“One loses one’s classics”: Samuel Beckett and the Counter-canonical Use of Canon

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It is almost as though he [Beckett] foretells the time when Dante, Proust, and Joyce will have no more deep readers, and Shakespeare and Racine will at last cease to be performed.
—Harold Bloom in The Western Canon

[H]e [Beckett] had neither to accept nor refuse a prize that was for no particular work (there is no work in Beckett) but was simply an attempt to keep within the limits of literature that voice or rumble or murmur which is always under threat of silence
—Maurice Blanchot in “Oh All to End”

Beckett between Bloom and Blanchot

This article seeks to examine Samuel Beckett’s subversive and counter-canonical use of the canonical literary intertext by studying some of the diverse instances of his variable, playful and deliberately erroneous citations
from early to late works, cutting across genres and media. I want to contextualize this discussion with Harold Bloom and Maurice Blanchot's mutually contesting claims about Beckett as a preserver of the literary high canon or as a counter-canonical writer. I would argue for a trajectory in the Beckett canon where the references gradually disappear from the textual surface into the depths of speech itself, which is increasingly perceived as a ventriloquist's conjuring of Other's words and voices. If this internalisation marks the inter-subjective nature of the field of speech, taking my departure from this point I will read Blanchot's favourite Beckett text *How It Is* and highlight the way it subverts the canonicity of knowledge formation and its disciplinary inculcation. This approach involves a deepening of Beckett's complex relation with the intertextual practice of citation as the author challenges the fundamental property at the heart of citation i.e. knowledge in its always already canonised status.

Citation works as iterative cultural memory, building bridges among various branches and registers of knowledge. It wants to take the readers elsewhere by making them connect with a different text or a different body of knowledge. This idea of knowledge as a relational matrix is inherent to intertextuality as a practice. We will gradually see how Beckett's intertextual practice foregrounds a *non-relation or cut* as opposed to the *relationality* of intertextual knowledge. Instead of celebrating knowledge as referential connectivity, Beckett's work gradually makes a transition from his early years of note snatching, invested in knowledge as citation, toward a radical uncoupling of knowledge from citational reference. I would argue that Beckett's late aesthetics appeals to a radical act of cutting into knowledge and his texts localise this epistemic hole as the only form of knowledge in the final instance. This aporetic and deconstructive dialectic of knowledge as severance calls for a shift away from knowledge as intertextual connectivity and this explains Beckett's homologous move in his later writing toward an assimilation of intertextuality within the fundamental *texture* of language. Beckett's famously anti-epistemological position in his credos of "impotence" and "ignorance" has been a critical commonplace in Beckett studies. However, the purpose of this article is to theorise this ignorance as an acting out of *knowledge as rupture* alongside the dynamic notion of Beckettian intertextuality that moves from citation to inter-subjectivity. I am interested in exploring this subversive edge of Beckett's writing contra Bloom where it protects literature from becoming a reified epistemological product of power by maintaining the alternative functionality of *knowledge as hole*.

If Bloom's Beckett is an elegist of the Modernist high canon of literature, Blanchot's Beckett is a radical writer, subverting the canonical norms
of literature and driving it toward its own vanishing point. Bloom’s Beckett is full of premonitions that the literary canon of high culture is doomed to a painfully slow death at the hands of the New Theocrats who “will enforce their quasi-literate, multicultural noncanon.” In this highly conservative resistance to the postmodern and the multicultural interventions into the canon, Bloom reads Samuel Beckett as a stoic canonist, standing tall as one of the last “strong writers” of the Western canon. On the other hand, Maurice Blanchot who, along with Georges Bataille, was responsible for Beckett’s rise in the French literati of the 1950s, gives us a very different Samuel Beckett: a radically anti-literary writer who tries to take literature out of the book, back into the origins of the book where at stake is the worklessness of the work. Blanchot considers Beckett’s canonisation in 1969 with the awarding of the Nobel Prize as a strategy on the part of the literary canon to incorporate within itself, its liminal exterior which is nothing short of a potential threat. He describes Beckett’s Nobel Prize as the literary institution’s “attempt to keep within the limits of literature, that voice or rumble or murmur, which is always under threat of silence.” However, Blanchot’s idea of the canon is non-literary inasmuch as all literature is also non-literature for him and though he marks the difference between a Beckett and a more normative literary writer, he also maintains that a writer like Beckett has more to contribute to the so-called literary canon than a more traditionally literary writer.

Literature is a matter of what Blanchot calls “plural speech” which can never be pinned down to one meaning and therein lies its agency of contestation. For him, literature is its own contestation as a form of power. Literature’s self-reflective nature and anti-masterful weak agency mark it out as a site of resistance. In “The Great Reducers,” Blanchot writes:

> Literature is perhaps essentially (but neither solely nor overtly) power of contestation: contestation of established authority, contestation of that which is (and the fact of being), contestation of language and the forms of literary language, lastly contestation of itself as power.

Looking back at Bloom and Blanchot’s championing of Beckett for mutually conflicting reasons from the vantage point of twenty-first century, one would have to say that Bloom’s canonical Beckett is a figure which now enjoys more cultural currency than Blanchot’s Beckett. Terry Eagleton sums up Beckett’s gradual accommodation by contrasting the mass condemnation of Waiting for Godot, primarily on account of obscurity, with the fact that nobody at around Beckett’s centenary in 2006 seems to have a single word of disrespect for him. Beckett’s infamous obscurity has gradually become a form of high-cultural power and his work is square bracketed within our
cultural heritage. What does Beckett have to say about his own literariness? I will take my cue from two remarks by him. The first occurs in a conversation with Charles Juliet. Responding to Juliet's point about a "speech without literature" in his works, Beckett commented: "Listening to yourself, it is not literature that you hear." The second is his initial reaction to the offer of honorary D. Litt from Trinity College Dublin in 1959 when he famously said: "what in God's name have doctoracy and literature to do with work like mine."

Why does Beckett, around whom a whole industry of academic scholarship continues to be organised and re-organised, consider his writings non-literary? Is there something more to these statements than authorial posturing? How can we refine our view of Beckett qua the Western canon? I will approach these questions initially in terms of the counter-canonical use of the canonical intertexts in his corpus and then move on to his internalisation of intertextuality with an acknowledgment that all speech is a form of quotation, irrespective of literary allusions or echoes. I will delve into the epistemological underpinnings of Beckett's work in the process and see how he evacuates the canonical disciplines of episteme as well as the disciplinarity of knowledge as irrefutable referential power.

**Beckett's Use of the Canonical Intertext**

Anthony Uhlmann in his article “Beckett's Intertexts” which primarily considers philosophical intertexts, observes that “Beckett is aware of the implications of the systems to which he refers and, rather than simply supplying quotations in order to establish his own erudition, is interested in the logic or shape of those systems.” Given that literature as a canon of reference is also a system, we can say following Uhlmann that Beckett is interested in the logic of its operation. As I would argue, one can diagnose a counter-canonical and subversive intent in Beckett's literary intertexts. Uhlmann in the aforementioned article refers to the "occlusive" nature of Beckett's intertextual references and argues that he deliberately veils the link between the text and the intertext to draw our attention to the gap between the two, which can be seen through his own preoccupation with non-relation in art. While Uhlmann focuses on the hole in knowledge between the text and the intertext which Beckett preserves as a gap for the reader to retain or fill in, I would focus on the way Beckett introduces variations in his intertexts or deliberately misquotes in order to arrive at a fragile point in the workings of memory, bordering on amnesia. The function of forgetting works as a way of subverting the canonicity of the literary referential structure.

Let me begin with a brief discussion of the way Beckett uses refer-
ences from canonical European texts. The narrator of “Yellow,” a story from More Pricks than Kicks (1934) keeps playing with a sentence from Hardy’s novel Tess of the d’Urbervilles: “When grief ceases to be speculative, sleep sees her opportunity.” He changes, replaces and transposes the terms of this sentence:

He had manipulated that sentence for many years now, emending its terms, as joy for grief, to answer his occasions, even calling upon it to bear the strain of certain applications for which he feared it had not been intended, and still it held good through it all.

This working through of Hardy’s canonical sentence is interesting in two ways. First it shows that a canonical text is not a static object but involves the dynamic process of a collective cultural memory. It also demonstrates how individuals evoke this memory through their own diverse subjective identifications. The playful citation not only highlights this subjective use-value of the intertext but also draws attention to its malleability as it percolates through cultural memory, transmitted from one generation to another. Moreover, there is a clear note of intervention here. The narrator manipulates the sentence and tests how lasting it is by modifying its terms. There is no banal acceptance of the canon but an actively playful manoeuvring of it. The manoeuvre may reveal how the citation sustains itself in spite of oppositions, but it does not fail to register the agency of the citing subject. The Beckettian subject is invested with the agency of counterpointing and interrogating the fixed nature of the reference and his interrogation sabotages the epistemic supposition of citation as a form of external and inflexible reference. If citation involves a display of erudition as a signature of an epistemic culture of power, Beckett already seems to question its inviolability by foregrounding the plasticity of citation.

In this context, we might remember Daniela Caselli’s discussion of Beckett’s intertextual “invention” of Dante in his texts. As Caselli shows through the example of Dante, Beckett’s intertextuality doesn’t takeitational knowledge as teleological sacrosanctity but interrogates the notion of auctoritas that informs the intertextual field of reference. Caselli shows how “Beckett’s texts invent their own precursors, reversing the terms of the statement” and instead of consolidating the authority of the antecedent text, they undermine the teleology of this authoritative precedence and hence Caselli’s palimpsest-like construction of multiple differing and different Dantes invented in and by Beckett’s texts. What we have seen above in the citing subject’s deconstruction of intertextual knowledge as authoritative power is an extension of Caselli’s point in terms of an “intratextual” re-framing of the intertextual.
In the play *Happy Days* (1963), Winnie, the female protagonist asks: “What is that unforgettable line?” The ironic wit in this question emerges from the tension between the structure and the content of the utterance. While the content describes the quote as “unforgettable,” the very fact that the sentence is uttered as a question points to the forgetting of the “unforgettable” quote. The function of forgetting here comes across as one of Beckett’s parodic counter-canonical strategies of reference. The value of this allusiveness is thus subtractive and anti-epistemological insofar as it bores holes in our knowledge instead of enriching it by celebrating its referential transparency. Winnie continues:

One loses one’s classics. [Pause.] Oh not all. [Pause.] A part. [Pause.] A part remains [Pause.] That is what I find so wonderful, a part remains, of one’s classics, to help one through the day.\(^\text{22}\)

In this passage, while there is amnesia leading to a loss of the classics, there is also a partial retention of the classics as an important ploy within the speech-act that sustains Winnie in the mysterious mound where she keeps sinking. Caselli glosses this forgetting as follows:

[M]emory fails not just because it can no longer capture its object but also because it gradually erodes it. Words are always repetitions of other words but they cannot be either completely repeated or anchored to the tranquillity of the source. The failing memory becomes a figure of the impossibility of both repetition and originality.\(^\text{23}\)

In this reading, we can already see how the condition of language as a generic sign of discursivity enters the conversation and envelopes falsifiable reference. The intervention of language as a medium attenuates reference as a verifiable and falsifiable structure of knowledge as language generically turns into reference incarnate. The iterability of language becomes its own generic reference as one word refers to, repeats and yet differs from another. While forgetting doesn’t necessarily mark a loss of knowledge, in Beckett, it introduces a creative subjective interventionism as the blurs caused by failing memory dramatize a generative principle of variance.

In the theatrical notebooks of *Happy Days*, Beckett produces an elaborate list of his quotes and echoes. Ranging from Milton’s *Paradise Lost* to numerous Shakespeare plays like *Hamlet, Romeo and Juliet* and *Cymbeline*; from Thomas Gray’s poem “On a Distant Prospect of Eton College” to Browning’s dramatic text *Paracelsus*; from Robert Herrick’s poetry to W.B. Yeats’s play *At the Hawk’s Well*; from Keats’s “Ode to a Nightingale” to Fitzgerald’s *Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam* and others, Beckett’s choices are resonant with the high canon of English literature.\(^\text{24}\) Most of these refer-
ences are buried beneath the textual surface as broken echoes punctuating Winnie’s speech. They act as anchor-points of alterity, giving her the assurance that these are not simply words churned inside her head but they have a source in the external world of texts. Insofar as the half-retained classics are Others’ words, they offer Winnie a potential relief from solitude. And yet these half-remembered lines are a site of creative appropriation where the outside and the inside impinge on one another. If Winnie continues to rely on the intertextual machinery of referential knowledge, she also owns it ironically by partially forgetting it. Through this forgetting and her recontextualisation of the classic lines, she makes them her own. This internalisation of the exterior is the flip of the exteriorisation of her interior through the Other’s words that release her from absolute self-enclosure. This is the cusp between the intertextual and the intra-textual and Beckett’s writing not only collapses the boundary between what’s inside and what’s outside the text, as Caselli would reflect, but also closes the gap between the inter-textual and the intra-textual.²⁵ I consider the actual mound in which Winnie keeps sinking to be an externalisation of her intertextual mound.

I would argue that Winnie’s ruinous memory which continues to conjure a constellation of half-lost literary classics has a connection with her mound. Her citations are acts of remembering which dis-member more than they re-member. They break, involute and alter the quotes by subjecting them to the unreliability of memory. To restrict ourselves to one example, Winnie only half-remembers Ophelia’s line from Hamlet: “O, woe is me! T’ have seen what I have seen, see what I see”²⁶ in her “what are those wonderful lines – [wipes one eye] – woe is me – [wipes the other] – to see what I see.”²⁷ In Shakespeare’s play, Ophelia is bemoaning Hamlet’s sudden turn to madness when she utters these lines. Her woeful “seeing” which relates to Hamlet’s insane words and behaviour has an elegiac if not tragic solemnity. Beckett in turn, profanes and deflates the seriousness of the original context by inserting this as Winnie’s lamenting response to her own inability in reading the promotional caption on the handle of her toothbrush. Winnie’s citations are incomplete and they enact a profanation of the carefully selected high canon of literature. A climactic moment comes when immediately after quoting a tiny part from Paracelsus, Winnie hesitates between “Browning” and “Brownie” or John Moses Browning, the maker of the famous automatic revolver. The slippage between the literary and the non-literary Brownings suggests how the non-literary reference ironically undercuts and profanes the canonicity of the literary reference. Winnie’s fragmentary citations are thus structured like debris and these intertextual ruins directly contribute to the consolidation of her mound. The more she engag-
es with this muddle of citations, the more she sinks into their mound; up to above her waist in the first act and up to her neck in the second.

The heap which consumes Winnie like quicksand is a heap of knowledge: “hardly a day, without some addition to one’s knowledge however trifling.” Everyday with the conundrum of her memory in ruins, she constitutes a rubbish of knowledge which swallows her unwittingly moment by moment. Winnie’s ignorance of her situation and her evasive happiness is Beckett’s ironic dig at the epistemic culture of citation. The words she churns up are neither her own nor the Other’s and fail to ground her in either of the two worlds. The more she cites, the more she drowns in the dangerous debris of her own convoluted knowledge which is neither entirely external nor completely internal but caught in limbo between the self and the Other when it comes to its source. The sinister implication of the mound underlines the Beckettian critique of referential knowledge as authoritative power when intertextual knowledge literally becomes a sinking vessel for the subject. As Clov would say, the heap actually becomes “impossible” as a broken tissue of knowledge and drowns the subject in a falsifiable quicksand. We know that Beckett was interested in misremembering and misquoting of literary texts and wanted to devote a whole play to this. The trace of this project is the abandoned dramatic fragment known as the “Bare Room Fragment” in which two characters dwell on their partial amnesia regarding a couple of Shakespeare sonnets.

There are two allusions to Shakespeare’s Macbeth in the plays Come and Go (1967) and Ohio Impromptu (1982). Come and Go opens with the question: “When did we three last meet?” This is a variation on “When shall we three meet again?” in the opening scene of Shakespeare’s tragedy. The change of tense is important since the Beckett play revolves around erasures that underwrite a recollection of the past while the line from Shakespeare is crucial in building a mood for the future. Shakespeare’s witches open the first scene of Macbeth with the aforementioned line but Beckett’s play is all of a single scene, involving the three spectral women with strange names: Ru, Vi and Flo. In Ohio Impromptu, one reads: “What he had done alone could not be undone. Nothing he had ever done alone could ever be undone. By him alone” which echoes the line from the first scene of the fifth act of Macbeth: “What’s done cannot be undone.” We can clearly see Beckett’s subversive reworking here. If Shakespeare’s line presents us with a pure impossibility, Beckett thinks through the possibility buried in the impossible by evoking the power of the couple. The addition of the expressions “alone” and “by him alone” suggests that something done can perhaps be undone when one is not alone or in other words, when there are two people involved. This is essential for the econ-
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omy of love between the Reader and the Listener in Beckett’s play and it reminds us of Vladimir’s similar articulation about the couple in Waiting for Godot: “It’s too much for one man.” If Beckett does consider his own line written almost thirty years back, it further complicates the intertext by introducing an element of self-reference into the Shakespeare allusion. If Beckett remembers his own line from Godot in Ohio Impromptu, it could be read as another intra-textual grafting of the inter-textual where Shakespeare is invaded by Beckett. In Shakespeare, Lady Macbeth seems convinced that be it herself or Macbeth or the two of them together, there is no undoing that which is already done i.e. the murder of Duncan. Beckett on the other hand implies that taken together, the two can perhaps undo something that the one cannot. Both these examples further underline the vein of subversion, integral to Beckett’s intertextual practice.

With the development of his corpus, Beckett abandons the referential plenitude of his early fiction such as More Pricks than Kicks (1934), Murphy (1938) and Watt (1953) which abound in multifarious references ranging from physics to philosophy. This is not to say, however, that the referential practice in these earlier texts is epistemologically rewarding. As we have seen with the More Pricks example, allusion works in a counter-epistemological way. It is striking that there is an increasing assimilation of canonical intertexts within the general field of speech in the later works. I will trace this movement in terms of a shift from the intertextual to the intra-textual or better still the former metamorphosing into the latter. Beckett buries his references within the deepest layers of the text in his later works. As I have discussed elsewhere, the prose piece Worstward Ho (1983) is built around a couple of lines from King Lear without any explicit reference; one has to look into his notebook to get the clue and yet the work has subtle transactions with Shakespeare throughout. Similarly with his last stage play What Where (1983) Beckett associates his four character names and the four vowels (a, i, e and o) in Bam, Bim, Bem and Bom with Rimbaud’s evocation of the vowels in his sonnet “Vowels” but without the help of the notebook, it is almost impossible to make this intertextual connection. Moreover, Beckett’s interventionist use of the intertext is highlighted here in the fact that he drops the fifth vowel “u” or what could have constituted “Bum” in the play which mentions five but only shows four characters. While Rimbaud’s sonnet describes all five vowels, Beckett works only with four which makes it another variational use of the intertext. Anthony Cordingley who has drawn our attention to Pascalian and Proustian echoes encrypted in How It Is, analyses this shift as Beckett’s mobilisation of intertextuality more as a “method of composition” rather than a way of interpellating the reader.
ences and subjects them to the generic order of his own textual discourse until what remains of these references is ruins: a primeval mud of waste in impenetrable darkness:

[O]ne glimpses the process of Beckett’s intertextual poetics when tracking the procedure by which allusions are discernable within the textual genesis, become volatilized and/or permeate the text’s tropes. To the extent that Beckett is indifferent to the prescriptive content (or “pus of reason”) within this discourse he is exercising “ignorance” towards its content. 38

As Beckett uncouples a rigid and falsifiable notion of knowledge from citation by encrypting them within the general register of inter-subjective speech, the detritus of citation marks this cut in knowledge as the only locus from which we can re-think or even un-think the question of knowledge. What remains of citational knowledge is a gaping hole in Beckett. It’s “all balls.”

The internalisation of allusion within the general body of speech in Beckett’s later texts underlines the inter-subjective nature of all speech. It is also homologous to what I am calling a counter-canonical intra-textualisation of the intertext. “The Unnamable” admits that he is made of words which belong to others: “I’m in words, made of words, other’s words.” 39 There is acknowledgment here that all our words always already work as quotes since they fundamentally come from the field of the Other. We do not make up words but rather use given words and none of them is exclusive to any one of us. This is how linguist Boris Gasparov defines the fundamental “intertextuality” of all speech:

The prevalent mode of speakers’ linguistic activity can be called “intertextual,” in the sense that speakers always build something new by infusing it with their recollection of textual fragments drawn from previous instances of speech. 40

I would argue that this is the final direction of intertextuality in late Beckett where the “inter” is permeated by the “intra” in an implicit critique of disciplinary and pedagogic knowledge, as we shall see in How It Is.

This internalisation of citation within the recesses of speech and the pragmatic operation of language constitute a signature of Beckett’s counter-canonical dissidence that not only interrogates literary citation and its politics of canonisation but also questions the inherent christening of knowledge as fixity and memorisation in citational practices. We hear a crescendo of this internalisation in the novel How It Is (1961) where the entire speech of the protagonist is qualified as an extended quotation. This is
how the text opens: “how it was I quote before Pim with Pim after Pim how it is three parts I say it as I hear it.” These three parts refer to the tripartite structure of the text and the narrator defines his speech as a form of quotation. The logic of all speech as quotation is not simply the inter-subjectivity of speech but also the typically Beckettian ramification of the narrative voice where one listens to his own othered voices from within and reproduces what he hears. This becomes a form of self-quotation. The refrain which becomes the coda of How It Is is: “I say it as I hear it.”

Beckett’s Work on Knowledge in How It Is

Beckett’s contestation of the canon can also be seen as a radical critique of the canonicity of knowledge in his aesthetics of “impotence” and “ignorance”:

I’m working with impotence, ignorance. I don’t think impotence has been exploited in the past. There seems to be a kind of esthetic axiom that expression is achievement—must be an achievement. My little exploration is that whole zone of being that has always been set aside by artists as something unusable—as something by definition incompatible with art.

Beckett is a “non-knower” and a “non-can-er” in his own words and evacuating the epistemological import of language is a project he consciously takes up as a writer. In a famous German letter to Axel Kaun in 1937, Beckett announces his literary project in terms of an act of boring holes into the “terrifyingly arbitrary materiality of the word surface.” This act of drilling intends to dissolve the surface of language and cut open the epistemic veil “until that which lurks behind, be it something or nothing, starts seeping through.”

While it is impossible to do justice to Beckett’s complex relation with canonical epistemology within the limited scope of this article, I will try to offer some directions through How It Is. The Maurice Blanchot remark I have used as an epigraph is part of his Beckett obituary where he singles out How It Is as a text which uncharacteristically demonstrates a dimension of “work” in the Beckettian subject. I would argue that this “work” can be seen as Beckett’s subtractive operation on knowledge insofar as How It Is is the summit of Beckettian evacuation and the narrator is full of ironic memories of knowledge, once gained and now lost. In the undefined dark mud, identified with the waste of the world, the basic functions of humanity subsist in these larval crawlers, oscillating between solitude and encounter. The narrator laconically mourns the disciplinary formations of knowledge and each
reference to such disciplines is accompanied by refrains like “the history I knew my God the natural,” “the humanities I had my God,” “the geography I had,” “the anatomy I had” and so on. In the narrator’s dying referential memory, proper names become tiny beacons of knowledge, in the process of evacuation. Nicolas Malebranche, the French occasionalist philosopher and Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock, the German Romantic poet are referenced as the epitomes of humanities while the post-Darwinian German biologist Ernst Haeckel becomes the symbolic proper name for the discipline of sciences in general. These proper names signify marginal traces of dying intertextual knowledge. They are minimalist versions of quotes, further abbreviated into names. In *How It Is*, this is how the intertext is metonymically reduced to the proper name of the source author. “No knowing” is the mantra of the text and though there is no such thing as an absolute non-knowledge and hence the remnant of proper names, Beckett’s drive is undoubtedly subtractive. If there is retention of knowledge here, it is paradoxically mediated through subtraction. As the novel suggests, knowledge can only be preserved as a dying memory. The voice, the narrator hears and then says by way of quotation, is not a voice which reveals everything. It is a partial speech leaving a lot unsaid. There is no knowing how this knowledge is acquired: “It’s not said where on earth I can have received my education acquired my notions of mathematics astronomy and even physics they have marked me that’s the main thing.” The point to note here is the passivity of the knower and the implication that knowledge appropriates a subject by producing marks on him or her. Let us look at another key passage:

Always understood everything except for example history and geography understood everything and forgave nothing never could never disapproved anything really not even cruelty to animals never loved anything

This passage is replete with a critique of epistemological canons from a pedagogic perspective as the narrator mocks the humanist education of man making. The word “forgave” starkly replaces and yet echoes “forgot” which would have been a simple contrast to “understood.” This understanding not only creates docile submissiveness in the subject but also a hapless indifference to both revolt and love. In the “primeval mud” of *How It Is* which brings together human wastes like saliva and piss, Steven Connor finds an autobiographical resonance of the “Portora mud” in Beckett’s childhood school. If we conjecture that the muddy grounds of Portora Royal School in Enniskillen speak to the mud world of *How It Is*, it gives the Beckettian mud, depicted as a “place without knowledge whence no doubt
its peerlessness,"52 an actual pedagogic anchor-point. The mud which re-

presents human wastes and scraps matures into a wasteland of knowledge. Beckett’s repeated metaphors of litter and trashing are significant as the mud world becomes this “incredible tohu bohu”53 where all knowledge is turned into wastes and scraps.

In his brilliant readings of How It Is, Anthony Cordingley has highl-

ighted the theme of “pedagogical violence”54 in relation to the notion of trans-

lation and Beckett’s self-reflexive bilingualism as he translates Comment c’est into How It Is. Cordingley reflects: “Indeed, the novel is a gothic alleg-

gory of its writing process, and, moreover, it focuses on the pedagogical drive that motivates the transferral of voice into fiction.”55 Instead of ap-

proaching what Cordingley rightly calls “pedagogical sadism”56 in terms of
Beckett’s learning of the French language and its contaminating and revital-

ising impact on his English, I would like to steer the question of pedagogical violence in How It Is towards a more general understanding of Beckett’s counter-epistemological textual operations. Cordingley in another article on the Platonic and Pythagorean resonances of How It Is passingly observes that Beckett’s text “complicates conventional intertextual hermeneutics by depriving his allusions of the power to affirm past meanings and their trad-

itions.”57 Cordingley’s point about the deprivation of referential power is consistent with Daniela Caselli’s aforementioned thesis that Beckett’s inter-

textual practice is inventive and not recuperative. The rest of this article will pursue a connection between this subversive intertextuality and epistemic violence in How It Is. In my argument what connects pedagogy with inter-

textuality is Beckett’s problematic evocation of a complex evolutionary map in the novel.

How It Is can be read as an ironic allegory of civilizational evolution in terms of species mutation which would explain the otherwise odd reference to Haeckel as the evolutionary embryologist, credited with the thesis of “ont-

togeny recapitulates phylogeny.” This progress is permeated with violence as Beckett’s crawlers get into a tortuous routine of exchanges on encoun-
tering each other. One is called a tormentor while the other, his victim. Each tormentor is named Bom and each victim, Pim which collapses the minimal referential specificity of the proper name into a common noun as “Bom’s” and “Pim’s” lose their individuating marks and become generic signifiers. Everyone gets to play both roles of the tormentor and the victim successively. When one torments the other, he is sure to be tormented next time. However, one never gets to torment his own tormentor but has to satisfy himself with a different victim. This structure of “justice” repeats itself along the infinite straight line of crawlers moving on the mud like a giant chain or caravan. The victim remains passive while the tormentor performs
ritual actions which intertwine the erotic with the pedagogic. The steps of this action are sardonically named "lessons" and they include pushing the tin opener into the arse, thumping on the skull, nails in armpit and so on:

[F]irst lesson theme song I dig my nails into his armpit right hand right pit he cries I withdraw then thump with fist on skull his face sinks in the mud he cries cease end of first lesson

At a later stage these lessons are summarised in a terser and more scientific language of objective itemisation which shows how they are normalised within the violent register of knowledge and its disciplining function. The operative passage reads:

Table of basic stimuli one sing nails in armpit two speak blade in arse three stop thump on skull four louder pestle on kidney five softer index in anus six bravo clap athwart arse seven lousy same as three eight encore same as one two as may be

The word “stimuli” here further strengthens the evolutionary metaphor of the species-being of the human animal. The lessons are now numerically arranged which is reflective of their normalisation within the disciplining body of knowledge. The violent constitution of the body of knowledge hardly excludes the actual body of the subject. Beckett sees this corporeal dimension of violence as being integral to the disciplining “mark” of knowledge. While the tortuous actions are libidinally charged inasmuch as they evoke a strange homo-fraternal sodomy, they also depict a kind of teaching as the narrator (one of the crawlers) carves Roman capitals with his nails into Pim’s armpit until he begins to sing. He also writes on Pim’s back till the furrowed letters turn his back into a site of blood bath. The narrator writes:

With the nail then of the right index I carve and when it breaks or falls until it grows again with another on Pim’s back intact at the outset from left to right and top to bottom as in our civilization I carve my Roman capitals

Soon afterwards, the narrator identifies this inscription with the unpunctuated narrative of How It Is: “unbroken no paragraphs no commas not a second for reflection with the nail of the index until it falls and the worn back bleeding.”

Pim speaks on occasions and narrates the story of his life but most of it is lost in the inaudible murmur as his lips open on the mud. The torment thus consists of an act of writing or marking on the body for extracting speech. This is also a way of passing on knowledge and involves a process
of learning language through writing. The violent marks of knowledge are left on the body of the subject and the pedagogic process in the name of "life in stoic love" borders on the sexual violence of sadomasochism. It is important that Beckett sees writing as being party to this violence of epistemological disciplining. Writing here acts as a civilizing tool for epistemological pedagogy. The important question is whether Beckett stops simply at this exposition of literary writing’s complicity with the humanist epistemological project of violence or does anything more than exposing what Blanchot would call literary institution’s nexus with power? As I see it, what Blanchot deems as “work” in How It Is does not stop at this moment of disclosure where literature is shown to be guilty of becoming a form of power at the hands of studia humanitatis. I would argue that the forgetting function of the subjects in the novel is the political “work” of resistance in response to the corporeal mark of knowledge. The crawlers forget in order to register their resistance to the corporeal wounds of knowledge which command them to remember. The forgetting aims at unmarking the marks of knowledge furrowed on the body through writing.

The narrator tries to think of both direct and indirect circulation of knowledge in between the crawlers. There is a hypothesis that from left to right the tormentor confides to his victim and the victim repeats it to his victim when in the next encounter, he becomes the tormentor:

Number 814327 may speak misnomer the tormentors being mute as we have seen in part two may speak of number 814326 to number 814328 who may speak of him to number 814330 and so on to number 814345 who in this way know number 814326 by repute

rumour transmissible ad infinitum in either direction

from left to right through the confidences of the tormentor to his victim who repeats them to his

from right to left through the confidences of the victim to his tormentor

From right to left the confidence moves from victim to tormentor. But both these hypotheses have to be abandoned due to the crawlers’ failing memories. One forgets what the other had said to him when he reaches the next. It is like playing Chinese Whispers with a sieve-like memory. The imparted knowledge is effaced as soon as the encounter ends:

so true it is that here one knows one’s tormentor only as long as it takes to suffer him and one’s victim only as long as it takes to enjoy
In this mud world, all knowledge lasts as long as the event lasts. Once the crawlers are severed from each other, they forget what went before and hence each discovery of Pim is always the first discovery. Every torment and victimisation appears to be the very first. The crawlers do not know if they have already had an encounter and are moving towards another encounter. This lack of knowledge is integral to what Beckett calls their "justice": "all here unwitting our justice go never from never towards." Beckett's use of the word "justice" reinforces my argument that the forgetting function in the novel has an ethico-political charge insofar as it resists the violence of knowledge produced in and through writing. Knowledge can only subsist in the form of an inaccurate memory of bits and scraps.

_How It Is_ ends on a note of apparent self-cancellation when the narrator declares that he has always been alone and rubbishes the whole story of encounter and torment as "all balls." He denies the whole story of company in the mud and nullifies Pim's existence. It is easy to read this self-contestation as internal to the Beckettian polemic of unknowing and forgetting which opposes epistemological violence. This finale can also be interpreted as an acknowledgment of literature's claim to falsehood and not to illumination which prevents it from becoming a form of power in itself. The self-negating speech can maintain the _weak agency_ of a literary ethics without collapsing into the totalitarian trap of power. However, the falsity of this self-cancellation can become a claim to illumination in itself. The fact that the falsity is admitted means that it cannot avoid an implicit claim to the illumination of this admitted falsity. When the voice admits its lies, the admission itself becomes a truth-claim and this risks a mutation into a form of power. I would argue that Beckett bypasses this mutation by resorting to the typographic "mark" of capitalisation.

In the second part of the novel which contained the encounter with Pim, Beckett had used capitalised phrases to mark the narrator's inscription on his victim's body in Roman Capitals. What the tormentor wrote on the victim's back was partially reproduced in the capitalised phrases and sentences. In the finale, just as the narrator is negating the whole narrative, Beckett brings back the repressed capitals in the voice's final movement. To give only one example: "no never stirred no never made to suffer no never suffered no answer NEVER SUFFERED." The return of the Roman capital suggests that just as the narrator is denying the existence of his tormentor or his Bom, his tormentor has arrived and started writing on his body. While the _content_ declares his solitude, the _form_ insists on the presence of company. Is the narrator alone or not? This question is left unanswered and unanswerable in an impeccable balance. He is alone and not
alone at the same time and this antinomy preserves ignorance. Beckett maintains this ambivalence as the final hole in knowledge and this is what prevents the text from becoming complicit with the nexus of epistemic power. It is ironic that Beckett chooses what appears to be a process of falsification ("all balls") to imply the impossibility of knowledge as a verifiable and falsifiable structure.

This is where the eroded intertextual trace of Ernst Haeckel’s proper name which had anchored the evolutionary-pedagogical trope is finally sabotaged by a logic of antinomy. The linear repetition of transgenerational transmission or ontogeny repeating phylogeny is halted here by the antinomy that the narrator is alone and innumerable multiple at the same time. If the referential content of the Haeckel allusion is evolution, How It Is punches a hole in that content by juxtaposing evolutionary continuity with the radical disjunction of an antinomy that both affirms evolution (I am not alone and there exists an infinite series of crawlers) and negates (I am alone and the Other doesn’t exist) it in the same stroke of corporeal writing. Due to the forgetting function every crawler loses the sense of evolutionary continuity and each encounter with the Other comes across as the first and last one. This is where the epistemic relationality with the Other is invaded by a logic of non-relation. I would argue that this is Beckett’s final undermining of intertextual authority through a pedagogical violence that evokes but cannot sustain any real mastery in the final run as the antinomic axiom of justice sets in.

In spite of this, Beckett doesn’t entirely succeed in locating his work outside the literary. Due to the nebulous and increasingly inclusive nature of the literary, Beckett can only distance literature from its conventional canonical and epistemological conception where it dishes out discrete totalities of knowledge. If his “work” is literary it is only in this counter-canonical way in which literature subtracts from knowledge and power instead of refurbishing it again and again. Beckett’s corpus works its way out of the established body of canonical literature as a referential field and source of knowledge. And this is where Beckett is remotest from Bloom’s high canonist writer. Instead of producing an elegy for the high canon of literature, much like Winnie, Beckett turns the canon into trash, although this trash is anything but benign and threatens to devour the subject. The more the subject trashes this knowledge, the more she drowns in its heap and this indeed is the paradoxical gap between the canon and the counter-canon where Beckett’s work can be seen to rest itself.

To make a brief return to Blanchot’s Beckett, How It Is is the Beckett text per excellence for Maurice Blanchot. In The Infinite Conversation (1969), he is convinced that it is the defining epic of modern times.69 How-
ever, it is noteworthy that Blanchot acknowledges the fact that a work like
*How It Is* demands a special kind of attention:

> In praising Beckett's *How it is*, would we dare promise it to posterity?
> Would we even wish to praise it? Which does not mean that it surpasses, but rather discredits all praise, and that it would be paradoxical to read it with admiration.\textsuperscript{70}

*How It Is* is an "unreadable" text for Blanchot and he is not sure if people read it at all in the year 1969 when *The Infinite Conversation* is published in French. Paradoxically enough, this is also the year in which Beckett wins the Nobel Prize for Literature. Blanchot's appraisal of *How It Is* underlines Beckett's strategy of almost entirely replacing the signs for the eye with those of the ear and a movement towards the purest form of inscription which is more mathematical and less literary; a form closer than anything else to Blanchot's dream of a *neutral* speech where literature shuns its dangerous potential to turn into yet another form of power and Beckett's "syntax of weakness" is an ally here. Discussing *How It Is* in the section titled "Words Must Travel Far" in *The Infinite Conversation*, Blanchot writes:

> "Here the force of seeing is no longer what is required; one must renounce the domain of the visible and of the invisible, renounce what is represented, albeit in negative fashion. Hear, simply hear."\textsuperscript{71} While Blanchot rightly emphasises the faculty of hearing in Beckett's novel where the whole work becomes an act of invocation, I must say by way of a departure that the visual dimension remains crucial, as we have seen, with the return of the Roman capitals which can only be visually perceived in writing and not in hearing the voice. The Roman capitals can only be seen in the text and this reserves importance for the act of seeing. The orthographic mark of capitalisation in the invocatory act of speech opens up the ambiguous gap between speech and writing. And Beckett's inter-penetration of the two resonates with an unmistakably deconstructive nuance here.

To restate the argument, Beckett begins by playing with the possible modifications of citation which already questions its reliability and then goes into the depths of the speech act itself where all articulations are marked by an internalised self-hearing and a resultant self-quoting. From this acknowledgement of inter-subjectivity in the field of speech and that of the given nature of language, we have seen how Beckett deepens his interrogation by attacking the kernel of citation which is knowledge as referential power. An excursion into the counter-epistemological stakes of *How It Is* reveals Beckett's manifold subversion of intertextual knowledge as a relational matrix of references. As I have demonstrated with the sabotaged disjunctive framework of (non)-evolution in *How It Is*, Beckett reduces refer-
ence to its minimal traces and further undercuts the ideational content of such allusion to unmark the violent pedagogy of referential power. Not only does he expose the network of power in knowledge as well as literary writing’s complicity in it but he also resists this violence by reducing knowledge to an equivocque in which the ambivalence of antinomy rescues literature from being implicated in the fabric of power. Beckett’s intertextual practice thus produces a rupture in knowledge instead of embellishing it. His use of the canonical literary intertext is counter-canonical because it attacks its underlying trust in erudition by subjecting the canon to variation and subversion through forgetting and misremembering. In this Beckett is less of Bloom’s high canonist literary writer and closer to Blanchot’s figure of the radical literary writer who works against the power inherent in the epistemological and institutional paradigms of literature.

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NOTES

4 I am indebted to Lacan for this theorisation of break or cut in knowledge which for him is integral to the rupture of truth. We might remember Lacan’s formulation that the “effect of truth is a collapse of knowledge” on page 186 in his 17th seminar *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, translated by Russell Grigg (London and New York: Norton, 2007). Throughout this article, I will trace this Lacanian efficacy of writing as a way of punching holes into knowledge.
7 George Bataille, “Molloy’s Silence,” in *Samuel Beckett: The Critical Heritage*, ed. Lawrence Graver and Raymond Federman (New York: Routledge, 2005) 60-9 and Maurice Blanchot, “Where Now? Who Now?,” in *Critical Thought series: 4: Critical Essays on Samuel Beckett*, ed. Lance St. John Butler (Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1993), 86-92. In the latter, on page 89, Blanchot writes about Beckett’s Trilogy, “perhaps we are approaching that movement from which all books derive, that point of origin where, doubtless, the work is lost, the point which always ruins the work, the point of perpetual unworkableness with which the work must maintain an increasingly initial relation or risk of becoming nothing at all.” [Emphasis in the original]

8 Maurice Blanchot, “Oh All to End,” 299.

9 In “Where Now? Who Now?” on page 92, Blanchot writes: “The Unnameable has more importance for literature than most ‘successful’ works in its canon.”


11 Terry Eagleton, “Introduction,” trans. Gregory Elliot. *Samuel Beckett and the Anatomy of a Literary Revolution*, ed. Pascale Casanova (London: Verso, 2006). On page 3, Eagleton writes, “Samuel Beckett is one of those writers about whom almost nobody nowadays has a bad word to say, despite the fact that the first London production of *Waiting for Godot* was greeted with outraged cries of ‘This is how we lost the Empire.’”

12 Ullrich Hasse and William Large, *Routledge Critical Thinkers: Maurice Blanchot* (New York: Routledge, 2001). On page 105 the authors write “If the challenge of a literary work is successful, it will itself be reduced to that which is the norm of communication. While Samuel Beckett’s language once shone in its desperation and aridity, today it has become a work read to illustrate our literary heritage. While it appeared as a disruption of our language and society, now we have the feeling that it has positively enriched our culture.”


17 Ibid.


19 Ibid., 5.

20 Ibid., 2.

21 Samuel Beckett, *The Complete Dramatic Works* (London: Faber and Faber,
2003), 160.
22 Ibid., 164.
23 Caselli, Beckett’s Dantes, 122.
25 Caselli, Beckett’s Dantes, 1.
28 Ibid., 143.
29 Dirk Van Hulle, The Making of Samuel Beckett’s Stirrings Still/Soubresauts and Comment dire/what is the word (Antwerp: University Press Antwerp, 2011). The book is part of the Beckett Digital Manuscript Project. In Section 1.2.3, on page 42, Hulle talks about this “Paralipomena” in the “Stirrings Still Notebook” which is otherwise known as the “Bare Room Fragment” in Beckett Studies. In this fragment, two characters try to remember the Shakespeare sonnets “No longer weep” [“weep” is already an instance of misremembering where it replaces the original word “mourn” in Shakespeare’s text] and “Let me not to” but cannot recall how the lines continue. The fragment ends with the acknowledgment of amnesia in “I can’t remember” or “I have forgotten.”
33 Macbeth, 70.
37 See Anthony Cordingley’s essay “Beckett’s Ignorance: Miracles/Memory, Pascal/Proust” Journal of Modern Literature 33.4 (2010): 129-52. Cordingley shows how Beckett uses the intertextual references only to grow out of them and what remains of the reference in the final text is nothing more than a detritus.
Ibid., 149.


43 Ibid.


45 Ibid.


47 Ibid., 38.

48 Ibid., 33.

49 Ibid., 34.

50 Ibid., 7.


53 Ibid., 35.


55 Ibid., 511.

56 Ibid., 512.


58 Beckett, *How It Is*, 57

59 Ibid., 54.

60 Ibid., 59.

61 Ibid., 60.

62 Ibid., 61.

63 Ibid., 53.

64 Ibid., 104.

65 Ibid., 105.
66 Ibid., 99.
67 Ibid., 127.
68 Ibid., 128.

70 Ibid., 328.
71 Ibid., 329.