly research, the majority of these eugenic sterilizations were performed on women, immigrants, orphans, alcoholics, the poor as well as those conceived as mentally ill or sexually promiscuous. The sterilizations were conducted in public institutions, such as hospitals, clinics, prisons and care homes.

In this paper I argue that since eugenic sterilization is usually theorized in relation to reproductive heterosexuality, and seen as a historical practice that targeted the assumed hereditary degeneracy of certain heterosexual and normatively gendered bodies and populations, the genealogy of present day, European transgender sterilization legislation has not caught enough scholarly attention in the literature on eugenics or even in the fields of feminist and critical transgender studies. I focus particularly on the ways in which certain forms of embodiment and desire challenged 19th and 20th century medical and criminological understandings of “normal”, human, “sex-typed” behavior and disclose how a complex, biopolitical double bind of pathologization and healthification emerged during the eugenic movement. This double bind, I argue, is still prevalent in present day transgender sterilization legislation discourse.

Jessica Isserow (Australian National University) **There and Back Again: An Internalist's Tale**

According to internalists, there is a tight conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation. Externalists, by contrast, insist that this connection is one of contingency. Regrettably, debates surrounding the character of moral motivation have had notable trouble progressing. This is owing to the fact that there seems to be very little common ground among the relevant parties. A well-known, promising move in the attempt to secure common ground has been to shift the discussion to our concept of the good person. Having agreed upon what we take paradigmatically good people to be like, we can then proceed to debate which understanding of moral motivation that profile of the good person favours. Unfortunately, even this matter has proven to be a point of contention. Here, I recommend an alternative, and less contentious common ground: our concept of the evil person. Ultimately, I argue that our concept of the evil person provides an indirect route to a particular concept of the good person, one that favours the internalist.

Sanna Karhu (University of Helsinki/New York University) **Rethinking Livable Lives: Judith Butler and The Question of Animals**

Judith Butler's recent work (e.g. *Precarious Life* 2004; *Frames of War* 2009, *Parting Ways* 2012) provides a powerful critique of violence in the context of contemporary global conflicts by asking whose lives count as valuable enough for protection against violence and suffering. Underlying Butler's analysis lies her ethical notion of vulnerability, which is based on the idea that although all bodily life can be understood as precarious and thus vulnerable to forms of violence, our ability to respond ethically and politically to the suffering of certain populations is conditioned by the socially operating norms that differentiate between "livable" and "unlivable" lives. During this period of her thought, Butler performs an interesting theoretical shift that moves her analytical focus from the question of "the human" to consider more broadly the normative constitution of "livable lives." While this move would allow Butler to address also the question of animal lives, the topic remains underdeveloped in her reflections on "livability." However, and despite the fact that Butler herself does not make the argument, in this paper I suggest that her theorization of the normative production of "livable lives" offers important insights into the pressing ethical question of animal suffering as well.

Chandra Kavanagh (McMaster University) **Buchanan's Defense of the Status Egalitarian Function of the International Legal System of Human Rights: A Rebuttal**

Justifying the claim that every person has equal basic moral status is an integral step in Allen Buchanan's attempt to outline potential justifications for the current system of international legal human rights, and a system of international legal human rights more generally. It is Buchanan's claim that there are two fundamental functions of this system that must be justified in order to justify having an international legal system of human rights at all, and to evaluate the efficacy of the current system. One of the fundamental functions of this system is the status egalitarian function, which affirms and protects equal basic moral status. In an attempt to justify the status egalitarian function of the international legal system of human rights Buchanan argues that everyone shares a morally salient characteristic, which justifies our equal basic status. On his account this characteristic is the ability to respond to reason. Buchanan's choice to try and justify the status egalitarian function of the current system of international legal human rights on the basis of responsiveness to reasons is problematic for two reasons. First, it assumes a rational subject. This is a common philosophical error that has been problematized by many feminist philosophers. Second, it excludes people we would want to include under the protection of international legal human rights, namely those people who cannot respond to reasons such as those with cognitive disabilities. It is my contention that Buchanan's justification for

the status egalitarian function of the current system of international legal human rights is most promising if we replace the notion of a shared characteristic that justifies equal basic moral status, with the idea of a constellation of characteristics that can come together in a variety of ways to provide justification for equal basic moral status.

Julie R. Klein (Villanova University) **Freedom without Dualism**

Spinoza mocks the idea of freedom as the ability to act from the citadel of an autonomous, disembodied self. The Preface to *Ethics* V tells us that experience “cries out” against such a model. Spinoza rejects, moreover, as destructive ideology the idea of freedom as something we experience. What good is a freedom we cannot actually experience, especially one that counsels us to transcend rather than change the present circumstances? Standard Anglophone readings of the *Ethics* standardly characterize Spinoza’s theory of human freedom as rationalist or intellectualist, and this characterization is undoubtedly true. Yet the standard readings have generally failed to conceptualize Spinozan reason and intellect independently of the dualist (e.g. Augustinian or Cartesian) metaphysics he clearly rejects, and this failure, in turn, has obscured the connection between the freedom discussed in *Ethics* IV-V and the freedom discussed in the *Theologico-Political Treatise* and the *Political Treatise*. French readers (e.g. Matheron, Althusser, Deleuze) have, in contrast, offered more thoroughly materialistic readings, but leave us with questions about how to make sense of the intellectual freedom described in *Ethics* V.

In my paper, I propose to remedy the defects of each approach and provide an integrated reading across Spinoza’s texts. My basic approach to Spinoza is perspectivalist. Perspectivalism emphasizes the non-reductive character of Spinoza’s philosophy. Spinoza’s aspects (eternity and duration or time) and attributes (e.g. thought and extension), as well as substance and modes and modes or kinds of cognition, are on this reading the same and different, and the challenge of thinking sameness and difference together constitutes a major theme in the *Ethics*. To demonstrate the power of this approach, I begin from the culmination of Spinoza’s discussion of freedom in *Ethics*. In *Ethics* Vp36s, Spinoza identifies intellectual love of God (*amor dei intellectualis*) with freedom (*libertas*) and health (*salus*). On Spinoza’s model, mind and body, intellect and affect are, as it were, two sides of one coin, and the freedom arising from the third kind of knowing is nothing but a way of experiencing natural, embodied life.

Anna Kostikova (Moscow State University), **Russia and European Values: Gender Discourse**

The actual context of anti-European sanctions and Russian self-identification as a traditional society makes quite a new sense in Gender discourse. It is a turn of the mainstream of Russian thought to the religious ideology and anti-gender rhetoric. And it is a paradox looking forward the history of feminism in Russia. Socialist feminism powered the soviet ideology and mass conscience from the very beginning. It was a labor attitude of personal diversity in the way to the communist gender neutral ideal. But this attitude was deprived from the language of gender studies. It was the idea of human equality and liberty in all human rights and obligations forward the society and each other’s. New ideal of familial union based on love and respect to each other was the rule for the fundamental brick of the new socialist society since Stalin’s Constitution of Soviet Union. That’s the point “No sex in Soviet Union” – only social interactions and emotions. The perestroika rebuilt this discourse totally in a sexual way and the liberation means in this context the return of before revolution patriarchal relations and attitudes, the return of religious sexist norms and rhetoric of Domostroi. Gender studies came as a strange empiric turn to communist already known past but with a quite new narrative of gender. It was a very welcome introduction in post-colonial postmodern thinking instead of widely and well known

very strict Marxist philosophy. But in highly hooted political debates of now days' gender became a very controversial but very hard argument against so called Europeans values.

Marguerite La Caze (University of Queensland) **Communal Atonement and Impossible Ethical Demands**

What kind of atonement or forms of atonement can contribute to restoring an ethical political community after political violence or oppression? This paper considers how a community can atone for past violence and oppression, in spite of its apparently impossible ethical demands, as outlined by Vladimir Jankélévitch, Arendt, and Derrida. One problem is that there may not be subjects who are able to or who wish to receive atonement. Survivors of the atrocity may be few and unwilling to accept any gestures to make up for the past. Second, the wrong may be so extreme that no form of atonement appears commensurable. Moreover, there may not be offenders willing to offer atonement, since they may be unrepentant or even triumphant. Two feminist philosophers who have presented accounts of making amends and atonement are Margaret Urban Walker and Linda Radzik, respectively. Through a critical discussion of their accounts, I argue that first the violence itself has to be exposed and acknowledged, and then explore how atonement can be offered and experienced through symbolic and practical means of apologies, memorials, commemorations, and reparations or making amends, to attempt to overcome the impossibility of atonement.

Carla Lam (University of Otago) **Theorizing Beyond the Third Wave -- Postconstructionist Feminisms**

In recent years there has been an emergence of interdisciplinary feminist theory that emphasizes materiality as part of a “discontent with the social constructionist orthodoxy” (Alaimo and Hekman 2008: 90). This includes a number of vital, groundbreaking material feminist texts from across the disciplines that analyze the effects of a once-radical feminist constructionism while acknowledging the continuity of thought from across the modern / postmodern spatio-temporal designation. Feminist studies scholar Nina Lykke believes that the new materialist feminisms, best described as “post-constructionism,” are indebted to feminist de/constructionism “from Beauvoir to Butler” (Lykke 2010: 132). Significantly, then, this reengagement has the advantage of decades of feminist insight about the co-constitutive relationship between representation and reality (regarding sex/gender and embodiment), a hallmark of postmodern thought though not exclusive to that approach (see Ahmed 2008, and Lykke 2010a and b).

Furthermore, these postconstructionist, material feminisms are associated with a “breaking feminist waves” methodology which circumvents the limitations of a linear progression to an end goal that is associated with the waves metaphor and counteracts reliance on the characterization of dualistic, unsetttable, and antagonistic differences in feminism, (such as second versus third wave, and essentialist versus constructionist approaches). But this is not a new endeavor in feminist theory. This paper examines the new material, or postconstructionist feminisms as helping to resolve the longstanding essentialist – constructionist impasse in feminist thought (especially as manifested in the complicated feminism / postmodernism relationship).

The biological essentialist / social constructionist dualism represents an impasse because it is characterized by a deeply entrenched conservatism whereby biology and culture are presented as opposed positions leaving us at a stalemate regarding “the woman question” which remains foundational to movements for sex/gender equality. I'll show how postconstructionism offers fresh thinking in feminist theory and practice and as a methodology that critiques, yet acknowledges and draws from both modernist and postmodernist insights.

Jiun Lee (Chosun University, South Korea) **The Imaginary Body and Technogender in the Near Future**

This study asks how can we understand the philosophy of technology from a feminist point of view? I explore how our conceptions of female gender and its social potentials are changed in a more technological society. I present two arguments. First, I propose the female body and the female gender gain new meanings and potentials in a more mechanical age whether in cyberspace or the physical world. My term for this transformation is ‘technogender,’ or, how technological mediation begins to blur or to challenge past ontological categories of the female body or lived female gender roles. This concerns what has been called the posthuman point of view, meaning an improved human body or a human substitute with a machine body. Second, I explore how a more technologically mediated cyborg human (man and/or female) become redefined, particularly around procreation and the act of birth (i.e., artificial insemination, gene editing/selection, test-tube babies, early premature delivery, ultrasound ‘viewing’ before birth or abortion, etc.). Particularly this is simultaneously a novel form of freedom for some females, while it can be used as a novel form of gendered discrimination for others unborn. In the future, such scientific intercessions encroach on the jurisdiction of the female body more and more, and thus define it in terms of both greater flexibility and choice and yet greater potential discrimination and potential constraint. I argue that increasingly the female has an imaginary body and this is the new ontological reality distinct from past biologically clear ontologies. I start from Donna Haraway’s ideas of cyborgs and Catherine Halyes’s ideas of posthumanity. Additionally, I discuss the posthuman ethics of feminist philosophers Rosi Braidotti and Christine Overall. In conclusion, I explain how we can we best talk about the future female body and its novel ontology under these more technologically mediated conditions.

Linda Lopez McAlister (University of South Florida), **IAPh: The Prequel**

The International Association of Women Philosophers had its official founding in 1976 and we are celebrating its 40th anniversary at this conference. But, of course, it did not spring into being out of nowhere. Having been a part of the events that led up to the founding of this wonderful organization, I’d like to share my experience of the organization’s pre-history, and pay homage to three German women philosophers whose support of the idea from the very beginning made it happen: Wiebke Schrader, Elfrieda Tielsch, and Gerda Walther.

Jennifer A. McMahon (University of Adelaide) **Mapping a New Terrain in Philosophical Aesthetics**

The terrain of philosophical aesthetics has been manicured over many centuries so that what we can say or what is deemed relevant is limited by certain entrenched ways of thinking. The terrain has evolved under the constraints of anxiety about relativism and more recently, it must be said, the need to treat an opposing view as a foil to further polemic. Arguably, the game of the debate characterises the terrain more than genuine attempts to understand experience. In this paper, I draw attention to a newly emerging terrain by considering the contribution of women philosophers who seek understanding above all else. Mary Midgley on the myths we live by, explains the subjective augmentation required in order to serve objective ends. Christine Battersby discusses the blinkered history of concepts of genius which in turn impacted upon the value placed upon women’s contribution, in effect thwarting that contribution. She lays the ground for new understanding of awe and innovation. Emily Brady takes on entrenched readings of central themes in aesthetics to re-sketch

the groundwork for the relation between pleasure and freedom. Tomoe Nakamura compares the origins of modern philosophy in the West to Japanese thought and in the process reveals an alternative ontology which resists the dichotomies which have solidified in western thought. Alison Ross works on the autonomy/heteronomy of aesthetic judgment revealing a more potent conception of the aesthetic which embeds the ethical. Cynthia Freeland reveals rationality of the senses without recourse to the conception of reason as upstream. Jane Kneller extends the conception of aesthetic judgment beyond debates about art into the realm of politics and community. From the resulting network of concepts and methods emerges a new field which might be called ethico-aesthetics.

Keya Maitra (University of North Carolina) **Sultana's Dream: Feminist Consciousness Through a Bengali Muslim Lens**

At least 10 years before Charlotte Perkins Gilman publishes *Herland*—often considered the first feminist utopian writing within Western feminist context, Rokeya Sekhawat Hossain—a Bengali Muslim woman—published *Sultana's Dream* in 1905. Targeting the *purdah* & *zenana* faced by women of late 19th and early 20th century Bengal, Rokeya imagines the utopian place of Ladyland that her main character Sultana encounters in her dream. Countering her male dominated society, Rokeya conceives Ladyland as “a technologically advanced world where men are confined to the *zenana* & women guarantee complete freedom.” The general goal of my paper is to explore how Rokeya's utopian science fiction can be considered a feminist text.

Drawing from Sandra Bartky's 1995 article “Toward a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness,” we can identify three features of feminist consciousness: (1) feminist consciousness is transformative since it effects a shift in a woman's cognitive, emotional and physical behavior; (2) it is at least partially liberatory, because it establishes change and liberation as real goals; and (3) in its active moral dimension, it can be taken as not merely self-directed but essentially other and world-directed. Therefore, an awareness of the powers and structures that have worked to limit women is at the heart of feminist consciousness. Further, as Bartky observes, it allows feminists to understand what they are and where they are “in the light of what [they] are not yet.” My working conclusion is that *Sultana's Dream* reflects strong representation of these three features of feminist consciousness: transformative, liberatory in its goals and aimed at changing the wider structure of social reality. Rokeya's portrayal of women and their empowerment in Ladyland does come to represent feminist consciousness. Indeed, it thus reflects strong ‘feminist sentiments’ growing from ‘indigenous roots.’

Anna Malavisi (Michigan State University) **Philosophies of Resistance and the Pursuit of Global Development**

Within the fields of post-colonialism and decolonial studies the concept of global development is rejected and critically acclaimed as perpetuating forms of colonialism or neocolonialism for some. This is all very well, in the theory. However, as it stands, the many institutions implicated in the practice of global development have no intention in shutting their doors and closing the chapter on global development. If anything, with the declaration of the “*Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*,” the resultant outcome of the post-2015 Millennium Development Goals process, a new impetus and fervor is evident.

In this paper, I argue that due to our current, global economic system the pursuit of global development will continue and is inevitable. What this means is that many institutions will continue to invest billions of dollars in the name of global development. As we have seen in past endeavors, this is not likely to adequately address the gross inequalities and inequities that exist globally. While rates of extreme poverty and infant mortality have reduced over the years, these have been disproportionate to

the amount of money invested. In other words, extreme poverty should and can be eradicated, that it has not, is due to a failing global development system.

To help mainstream thinking on the theory and practice of global development better understand where the problems and obstacles lie, and where they are embedded I provide an analysis using feminist epistemology. First, I will describe the situation of global development today, second I will consider the major weaknesses and obstacles of global development. Thirdly, I will describe how feminist epistemologies are crucial for providing a critical lens to the theory and practice of development, but also what this would mean in the practice.

Eva Man (Hong Kong Baptist University) **Some Reflections on Feminist Aesthetics and the Confucian Notion of the Beauty**

Feminist aesthetics rose from the reflection of the situation of women's artistic creativity. However, the reflection is only part of the main agenda of the so-called feminist aesthetics. The paper starts from a brief review of how men have built a world based on mind, reason, spirit, and intellect ever since the fifth century, and have downgraded the body, senses, desires, and emotions, features that are always related to the notion of femininity and aesthetics. It demonstrates philosophical aesthetics' place in the matrix of Western philosophy that is inconsistent with its fundamental logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and values and how feminist aesthetics challenges the "defections" of traditional aesthetic concepts and Kant's aesthetics. It recommends that art should be evaluated according to its potentials in promoting a more effective, moral, and satisfying life. The presentation then turns to Confucian theory of music as an alternative aesthetic paradigm in the traditional Chinese culture, which discusses how aesthetical is conducted in terms of the subject's moral temperaments, which is developed from one's personal qualities, history, experience, and preferences, leading to one's value system and tastes. It claims that the more moral the artistic subject is, the more beautiful one's creative product and aesthetic vision. While echoing the attempts of feminist aesthetics in reconstructing the Western modern aesthetics model, the presentation points out the differences between the proposed agenda and the Confucian modality. It also critically reviews the Confucian's aesthetical claims: when it does not accord with the binary oppositions and dichotomous thoughts that Western feminists criticize, Confucian practice has shifted to a hierarchical authoritarianism and gender elitism that has never endowed women with equal status under its own patriarchal context.

Natividad Dominique G. Manauat (De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines) **Ethics of Care Revisited: Contexting the Filipino Values of Pagkalinga, Pag-aaruga, Pakialam and Feminist Ethics**

In this article, the author looks carefully into revisiting the Filipino value system as it relates to the many ways that caring takes place in the Filipino context. It begins with a critique of traditional value theory that yields to the conclusion that reason-based values have primacy over those that are based on emotion, such as caring. Feminist philosophy's contribution in this context is to cast a critical eye on the way traditional Western philosophy uses said standards of valuation. It is revealed that philosophy and value theory are gendered in particular ways. In looking at the Filipino values of caring such as *pagkalinga*, *pag-aaruga*, and *pakialam* (all Filipino terms that are rooted in 'care') the author puts them in context via life experiences. She argues that caring ought to be recognized and re-valued but finds that most Filipinos have yet to take the value of *pakikipagkapwa* more seriously. She adds that although caring is indeed important, it is not independent of other value systems such as justice-based ethics, among others. Hence, a precarious balance must be made between virtue-based ethics and traditional ethics that is rooted on rational notions of justice.

Cintia Martínez Velasco (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México) **What is a Woman? Feminist Metaphysics, Post-structuralism and Decolonial feminism**

With an analytical and continental approach, influenced by anti-metaphysics, social justice topics have been the starting point to discuss gender issues; we are interested in showing that this will invariably include ontological questions. We suggest highlighting the value of pondering on gender ontology as the basis for political solidarity.

This paper will address in a critical manner two stances in contemporary feminism: post-structuralism and cultural studies. We are interested in their opinions regarding gender essentialism at the center of the discussion.

The points of view that will be juxtaposed are:

- 1) Cultural studies conceive feminine identity in an essentialist-determinist manner. They try to glorify the identity of subordinate socio-cultural groups, by doing so, they defend a type of regional peculiarity against the system. They are at a disadvantage because they dehistoricize essentiality and segment diversity making it impossible to build common bonds between different regions. I will exemplify this stance with a representative of decolonial Latin-American feminism: Ochy Curiel.
- 2) Post-structuralist feminism questions sexual identity realism with its best statement: gender is doing. This stance by Judith Butler—which aims to avoid a determinism that is loyal to gender reproductive functions or a confirmation of heteronormativity—has a tendency to hegemonically prioritize gender over sex. Sexual difference remains empty to the point of being extinguished in sociocultural practices. This has a consequence that is not ideal: an eliminativism of gender (as anti-essentialism). The scope of the demands will be restricted to strategic political situations but it will not be able to give philosophical grounds.

Alongside Charlotte Witt, Linda Alcoff, Natalie Stoljar, the last section in the paper will be an invitation to resume a debate, one that lays out different ways of answering the question: what is a woman? This discussion will be directed by the last debates of Feminist Metaphysics.

Catherine Mills (Monash University) **Seeing, Feeling, Doing: a Critique of Mandatory Ultrasound Laws**

In recent years, a number of US states have adopted laws that require pregnant women to have an ultrasound examination, and be shown images of their fetus, prior to undergoing a pregnancy termination. While there is some critical literature on such laws, there has been almost no philosophical engagement with them, and nor has there been any attempt to unpack one of the basic presumptions of such laws: that seeing one's fetus changes the ways in which one might act in regards to it, including in terms of the (ethical) decision about whether to allow it to live or not. However, this presumption raises significant questions, specifically about the relation between visibility, emotion and ethics. In this paper I elaborate these questions and begin to address them, especially through recent philosophical literature on empathy.

Julia Maria Mönig (University of Passau) **Privacy as a Luxury**

In the history of philosophy as well as in current debates, 'privacy' often figures as a privilege for those, who are wealthy, healthy and educated enough to profit from it. Historically, one example is Aristotle's 'oikos'/'polis'-distinction which has been interpreted as one of the first public/private definitions, whilst only the 'oikosdepotes' as head of the household was able to choose between a public and a private life. The 'privileged', luxurious aspect is also reflected by the feminist critique of

patriarchal systems, when only men are e.g. allowed to earn money or to hold offices. Today less privileged, poorer people might need to ‘sell’ their data to get e.g. discounts by using fidelity cards. In this contribution I take into account several ‘dimensions’ of privacy in order to factor in the many distinct senses of the word privacy. The ‘decisional’ dimension of privacy, for instance, entails being able to come to autonomous decisions considering one’s own body and one’s own life. I claim that privacy should be a universal right because it is a requirement for autonomy. To achieve the goal that anybody can profit from a self chosen ‘amount’ of privacy, we must guarantee the circumstances for people to make decisions which are right for them. If my assertion that more privileged human beings do profit from a greater ‘amount’ of privacy than non-privileged persons proves true, we can see a connection between gender and guaranteed privacy respectively privacy violations since women in many cultures today are still less ‘privileged’ than men.

Noa Naaman-Zauderer (Tel Aviv University) **Spinoza on Human Freedoms and the Eternity of the Mind**

Spinoza’s account of human freedom has drawn increasing scholarly attention in recent years. Scholars have offered various perspectives on the kind of freedom Spinoza might have envisaged when speaking of human freedom in the *Ethics*, and on how “the true freedom of man” may relate to the absolute freedom of God. Most work on Spinoza’s view of human freedom has tended to focus on acting from reason (*ratio*) or the second kind of knowledge, and thus in Part 4 of the *Ethics* and the first half of Part 5 (5p1-5p20). Surprisingly, though, the notion of freedom that arises from the third kind of knowledge (*scientia intuitiva*), which Spinoza equates with blessedness, salvation, and intellectual love of God in the second half of Part 5 of the *Ethics* (5p21-42), has typically not been part of most Anglo-American scholarship on human freedom.

In the present paper, I focus on this relatively neglected aspect of Spinoza’s account of human freedom as present in the second half of *Ethics*, Part 5. I will argue that, apart from the absolute freedom applied exclusively to God, two distinct notions of *human* freedom are at work in the *Ethics*, in accordance with the second and third kinds of knowledge. Although both consist in adequate causation and activity, I will suggest that rational freedom and intuitive freedom deserve to be treated separately as they differ from one another in kind and not merely in degree. I will argue that Spinoza’s notions of eternity and blessedness, which he equates with intuitive freedom (or “freedom of mind”), are to be viewed as constitutive of his full account of human freedom and ethical theory in general, and that they have important bearings for our understanding of how human freedom might relate to the absolute freedom of God.

Ma. Theresa T. Payongayong (University of the Philippines) **Herstory of Feminist Philosophy**

Excluded, denied, inferior, invisible, insignificant – these are adjectives that describe women in philosophy before. These descriptions had kept feminist philosophers in the Asian context puzzled from the time they have decided to take interest in and work on feminist philosophy. It was a big question for them before how in the history of philosophy women had been excluded from various forms of inquiry and epistemology. It was a puzzle for them why there had been outright denial of women’s rights and authority when it comes to knowledge formation and knowledge production. It was unacceptable for them how women’s value remained invisible and their work insignificant over a long period of time.

This paper aims to share a brief herstory of women philosophers’ struggles as feminists in the Asian context from the time they began to take interest in women in philosophy studies to the height

of their feminist struggles and projects in the academe. Part of the struggles had been to survive teaching in male-dominated philosophy departments. Some of their feminist projects include, among others, engaging in multi- and inter-disciplinary collaborations with students and colleagues, gender mainstreaming, curriculum development, institution of courses on gender and sexuality, and feminist theories and philosophy. Other projects include integration of gender concepts and principles into the curriculum as well as developing gender-sensitive academic programs. Aside from addressing local issues and academic concerns, their feminist projects had also reached other countries through paper presentations, intensive trainings and attendance to conferences. Ultimately, they aim to share their story and see their lives as continuous learners, advocates, workers and feminists in the global and local (glocal) contexts aimed at providing a complete picture of what it means to be women of, in and for this world.

Jeane Peracullo (De La Salle University, Philippines) **Re-visiting, Re-imagining Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: Asian Women Theorize on the Triangulation of Gender, Religion, and Post-Coloniality**

Gender, race, and ethnicity are almost always invisible in mainstream religious discourses. Mainstream scholars of religion often position religion as the ultimate transmitter of Divine Love in all corners of the world yet increasingly this un-critical regard of religion is being questioned particularly by some feminists who have seen the irreconcilability of religion and gender. In a moving article by Japanese sociologists of religion, Noriko Kawahashi, Kayoko Komatsu, and Masako Kuroki (2013), they note the apparent disdain of other Japanese feminists of religion which they regard as extremely patriarchal and binds women to their biological roles. Yet these scholars caution that gender perspective cannot be ignored in religious studies as “gender, in other words, is a critical concept that can generate the power to disclose discrimination related to sex and the structure of authority and to leverage reforms in society.” (2013: 19)

Meanwhile, a thriving group of self-confessed feminist theologians flourish. The Ecclesia of Women in Asia has been in existence for 12 years. “Ecclesia” was re-imagined as the “democratic assembly of free citizens.” Since then, EWA has organized 6 international conferences.

On the question, “Can subalterns speak?” which has reverberated around the world, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak muses that “it was a feeling at that time that all ejaculations should not be confined to the Abrahamic.” (Spivak 175). Much has been said about how Spivak appropriated the term “subaltern” but what is seemingly lost on those critics is how Spivak extends the term to “third-world” Asian women who were rendered inarticulate by centuries of oppressive masculinist, imperialist and colonial rule. However, true to her profound understanding of deconstruction, Spivak actually allows for *resistance*.

This paper argues that a re-visit of Spivak’s notion of subaltern uncovers the way that EWA triangulates gender, religion and postcoloniality as well as Noriko Kawahashi’s work on Japanese Buddhist nuns’ re-framing of Buddhism in their own terms are deeply resistant because they challenge women’s exclusion in the mainstream (masculinist) theologies as well as expose the implicit ethnocentrism in Western feminist theologies.

Kate Phelan (RMIT) **Social Determination and the Possibility of Emancipation**

As our image of a being dictates our treatment of it, often when we wish to argue that the treatment of such a being is wrongful, we ground our argument in the claim that our image of it is incorrect. As an instance of this, when feminists wish to argue that men’s treatment of women is oppressive they typically base their argument on the claim that men’s image of a woman as just a feminine being is false. As it is false, men’s treatment of women, that being treatment of women as though they were

just feminine beings, is oppressive. Taking from Richard Rorty, let us call this the realist approach to arguing that men's treatment of women is oppressive. But this approach is undermined by another argument. This argument, made by Catharine MacKinnon, is that by virtue of their epistemic authority, men make women be just what their image of a woman is. This argument is often considered dismal and unhelpful, and therefore largely rejected. But, in this paper, I show that the view of the realist approach as fruitful and the argument made by MacKinnon as dismal and unhelpful has things quite the wrong way around. I begin by outlining MacKinnon's argument, and showing that this argument undermines the realist approach. I then explain why we should abandon the realist approach and embrace MacKinnon's argument. Finally, I show that this forces a dilemma upon us, one until the resolution of which feminism will remain paralyzed.

Tuija Pulkkinen (University of Helsinki) **The Politics of Philosophy in Adriana Cavarero's Feminist Thought**

While elaborating on the idea of sexual difference, Italian feminist philosopher Adriana Cavarero creatively engages with Hannah Arendt's thought. As a political theorist, Cavarero is known for her work on relationality and narrativity of self, theorizing on natality, ideas on the singularity of voice, and on vulnerability. In this paper I will approach this work from the point of view of its wider philosophical engagements and underpinnings. I argue that Cavarero's texts cannot be truly understood without recognizing their politics with respect to the phenomenological-existential tradition of philosophy. In particular, I argue that Martin Heidegger's work, and a riposte against Jacques Derrida's challenge to Heidegger, play a significant role in Cavarero's work. My approach in the paper is based on the ongoing project "Politics of Philosophy in Contemporary Feminist Theory," in which I seek to expose underlying and conflicting philosophical threads within contemporary feminist theorising, and the implications of such threads for different feminist philosophers' thought on gender and sexuality. In this paper I will examine how Cavarero's politics of philosophy works, how it affects her thought concerning gender and sexuality, and how she places herself in conceptual conflict with feminist theorists who draw upon more post-phenomenological philosophical threads.

Louise Richardson-Self (University of Tasmania) **Intersections of Privilege: the Consequences of Hate Speech**

When thinking about why hate speech is morally wrong, it pays to refocus our attention from victim to perpetrator. Typically, the literature on hate speech (in the west) focuses on the harms that are incurred by certain groups – namely, non-white racial groups, religious minorities, people who can be broadly categorised as queer, and/or women. Another related way we might understand the wrongness of hate speech is in its implicit *privileging* of certain groups, namely people who are white, (moderately) Christian or secular, heterosexual, and/or male. This allows them to extol the virtues of free speech without bearing the burden of the identity-based group discrimination that such freedom of speech maintains. If we focus on the privileges that free speech bestows, this opens up another angle from which to see that such freedom maintains social hierarchies that oppose a commitment to equality and fails to respect groups' dignity, and that this is something which should be immediately rectified.

Laura Roberts (University of Queensland) **Performance-Philosophy and Luce Irigaray's Mimesis: Performing, Breathing, Listening ... Differently.**

Performance Philosophy is an emerging field that attempts to engage with questions at the intersection of theatre and philosophy. This new paradigm reveals "the possibility that philosophers perform—that

they also harness theatrical techniques to express their conceptual creations” and it is this point in particular that I wish to explore in more detail in relation to Luce Irigaray’s work (Hollingshaus and Daddario 51-52). While scholars in this so-called new field have engaged with Judith Butler’s work on performativity it seems little attention has been paid to Luce Irigaray’s notion of mimesis (which Butler draws on when developing her concept of performativity).

In this paper I intend to complicate this supposedly new (?) claim “that philosophers perform” using Irigaray’s notion of mimesis which elucidates how “woman”, the feminine, can only ever “perform philosophy”. Irigaray argues that a non-hierarchical sexual difference is covered over and silenced in Western philosophical discourse. As a consequence of this silencing women have no access to ‘Philosophy’ as autonomous speaking subjects. As we have no language or words of our own Irigaray suggests that perhaps we are always only ever miming. In order to challenge “the tightly woven systematicity” that is (traditional Western masculine) Philosophy Irigaray writes that we, as women philosophers, must “assume the feminine role deliberately” (Irigaray, *This Sex Which is Not One*, p76). Mimicry is thus taken up by Irigaray as a strategy to disrupt the “theoretical machinery” and phallogocentric logic of Western discourse. Irigaray is not attempting a reversal of masculine and feminine, rather Irigaray’s work attempts a full scale revolution of thought and logic in which mimicry and performance play a foundational part.

Assuming the feminine role deliberately, or performing, for Irigaray, is an ethical and political act. Following Lynne Huffer I argue in this paper that Irigaray is performing an ethical relation with an Other and the consequences of this are revolutionary. Huffer writes:

In ethical terms, the force of performance cannot be thought without the response of she who would be bound by its terms. We need to hear the story of the one who gets shot, beaten, raped, or abused, and survives to narrate its truth. We need to hear so that she, with another, can perform a different economy of speech, resistance, pleasure, and love. That’s what the lips are saying. Listen (Huffer 1995, 36).

Performance and Philosophy need to recognise an ethical other and it is this that Irigaray’s mimetic strategies perform for us throughout her work. Appreciating Irigaray’s performance we begin to imagine a different logic based upon an ethical notion of love and ethical listening. These are themes that Irigaray’s more recent work explores and I bring these topics into relation with her earlier mimetic strategies. And so, in order to destabilise and crack open these claims of a supposed newly emerging field which seems to erase this important work by feminist thinkers in the last 30 years, I return to Irigaray.

Frederike Schuh (University of Vienna) **Women Philosophers on the Question(s) of Freedom and Utility**

My assumption is that there is something like a female perspective on philosophy (female according to various things as sex and gender, as well as a feminine socialization) and it crystallizes especially in two philosophical topics: freedom and utility.

Both are deeply interdigitated with other questions of philosophy and I have the impression two big differences between the male and the female perspective on philosophy become obvious by looking at them.

The first is the cognitive interest and motivation for research – women are more likely to be interested in *understanding* the world while men are more likely to be interested in *explaining* it.

The second difference are the methods – once you found out objectivity always simply meant “from a male point of view in patriarchy” it loses some of its significance. This makes women more likely to consider various perspectives, options and possible consequences before assessing something. For the topic of freedom this results in an advocacy of positive freedom – it seems to be much more obvious to women that there's more to achieve than being free *from* certain influences. At the same time freedom is considered as a recurring act, as something which wouldn't exist if we didn't perform it

over and over again and which is deeply depending on human relations and communication. Examples are the careful considerations by Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir as well as by Rosa Luxemburg and Emma Goldman.

In my talk I want to show how those and other women philosophers of the 20th century dealt with these two topics and how this represents their analytic skills, their political and social insights and their versatile competences. Subsequently I want to point out what we can learn from them individually, as women, as activists and as philosophers.

Lisa Shapiro (Simon Fraser University) **Revisiting a Philosophical Canon**

I reflect critically on the justification of the early modern philosophical canon. There are two potential problems facing its core of seven figures—Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant: (1) a kind of petrification of the canon, which seems to have seen no shift since the early twentieth century, and (2) the homogeneity of the canonical seven. Rather than rejecting the very idea of a philosophical canon, I distinguish three elements of the standing canonical history of early modern philosophy: a causal story, a set of core philosophical questions and a set of distinctively philosophical works. I argue that by opening the range of genres taken to be properly philosophical, we can effectively bring more women into the scope of the history of philosophy. I further argue that we often focus on some philosophical questions while discounting others, and that, in particular, the question of the nature of an education ought to be taken as philosophically central, especially in the early modern period. Doing so provides insight into the radical answers to the canonical questions of the nature of human understanding that are often taken to define the period. Thus, by revisiting questions of genre and the framing of philosophical questions, we can tell a new story that both respects the figures we have taken to be central, while also including women figures whose voices held significant influence on the philosophical thought that followed them.

Jung Won Shin, (Korean National Research Center for the Arts) **Korean Female Identity Seen through Family Dialogues in Movies**

In view of a philosophical discussion, this study discusses the experiences of Korean women based on the context of family relations. For this purpose, it sheds light on the philosophical implications that various changes in family relations have on the formation of female identity. Whereas Korean women in the past had faced strict constraints dictated by the behavioral norms expected in family relations within traditional Confucian society, the modern and postmodern eras ushered in rapid changes for Korean women. To draw the philosophical implications that such changes place upon the formation of Korean female identity, this study focuses on family relations and the range of experiences portrayed in Korean movies, and analyzes them from a philosophical perspective.

A review of the female identity, which has undergone significant change in the context of modern society, and which is now faced with pluralism and dissolution in postmodern society, requires a philosophical discussion from various perspectives. Though today's women are striving to part with traditional ideologies of the past, they are still largely influenced by modified traditional norms and family relations. To some degree, they live with the contradictions and constraints of reality, despite having internalized modern and postmodern values. Although they seem to be taking the initiative and leading independent lives, they are still concerned about how they are viewed by others in and outside the family due to the invisible relationships of power in the capitalist society. By reviewing images of Korean women through their dialogues in movies, this study discusses the relationship between Korean women and their families, and how their identity might evolve within redefined family relations of the postmodern era.

Antonia Smyth (Macquarie University) **Contextualizing the Luck vs. Relational Egalitarianism Debate: How Anderson's Approach can Inform Accessible Mental Healthcare**

Recent work in political philosophy and feminist epistemology has considered and analysed injustice based upon race and gender. In this paper, I hope to extend this kind of social enquiry into mental health, and show how concepts commonly employed in relation to other forms of social injustice can be applied in this context, thereby demonstrating that mental health injustice is a significant axis of oppression that has been somewhat overlooked in the philosophical canon.

I begin by asking what the demands of justice entail in regards to mental health. I examine two egalitarian theories of justice, luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism, and contrast these approaches in regards to mental health. Although luck egalitarianism is a popular and influential view, I hold that the case of mental illness demonstrates that there are two major problems which show that luck egalitarianism can, at best, offer only a partial account of what justice requires.

Firstly, I argue that luck egalitarianism cannot effectively advocate for the distribution of healthcare to those with mental illness as it employs too simplistic a concept of 'choice.' Secondly, I argue that the nature of mental health injustice is not merely a matter of distributional inequality, but rather of specific hierarchical and epistemic oppressions resulting from the stereotyping of mental illness.

I argue that persons with mental illness face injustices that the distributional measures advocated by luck egalitarianism cannot address. Drawing on the work of philosophers such as Elizabeth Anderson and Miranda Fricker, I attempt to give a detailed picture of the way that longstanding and inaccurate stereotypes surrounding mental illness account for the injustices I will identify, these being stigmatization, as described by Anderson, and Fricker's epistemic injustice.

Rosa Terlazzo (Kansas State University) **Transformative Experiences, Well-being, and Children**

Elsewhere I have argued that the needs of children give us reasons to consider the well-being effects of preferences as preferences held over time, rather than as time slices. But this means that we need a way of comparing the well-being effects of the various transformative experiences that children might undergo. While making this kind of comparison is notoriously difficult, I will draw on a set of conceptual and moral considerations to make a proposal that will ultimately do the same work. Which transformative experiences a person is best off having will of course depend upon which theory of well-being is correct. However, while some theories of well-being (namely, perfectionist and simple desire satisfaction theories) allow us to straightforwardly compare the well-being effects of alternative transformative experiences, given that we may be wrong about which theory of well-being is correct, we have moral and political reasons not to use either of these theories. Given these problems, I propose using an informed-desire account of well-being. While it is conceptually more difficult to compare the well-being effects of alternative transformative experiences on an informed-desire account, the issue motivating the paper is a political and moral one, and informed-desire accounts of well-being have the political and moral virtue that they can be implemented in morally defensible ways before the conceptual question is solved. I'll suggest that if informed-desire views are true, then we are best off encouraging children to undergo slow and gradual transformative experiences in the presence of as many alternatives as are reasonably possible. Such experiences allow children to reconsider and retrace their steps before they are fully transformed in one direction or another. And even if informed-desire views are not true, these experiences are conducive to developing autonomy, which is instrumentally valuable for developing preferences whose satisfaction enhances well-being.

Ericka Tucker (Marquette University) **Absolute Democracy: Freedom, Power and Reason**

One of Spinoza's more puzzling claims is that a large group of people is less likely to agree to a single piece of nonsense, and thus that the more people involved in decision making, the more reasonable, powerful and, ultimately, free those decisions will be. This is often taken, itself, to show the absurdity of Spinoza's political writings, and indeed his naiveté about human nature and politics. We need only picture the crowds at Nuremburg to think that large groups often agree to absurdities, often with terrifying consequences.

I argue that when we account for the metaphysical architecture of Spinoza's position, his view is neither incomprehensible nor absurd and makes considerable sense. Overcoming our failure to understand Spinoza's ontological and epistemological theories brings into sharp focus Spinoza's claim democracy is the most absolute form of governance, can yield the most reasonable agreements, and crucially, is the freest. The contemporary relevance of this position is hard to overstate. I show first that Spinoza conceives freedom as power, and I show the meanings of power in Spinoza's physics and metaphysics. Second, I re-articulate freedom and power in socio-political terms. Spinoza argues that successful states find ways of making individual humans recognize that they are part of larger wholes. Made up of human parts, states are able to allow human individuals to join their 'power' together, to add to the power of the whole. Collective power allows humans more power than they would otherwise have to achieve their individual and collective goals. The more power such a state has, the freer its citizens are. Achieving this 'collective power', however, requires maximizing individual human power and developing institutions to maximize collective knowledge. Spinoza argues that democracy achieves these aims most successfully, and thus, in his view, is the most 'absolute' form of state and the most free. Freedom thus emerges as social and cooperative experience.

Mayuko Uehara (Kyoto University) **The Self-Formation of Women in Japan's Modern Period**

Propelled by the influence of Western culture the early 20th century saw the beginnings of the feminist movement in Japan. At the same time it was also period where we see new views put forward by men on the status or nature of women. In this presentation I wish to focus on these views on women by male thinkers. While on the one hand we see the birth of discourse by men promoting the advancement of a new education for women. However we also have discourse by men who are unable to leave behind their traditional misogynistic views. Taking both aspects of the new discourse into account I will examine the manner in which modern women were involved in society and how the "self" of these women was expressed. In particular I will look at the "self" of women in two different professions; the "geisha" of traditional Japanese culture, and what we may see as one product of modern society, the "café serving girl".

Stella Villarrea (University of Alcalá) **Values in Obstetric Controversies: An Epistemological Inquiry**

Which epistemic assumptions underlie contemporary obstetrics? The talk will address some of the current debates on obstetrics. In relation to the notion of pregnancy, labour and childbirth, we risk our notions of the world and the human being. Obstetrics is a fruitful field to explore questions and answers such as citizenship, health, body or the relationships between knowledge, power and practices. Philosophy of Birth has an added value when it is supported by empirical data and medical practices analysis. Research in this field is closely linked to innovation and knowledge transference, as it is the case of medical humanities in general.

Julie R. Walsh (Wellesley College) and Susanne Sreedhar (Boston University) **Duchesse de Montpensier and the Dystopia of Marriage**

Discussions of early modern views on marriage tend to focus on property, paternity, contracts, and authority. Traditionally, we have looked to thinkers like Hobbes and Locke to see what early moderns thought about the institution. The tradition is changing, though, and in recent years other voices have joined the discussion. To the list, we now add the calls for marriage reform from thinkers like Astell and Wollstonecraft. The aim of this paper is to bring a new voice to this discussion: Anne-Marie-Louise d'Orléans, Duchesse de Montpensier. Montpensier discusses neither property, etc., nor reform. Instead, she calls for an outright ban of the institution, the strict enforcement of which would fall under her purview—feminism by fiat. Born in 1627 to a powerful French family, it was Montpensier's fate to marry as the king decided. Chance and politics changed this fate, allowing her to turn down several offers. Her flexibility to deny the king, however, explains only how the denial was possible, not why she did so. She tells us why in a brief correspondence in 1660–1661 with fellow woman at court, Motteville. Their conversation reflects two distinct and incommensurate views about the value of marriage. Montpensier argues that marriage makes slaves of women, and is so irredeemable that abolishment is the only way. She envisions a utopia where men and women live together as friends, without ambition and without love. Motteville, echoing Astell and Wollstonecraft, argues that marriage ought to be reformed. Because love between men and women is natural, she states, it cannot be eliminated altogether. We focus on the correspondents' dueling views of human nature, and suggest that Montpensier's dim view of marriage foreshadows contemporary feminist debates about the ongoing value of marriage given its sexist history.

Georgia Warnke (University of California, Riverside) **Central vs. Non-Central Identities: The Case of Race vs. Gender**

In the summer of 2015, Bruce Jenner transitioned to become Caitlyn Jenner and Rachel Dolezal was revealed to be white although she lived as a black person. While reactions to Jenner's transition were largely positive, praising Jenner for her honesty, reactions to Dolezal were largely negative, claiming that her act was racist and a lie. What distinguishes the two cases? Both Jenner and Dolezal identified with an identity group into which they were not born and both identity groups were historically marginalized. Perhaps Dolezal did not earn the right to self-identify as black since she did not grow up with the discrimination and danger that being black in the United States involves. Yet Jenner did not experience the dangers and humiliations that growing up as a woman can involve. Perhaps the difference is that Jenner felt like a woman whereas Dolezal merely wanted to be black – some said, for opportunistic reasons. Yet not all M2F transgenders think they are women; some merely want to be women. In any case, respect for gender transitions does not appear to rest on reasons for transitioning. In this paper, I argue that the different reactions to the two cases reveal an ironic aspect of gender identity. On the one hand, if social identities are socially constructed, those constructions include the idea that our racial and ethnic identities are not up to us. On the other hand while gender identity would seem to have more purchase on at least some aspects of biology than either racial or ethnic identity, it appears to be less central than either of these to our conceptions of who we or others can be. I also argue that while alert to racial and ethnic discrimination, we should work towards a future in which all our identities are equally non-central.

Xiao Wei (Tsinghua University) **Feminist Ethical Approach to Mental Health in Contemporary China**

Mental Health has become a crucial issue in the contemporary world, which has an enormous impact on population health and socio-economic development. According to World Health Organization (WHO) data (2001), there are around 450 million of various mental and brain disorders worldwide. One in every four people will suffer from some mental disorder in his life. During the transition of Chinese society from traditional to modern changes, Chinese people are encountering different challenges and pressures in their survival and development. They have to pay more attention to the meaning of existence, self-identity and pursuing of ultimate concerns. Meanwhile, the unprecedented anxiety and confusion, as well as perplexity have resulted in mental disorder or illness prevalent in Chinese society. China currently has about 16 million patients with mental illness, and in terms of the total burden of disease of China, mental illness ranks number one, up to 20%.

Facing to the rapid increasing number of mental disorders or illness, it is urgent to find out the feasible theoretical analysis paradigms and methods to deal with the issue. The article attempts to discuss Mental Health from feminist philosophical perspective. It includes four parts: 1. Mental health: Contemporary Issues in China; 2. Mental health: feminist ethics of care; 3. Mental health: Confucian Ethics; 4. Brief conclusions.

Emma Wilson (University of Queensland) **#Accelerate's Feminist Prototypes**

Donna Haraway's "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the 1980s" remains a major reference point for twenty-first century cyber- and techno- feminists. However, its broader political and philosophical relevance has become increasingly obscured. The emergence of twenty-first century accelerationism, I will argue, calls for renewed engagement with Haraway's iconic text. Through bringing accelerationism into contact with cyborg ontology, I aim to show how accelerationism might benefit from further engagement with the history of technofeminist thought. Such engagement, I will argue, not only assists in clarifying what accelerationism is, but also contributes to developing what it might be, through providing productive responses to some of its major criticisms. In reconfiguring the cyborg as an "accelerationist prototype," I hope to contribute to the ongoing elaboration of accelerationist politics, as well as demonstrate the continuing and perhaps increasing efficacy of technofeminist philosophy in the twenty-first century.

Jessica Wolfendale (University of West Virginia) **Shame and Sexual Modesty**

In Western societies, norms of sexual modesty apply almost exclusively to women. These norms are often justified by claims that women need protection from men's sexual advances, and that modest clothing signifies sexual virtues such as chastity. These norms imply that women are responsible for men's sexual responses, and that men can't control their sexual behavior.

In this paper I argue that modesty norms are deeply implicated in the sexual objectification and shaming of women and women's bodies. Modesty norms reflect the belief that women's bodies are inherently sexualized, and reinforce the belief that women are to blame if they receive unwanted sexual attention. Thus, for many women and girls, trying to be modest is inextricably connected to the fear of being shamed for not being modest enough.

After critiquing modesty norms, I consider whether modesty could ever be empowering. I discuss two views of modesty: the privacy model (in which modesty is a way of protecting one's sexual privacy) and the respect model (in which modesty shows respect for other's sensibilities). These models contain insights into the relationship between clothing and our attitudes towards ourselves and

others, however both views require women to defer to others' interpretation of their outfits, yet do not challenge the problematic bases of such interpretations.

Finally I suggest a third option: the allure model, in which modest dressing is a way of *expressing*, rather than hiding, sexuality without conforming to objectifying ideas of women's sexuality. Such forms of modesty can sometimes be seen in older women, such as the actress Helen Mirren, who are less likely to be subject to objectifying conceptions of "sexiness" than younger women. This model of modesty would require radical changes in how women's sexuality is viewed, but has the greatest potential for an empowering conception of sexual modesty.

Hae-Young Won (Daejin University) **Glimpses of Buddhist Nuns in Therīgātā**

The Therīgātā mainly deals with the lives of Buddhist nuns before and after their commitment to Buddhist priesthood. The community of Buddhist nuns not only played a central role in taking care of these women but also significantly contributed to their individual self-actualization. As the group grew into an influential religious community, it overcame the obstacle of dualistic perception regarding women's body and mind. This religious group of women who possessed clear and insightful knowledge praised independent and free women through its poems.

The elders mentioned in Therīgātā carried out the role of female leaders among the Buddhist nuns. We cannot see any authoritative instructions or sense of religious superiority in the poems recited by the elders in the book. The poems shed light on such matters as women living as human beings and the joy of enlightenment. These naturally led to the principle of Buddhist teachings leading women to learn of freedom and independence. To apply a modern interpretation to the book, it steadily took responsibility for women's movement by establishing a sense of freedom and autonomy for women. We can confirm that a special set of universal ethics existed in the Buddhist nun's community by the way they contrasted with the religious precepts that guided male Buddhist monks.

Shiu-Ching Wu (National Chung Cheng University, Chia Yi, Taiwan) **A Tentative Project of Epistemizing Care : Caring Standpoint Theory (CST)**

This paper aims to unite the ethics of care and feminist standpoint theory into what I call caring standpoint theory (CST) so as to comprehend why and how care values are internally constitutive to the knowledge production and scientific objectivity. To that purpose, I propose an account of what CST is under the rubrics of its distinctive way of knowing, methodology and conception of strong objectivity. First, CST as care-knowing is similar to connected Knowledge much inspired by maternal thinking. Second, CST attempts to study up from the dailiness of women's lives in different class, race and nationality, where caring works mostly done by women incubate caring habits and caring virtues (patience, humbleness, sensitivity, particularity, receptivity, and empathy) which, in turn, are conducive to the development of intellectual virtues. Third, CST is a project of epistemizing care so as to narrow the great divide between ethics and epistemology.

In conclusion, compared with the orthodox view of knowledge that separates science, society and ethics, CST is modeled on their interrelatedness. In contrast to the top-down view held by the orthodox version of knowledge, CST holds a bottom-up view that starts in women's marginal social spaces, where women's work incubates caring virtues (e.g., patience, humility, sensitivity, partiality, particularity, receptivity, and empathy) which then lead to moral virtues of moral endurance, open-mindedness, moral sensitivity, moral particularity, and empathy to distant others, all of which are conducive to the development of intellectual virtues, such as sustainability, sensitivity of detail, receptivity to different views, and, above all, intellectual complexity, which is particularly good in the quest for the scientific anomaly.

Sarah Wyld (Deakin University) **At The Heart of Freedom: Drucilla Cornell and Feminism in the Modern World**

In her text *At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, Sex and Equality* (1998), Drucilla Cornell argues that one solution to the continual issues of gender identity and gender equality in the global community is to alter the ways in which society perceives gender and sexual identity. Written in the 1990's, Cornell approaches issues such as abortion, gay marriage and pornography to scope out a new understanding of how one should determine their own sexual identity. Cornell argues that each individual person should have the right to determine their own sexual nature and the understanding of themselves as sexual creatures. Given the current changes in society's definition and understanding of gender, sexual identity and sexual nature, this inclusive approach appears to be a fair and just step forward to accepting and promoting the rights of individuals and minority groups within the community. This paper aims to critically analyse Cornell's theory in relation to the understanding of individual sexual identity and to suggest ways in which her theories could be implemented in the contemporary social environment. This paper also aims to highlight any issues that could arise in attempting to challenge the heteronormative and male-as-norm perspective of modern culture, and work towards any new strategies that could potentially be included to achieve greater gender equality. In doing so, this paper attempts to highlight that Cornell's theory is a valuable and well-structured first step towards creating and fostering greater gender rights and recognition.

Sameema Zahra (University of Queensland) **Women in the Work of Qurratul-Ain Haider: An Odyssey of Identity, Migration and Patriarchy**

We mostly speak in the language of Man. Moreover we always write in the language of Man. Rarely is there a woman, who attempts to raise a feminine voice in the language of Man, and, is noticed. Qurratul-Ain Haider is one of them. Haider witnessed the turmoil, the animosity and the bloodshed of colonial India and pre and post partition India and Pakistan, that gave her experience a depth, which can be hardly matched.

Haider wrote her novels and short stories in Urdu and herself trans created, most of them in English. Some of her most famous works are *River of Fire*, *My Temples Too*, *Fireflies in the Mist*, *Sita betrayed*, *Voice of Autumn*. The unifying theme of most of her work is time and how it unfolds people. Her characters range from all classes of society. One of the distinguishing features of her work, which sets her apart from her contemporaries, is giving her female characters a voice, which was mostly unsung and unheard. Haider wrote extensively about migration and how its challenges were different for women. She unveils the ambiguity of feminine identity in a patriarchal society, which exacerbates in migration. Her characters portray the human desire to posit themselves as individuals; filled with possibilities and not merely a product of their past. Some of her heroines loose this battle and submit to the situation and patriarchal order; others make choices that challenge this order. However, usually they are doomed to failure and misfortune as the structure overall is patriarchal, and woman, no matter what her choices are, cannot win this game. Nonetheless, at times Haider shows a glimmer of hope for the future where stronger men and women will make a better world.

Karin Zhu (Monash University) **Social Media's Role in Defining the Feminist Movement**

Social media is increasingly an essential part of social justice activism and the feminist movement. From Twitter to Tumblr, feminists now use social media to educate and to organize. Rather than focus only on the variety of social media platforms and how they are used to aggregate audiences and how each platform is used differently by feminists, this presentation seeks to understand how the online

world mediates the feminist movement from the perspective of an affective economy. This will involve contrasting the rise of “White Feminism” and “Black Feminism” and contrasting the affective connections with those that are established in reference to normative ideology and practice. A key focus is using the theories of Sara Ahmed to analyze the use of strategic essentialism by online feminist spaces to build and maintain solidarity, where the pre-existence of an affective connection is presumed. The notion of essence does not reduce the social activist to a given position but rather provides the impetus for a continued form of engagement. However, strategic essentialism in online feminism carries its own dangers, such as what happens when members of a community are excluded because they do not fit the community’s ideals of authenticity and what happens when different sectors of the community differ in theoretical ideals. This focus on the role of affectivity in the analysis of the relationship between different sectors of the feminist movement online is important given the value attributed to questions of authenticity in networked spaces and because of the influence of watershed pop culture moments such as the Twitter fight between Taylor Swift and Nicki Minaj.