At the close of Oedipus at Colonus (c. 401 BC), the last extant play of Sophocles and his final treatment of the myth of Oedipus’ accursed family, a strange dramatic event occurs. As the thunder of Zeus peals overhead, Oedipus’ body, located somewhere offstage, disappears forever, simultaneously bestowing a remarkable power upon the site where he departs from earthly life. Perhaps stranger still, for the form of the drama, are the responses that Theseus and Antigone have to the catastrophe. According to the messenger who reports the details of Oedipus’ death to the chorus (and the watching audience), the epic hero who alone among humans has permission to witness Oedipus’ passing actually fails to see the singular event:

And when we had departed, after a short time we turned around, and could see that the man [Oedipus] was no longer present, and the king [Theseus] was shading his eyes, holding his hand against his head, as though some terrible, terrifying thing, unbearable to see, had been presented.

ως δ’ απῆλθομεν,
χρόνω βραχεί στραφέντες, εξαπείδομεν
τον ἀνδρα τον μεν ουδαμού παρόντ’ ἔτι,
ἄνακτα δ’αυτὸν ομμάτων επίσκιον
χείρ’ αντέχοντα κρατός, ὡς δεινοῦ τίνος
In an odd twist of dramatic performance, Sophocles represents the catastrophe\(^2\) of Oedipus’ death by means of a messenger who is forbidden to see the occurrence. Thus the messenger must report upon what he saw of the only one who was allowed to see, Theseus – who himself fails to see because the sight presented is too terrible for seeing. In lieu of representation, then, in the place of what cannot be staged, the audience must turn to narrative language to gain knowledge of this event.

Such a pointedly linguistic presentation seems counter to the drama’s theatricality. As Aristotle indicates in the *Poetics*, tragedy, which belongs to the arts of *mimesis* or representation, remains distinct from other mimetic arts such as epic poetry, dithyramb, or music in that it utilizes actors on a stage along with verse and rhythm in order to convey its meaning. As his well-known formula describes:

> Tragedy is a representation of a serious, complete action which has magnitude, in embellished speech, with each of its elements [used] separately in the [various] parts [of the play]; [represented] by people acting and not by narration; accomplishing by means of pity and terror the catharsis of such emotions.

The body of the actor corresponds to the meaning of language; gestures have the potential to be both mimetic and deictic. In tragedy, this passage suggests, the “doing” (δρώντων) of actors takes the place of the reporting (απαγγέλων) of narrative language. Tragedy represents its meaning upon a stage before an audience by means of bodily actions supplemented by spoken words.

The speech of the messenger (that is, the reporter, the ἄγγελος) quoted above, however, suggests a more complicated relation between *mimesis* and language in tragedy. In fact, later in the *Poetics*, it seems that poetic language, apart from the bodily gestures that correspond to it, comprises an integral part of the function of the drama. The purpose of the performance of speech, Aristotle suggests, would disappear if the thoughts spoken by the actor were not essential: “For what would be the task of the speaker, if the necessary elements were apparent even without speech? [τι γαρ αν εἰπ τοῦ λέγοντος ἔργον, εἰ φαινότοι η δέοι καὶ μη δια τον λόγον]”\(^3\) (1456b7-8, my trans.). Lucas’s commentary suggests two possible mean-
ings: “Either A. is asking what would be the function of speech in drama if the necessary emotions could be aroused by pantomime, or, more likely, what would be the role of rhetoric in drama if the emotions could be aroused by the action.” With an emphasis on the way in which language itself conveys meaning, Aristotle introduces a discussion of *lexis*, diction, the manner of speaking the thought of the tragedy. Diction provides, he explains, the means by which rhetoric will be effected in the drama. Derrida, in his essay “White Mythology,” likewise suggests that this passage emphasizes the function of rhetoric in tragedy: “If there were no difference between *dianoia* and *lexis*, there would be no space for tragedy. … This difference is not only due to the fact that the personage must be able to say something other than what he thinks. He exists and acts within tragedy only on the condition that he speaks.” For Derrida, the need for *lexis*, the rhetorical presentation of the thought of the work, indicates a significant difference – between speech and thought – that creates the space for tragedy. In tragedy, the thought of the work can be expressed in speech that does not refer to it directly; conversely, words in tragedy may, by means of their rhetorical potential, pose a number of possible meanings. Rhetorical speech, then, is an essential aspect of tragedy; without speech, the thought of the play remains unspoken.

Yet what happens when speech fails? To return to *Oedipus at Colonus*, in the speech of Antigone that follows the messenger’s report (quoted above), Sophocles presents another barrier to understanding:

Alas, alack! It is for us, it is for us to lament in all fullness for the accursed blood from our father that is in us, unhappy pair; our father for whom we endured continual pain, and at the last we shall carry away from him things beyond reason that we have seen and suffered.

αιαί, φευ. ἐστιν ἐστι νων δή
οὐ τὸ μὲν, ἄλλο δὲ μη, πατρός ἐμφυτον
ἀλαστον αίμα δυσμόροιν στενάζειν,
ὡπιν τον πολύν
ἀλλοτε μὲν πόνον ἐμπεδον εἴχομεν,
ἐν πυμάτω δ' ἀλόγιστα παροίσομεν,
ιδόντε καὶ παθούσα. (1670-6)

For Antigone and Ismene, what is left at the end of Oedipus’ life, which it is their continual curse to mourn, surpasses reason (it is *αλόγιστος*), remaining for them in the experience of sight and suffering. What eludes speech can nevertheless be seen and felt. It seems, then, that speech works in conjunction with physical performance in the tragedy; for, in drama, “dis-
course itself is on display.”

These two responses to Oedipus’ death present two divergent hurdles to communication. On the one hand, the event of Oedipus’ death is not seen by any individual, even the epic hero designated to witness it. Nevertheless, the death is reported by the witness in terms of its not having been seen; the messenger’s words, delivered to the audience of Theban elders and the audience of spectators, take the place of the actual event. Yet this narrative account, failing to correspond entirely to the catastrophic moment of Oedipus’ death, cannot entirely convey the thought or meaning of his death. This difference arises again in the second passage. For, as Antigone laments, the meaning of Oedipus’ death – that is, what the mourning of his passing, and therefore of his past, would convey – stands beyond reason, it cannot be reasonably communicated to others, but remains to the daughters only in what they themselves have seen and suffered because of their father’s life. This failure in language returns us to the difference between speech and thought. Bridging the difference between lexis and dianoia, the tragic actor performs upon the stage not only before his audience, but for his audience. The terms of this performance are echoed in Antigone’s troubled lament. The necessity of the mourning that Antigone finds impossible shifts the impact of Oedipus’ death from his daughters’ individual experience of the event to the manner in which they may (or may not) communicate his death, by means of his life, to the polis. The transference of mourning from an individual ritual to a communal demonstration and process raises the problem of communicating the act of mourning to a large body of people. What does the corpse of the one who has died mean for the polis? What is the meaning of the loss of the individual for the city?

In Oedipus at Colonus, the meaning of Oedipus’ passing, and his past life, for the city, is embodied in his crimes: his past achieves significance in its pollution of the polis. For the city, the meaning of his passing must somehow indicate the nature of that pollution – that is, the extent of his transgression – in order to measure its loss or resolution in death. While the individual mourns in ritual the passing of an other individual, the meaning of mourning for the city is construed in terms of a larger ideal that reflects the position of that individual in relation to the city. In the case of Oedipus, mourning becomes an exploration of justice, in which the body becomes evidence or proof that will indicate justice effected. Thus, the individual body stands in as evidence for the meaning – the thought – of Oedipus’ life. Antigone’s method of communicating the meaning of his death – by means of her own body’s suffering – suggests this potential of communicating, from the individual to the masses, by means of the body.

While Oedipus at Colonus offers a demonstration of the political fate of
Mourning the Public Body

Oedipus’ body, whose public significance has already been made horrifyingly clear, Sophocles’ tragedy *Antigone*, in its essential concern with burial, traces the role of the body in its shift from individual to political mourning. Describing events that occur after Oedipus’ criminal investigation, self-conviction, and death in exile, this play demonstrates a preoccupation with crime and justice that reflects a fifth-century Athenian interest in the democratic mode of judgment – the formal trial. As a result, the body in *Antigone* functions not only as a representation of an action, but ultimately as a potential body of evidence – the evidence of meaning – whose suffering provides the legitimacy of proof to a witnessing audience. While the corpse, in its persistence on stage, reminds the audience of a potential meaning which it indicates, the body acquires this potency by having suffered pain. How does suffering enable the body to mean more than itself? How does the symbolic potential of the body relate to its position at the juncture of individual and *polis*? In this article, I will suggest that in the conjunction of tragedy and trial (both aspects of the *polis*), the sense of the body as evidence expands the function of mimesis – through the rhetorical concepts of evidence, proof, and punishment – beyond determinable meaning, surpassing the temporal and spatial limits of language to refer directly to the conception of divine justice at the location of the tortured, dead body.

The unforgettable corpse

Of Sophocles’ three Theban plays, *Antigone* (c. 442 BC) provides, in the motivating corpse of Polynices, the clearest example of the status of the material body for the *polis*. Taking place after a war between opposing forces led by Antigone’s two brothers, the play opens in the wake of an army of bodies killed in battle – corpses among which those of the brothers occupy a position of marked importance, due to the political significance with which they are invested. Yet it is Polynices’ corpse, denied burial by Creon as punishment for his insurrection against Thebes and his brother Eteocles, which poses the ethical dilemma of the play. While Antigone expresses a passionate loyalty to her brother, repeatedly attempting to give Polynices a proper burial, Creon opposes her efforts with a staunch and unbending loyalty to the city-state, condemning her actions as traitorously criminal.

Polynices’ unburied corpse introduces an ethical dilemma into the play from the very first, when Antigone proposes to her sister Ismene the plan to bury it, raising the problem of Creon’s edict against such an action. What seems to strike Antigone first about the situation is the inequality with which her brothers are being treated: while Eteocles is honored with burial,
Polynices is not. Yet the manner in which she relates Creon's proclamation to Ismene reveals that the matter is not merely about a simple burial: "But as for the unhappy corpse of Polynices, they say it has been proclaimed to the citizens that none shall conceal it in a grave or lament for it, but that they should leave it unwept for, unburied, a rich treasure house for birds as they look out for food [τον δ’ οθλίως θανόντα Πολυνείκους νέκυν / αστοίσι φασιν εκκεκηρύχθαι το μη / τάφω καλύψαι μηδὲ κυκώσαι τινα, / εάν δ’ άκλαυτον, άταφον, οιωνοίς γλυκύν / θησαυρόν εισορώσι προς χάριν βοράς]" (26-30). While the practice of leaving traitors unburied is not uncommon in fifth century Greece (and therefore would not have been especially shocking to Sophocles' audience), Antigone's emphasis upon the results of such treatment — that the body as carrion would provide food for scavengers — emphasizes the particularly shameful quality of the corpse denied burial. In addition, Creon's edict specifies that the body not be covered in a grave (μη τάφω καλύψαι); the corpse thus remains in view, as a reminder to citizens of the fate of a traitor, but also as a nagging reminder to Antigone of the dishonour directed toward her brother. Thus the dramatic stichomythia between the sisters that opens the play revolves around the ethical dilemma posed by the presence (above ground) of the dead body: while Ismene protests that in burying Polynices Antigone would commit an act forbidden to the city (απόρρητον πόλει [44]), Antigone asserts that to be caught not burying him would be a betrayal to her brother (ου γαρ δη προδούσομαι [46]), one of her own (των εμών [48]). Arguing that her crime is a hallowed one (όσια πανουργήσασ [74]) that the gods would honour, Antigone claims that it would be especially honourable to die doing such a deed. When Ismene suggests that her sister is seeking to accomplish an impossible thing, Antigone retorts: "If you say that, you will be hated by me, and you will justly incur the hatred of the dead man [ει ταύτα λέξεις, εχθαρή μεν εξ εμού, / εχθρά δε τω θανόντι προσκείση δίκη]" (93-4). Thus, Antigone asserts that the honour of the gods protects her in burying Polynices, even if she should die, whereas the just hatred of the dead condemns Ismene's refusal to act. In her passionate conviction, however, Antigone urges Ismene not to maintain a protective silence about her transgression, but rather to proclaim her crime to all, a request that Ismene responds to with clear misgiving.

Creon's entrance, in which he takes up the thread of Ismene's argument, is directly preceded by the parodos describing, as Mark Griffith's commentary points out, "what Polynices had represented while he lived — a hideous threat to his whole community." That a chorus made up of Theban elders, leading citizens of the city of Thebes, delivers this warning re-emphasizes the political nature of the problem of Polynices' corpse. The
chorus’ concern with the *polis* thus sets the stage for Creon’s claim, following this chorus, that he enacts his laws for the good of the city. In his first speech (162-210), Creon describes the needs of the city as his first priority, clearly establishing that this takes precedence even over the ties of a loved one, since such dear attachments, he argues, can only be formed in the luxury of a well-run city. The greatness of Thebes, he continues, can be attributed to the effectiveness of the laws (*nomoi*, 191) of this hierarchy, laws that privilege the city over personal feelings.

Creon’s emphasis upon the priority of the city over the personal makes his laws, of course, radically incommensurable with Antigone’s emphatic assertion that her ties to her brother precede any other consideration, even concern for her own life. Creon proposes that his civic laws take precedence over Antigone’s individual ties to her family, raising an ethical conflict that seems to present an opposition between societal structures, such as the law and the city, and the desires of the individual, such as home and family. Thus, the play has become for many commentators a paradigm of the ethical dilemma of the individual in society. Critics find expressed in *Antigone* a tension between a range of dialectical oppositions, including the law of the *polis* and the law of the *oikos*, the law of men and the law of the gods, civil law and natural law, techne and nature – with Antigone’s revolt associated with family, nature, the worship of the divine. Feminist critics find in Antigone a distinctly feminine heroine, overturning the patriarchy in a passionate subversion of the order of the law; in these readings, Antigone’s desires cause disruptions that can break apart the regimes of Creon, Aristotle, and all of dialectical philosophy. Yet what is this nature, this passion, this desire, that would be incorporated into a conception of ethics, specifically the ethical conflict at the heart of *Antigone*? In these ethical readings of the play, Antigone is seen to personify or enact limits which are particularly human aspects of existence in opposition to the societal construction of the *polis* and the laws that correspond to it. At the heart of these terms of conflict, however, lies the compulsion that initially provides the catalyst for their production. While the dialectical approaches noted here appropriately draw out possible terms of conflict within the play, none address the persistent and haunting figure that prompts these oppositions: the corpse of Polynices, a representation of the human at its most extremely inhuman.

**Mourning and Burial**

The guard who arrives to report the initial transgression of Creon’s edict – the discovery that someone has buried Polynices’ corpse – states his case nervously and briefly, afraid that he will suffer blame for delivering
the bad news. Significantly, in his initial statement of the problem, he casts the burial itself in metaphorical terms: “Someone has just gone off after burying the body, sprinkling its flesh with thirsty dust and performing the necessary rites [τον νεκρό τις αρτίως / θάμας βέβηκε κατί χρωτί διψίαν / κόνιν παλύνας καφαγιστεύσας α χρη]” (245-7). While the guard’s reference to the proper rites of burial conveys a sense of the significant act accomplished, he expresses the physical action in terms of a metaphor: “thirsty dust [κόνιν παλύνας].” Though the correspondence of these terms seems almost clichéd – when the ground is dry and dusty, it needs water or is “thirsty,” – Griffith suggests in his commentary that the reference to water also may indicate the burial ground’s need for the tears of lament. Indeed, as the description of the guard goes on to indicate, Antigone’s scattering of dust over the body, accompanied with the necessary ritual mourning rites, seems to have sufficed to protect Polynices’ body just as well as a fully underground burial would. In fact, as Carol Jacobs has pointed out, the slightness of Antigone’s interaction with the physical earth echoes the lightness of the dust on Polynices’ body: both are so light as to seem hardly existent at all. Thus, the guard marvels at how the earth about the body remains unmarked, and at how the body has vanished despite the fact that it is only covered with a light dust: like the scattering of dust, the metaphor suggests, rather than explicitly demonstrates, the burial of the corpse under the earth. Significantly, also, the guard notes that the layer of dust has somehow protected the body from being mauled by animals or birds (a fact bearing the potential to especially irritate Creon, whose edict had emphasized such a fate for the corpse).

Antigone’s ritual burial, slight as it manifests itself physically, subverts the prohibition that Creon has placed on the body. In doing so, she follows a customary rite of mourning that mediates between the dead mortal and the gods, as Bernard Knox points out:

Antigone’s appeal is not general but specific. She is not opposing a whole set of unwritten laws to the written laws of the polis, nor is she pleading the force of individual conscience or universal and natural law. She is claiming that the age-old customary rites of mourning and burial for the dead, which are unwritten because they existed even before the alphabet was invented or the polis organized, have the force of law, unwritten but unfailing, which stems from the gods and which the gods enforce.

Antigone herself, of course, claims that she performs the ritual of “burying” Polynices in the service of the laws of the gods. Yet the dusted corpse remains in view for the guard to discover; thus the ritual Antigone performs
affects the city, as well. When the guard brings her before Creon, charging her with the burial, the chorus exclaims as she approaches, “Surely they do not lead you captive for disobedience to the king’s laws…? [ου δὴ πτού εἰ γ’ απιστούσαν / τοῖς βασιλείοις απάγουσι νόμοις...;]” (381-2). Providing the conclusion to their choral song that has addressed the dangerous potential of man, the choral reference to the *nomoi* that Antigone has broken as kingly (τοῖς βασιλείοις νόμοις) distinguishes these prohibitions as another man-made thing, a product of *techne*, and thus good or bad only to the extent to which they carry out the justice of the gods (see especially lines 365-71). Antigone reiterates this distinction shortly thereafter; when Creon clarifies with astonishment that she has dared to break his law, she replies with a justification that places her squarely on the side of the gods:

Yes, for it was not Zeus who made this proclamation, nor was it Justice who lives with the gods below that established such laws among men, nor did I think your proclamations strong enough to have power to overrule, mortal as they were, the unwritten and unfailing ordinances of the gods.

ου γαρ τι μοι Ζευς ἢν ο δηρύξας τάδε, οὐδ’ ἡ ξύνοικος των κάτω θεών Δίκη τοιουσδ’ εν ανθρώποισιν ὑώσεν νόμους. οὐδὲ σθένειν τοσούτον ωόμην τα σα κηρύξας’ ἄγραπτ’ ἄγραπτ’ ἄγραπτ’ ἄγραπτ’ οὐκ ἀνθρώπων καρφαλή θεών νόμιμα δύνασθαι θνητά γ’ ὄνθ’ υπερθραμεῖν. (450-5)

Excluding Creon’s laws from the divinely ordained laws, Antigone aligns herself with rights proclaimed by either Zeus or divine Justice – which she significantly locates as residing with the gods below, that is, the chthonic gods, among whom Hades would be included. In either case, Zeus or Justice, these divinely ordained laws seem to gain their validity in her assessment because of their immortal nature: they are unwritten (ἀγραπτα), unlike the laws of men, which in their material (written) presence may ultimately be subject to temporal decay (thus her designation of them as mortal [θνητά]). The mourning that Antigone seeks to accomplish, then, echoes the divine laws she claims to follow, inasmuch as mourning seeks to immortalize, or make present in memory, the one who has passed away.

Yet the effects of this memorial ritual extend beyond Antigone’s relation to the gods; the importance of Polynices’ unburied body to the city determines that her actions must resonate in a public sense as well. In response to Antigone’s claims, Creon emphasizes again his devotion to the laws of the city, arguing their importance in terms of what lies at stake in their being obeyed or transgressed:
But there is no worse evil than insubordination! This it is that ruins cities, this it is that destroys houses, this it is that shatters and puts to flight the warriors on its own side! But what saves the lives of most of those that go straight is obedience! In this way we have to protect discipline.

αναρχίας δε μείζον ουκ ἔστιν κακόν. 
αὐτή πόλεις ὀλλυσιν, ἢδ' αναστάτους 
οίκους τίθησιν, ὢδ' συμμάχου δορός 
τρωτάς καταρρήγνυσι των δ' ὀρθουμένων 
σώζει τα πολλά σώμαθ' η πειθαρχία. (672-6)

For Creon, then, the laws of the city must be obeyed because they save the citizens at all levels: in government, home and military life. In the face of such high stakes, obedience becomes unequivocal and unquestioning; he therefore categorizes any deviance from the straight path of the law as anarchy (αναρχίας, not subordinate to the ruler or αρχή). The choice here stands framed as the stark difference between disorder and order, a distinction at the heart of much of Sophocles’ work. Creon’s fear, expressed here, of a continuous threat to the fragile hold of absolute order manifests itself in his extreme treatment of Polynices’ body (i.e., his emphatic desire that the body be exposed as carrion for mutilation by animals) and his later obsessive attempts to oppress Antigone. Such a fear gives a tenuous quality to his rule, as if it could be subverted by the slightest deviance, the expression of any loss of faith. Thus he declares in his decree (or so Antigone reports it) that the one burying Polynices will be subject to death by stoning. Such a death might serve as a public demonstration of the results of betraying the rule of Creon. Even the demonstration of force and control that a public execution might provide, however, seems too weak an enforcement for Creon. In a later exchange with Antigone, he extends this desire to control not only the lives but also the deaths of those who usurp his authority. When she asks, “Do you wish for anything more than to take me and kill me? [θέλεις τι μείζον ἢ κατακτείναι μ' ἐλών]” (497), he replies, “Not I! When I have that, I have everything [εγώ μεν οὐδέν, τουτ' ἐχων ἀπαντή' ἐχω]” (498). Indeed, if he had Antigone’s death, he would have everything, for being in possession of another’s death would give him a quality similar to the gods who have a hand in fate. With this threat, Creon conflates his own potential with that of the gods.

Yet for Creon, as he demonstrates with the public spectacle of stoning he first proposes with his edict, his power depends upon his ability to persuade his subjects, the citizens, to invest him with it. This becomes clear as he begins to lose the empathy of the chorus. Once Haemon appears on-
stage and tries to convince his father to change his mind, the chorus seems to waver in their support of Creon’s execution of Antigone, his son’s fiancée. Thus, after Haemon exits, the chorus asks Creon if he still intends to kill her; when he replies in the affirmative, they ask how he will do it, giving him the opportunity to change his method of execution from the formerly expressed public stoning to a less dramatic option of burying her alive in a tomb, out of sight of the city (775). Creon therefore struggles to maintain his present power, seeking to prevent any disorder in the city that might lead to a loss of authority, by modifying his plans.

The execution he therefore proposes, death by burial alive, though less dramatic and painful (presumably) than the first option, presents its own set of worries to Antigone. From loudly proclaiming her part in mourning her brother, she turns to nagging worries about the chances that she herself will be mourned by others, if she is to die alone, hidden, and possibly forgotten in a cave: “No longer may I, poor creature, look upon the sacred eye of the shining sun; and my fate, unwept for, is lamented by no friend οὐκέτι μοι τόδε λαμπάδος ιερόν / ὃμμα θέμις οράν ταλαίνα. / τον δ’ εμόν πότμον αδάκρυτον / ουδείς φίλων στενάζει” (879-82). With this complaint, Antigone shifts her focus from the consideration of her (and her brother’s) individual relation to the gods to anxiety about her position in the public at her death; in other words, she worries that her memory, her reputation, will die with her. Creon responds to this concern by reaffirming her worries; although he rhetorically suggests at first that she will be mourned as a matter of course, he goes on to emphasize the isolated nature of her living tomb, and its complete removal from those living above ground. By removing her body from view, Creon suggests that he will veil the sign that would inspire the mourning of Antigone – her corpse.

With this gesture, Creon plans a similar fate for Antigone as he has designated for her brother: by consigning her to a death removed (effectively) from the city, he buries the disorder of her anarchy along with her – just as he excludes the body of Polynices, who has brought disorder into the city as a result of his uprising. In each case, Creon physically removes the disorder from the sphere of city life or action. By burying Antigone alive, Creon also hopes to remove the pollution of further disorder by avoiding the guilt of having killed her directly. Yet, in doing so, he subjects Antigone to suffer a fate in death also similar to Polynices’: an unmourned death. However, in eliding the space for burial, Creon continues the cycle of disorder, thus failing to impose the order he hopes.

The potential for disorder inherent in Creon’s treatment of corpses is realized in Teiresias’ warning of a plague on the city resulting from Creon’s treatment of Polynices: “And it is your will that has put this plague upon the
city; for our altars and our braziers, one and all, are filled with carrion brought by birds and dogs from the unhappy son of Oedipus who fell [και ταύτα της σης εκ φρενός νοσεί πόλις. / βωμοί γαρ ἡμῖν ἐσχάραι τε παντελείς / πλήρεις υπ’ οἰνωνίν τε και κυνών βοράς / του δυσμόρου πεπτώτος Οἰδίπου γόνου]” (1015-18). In this case, the pollution of the plague on the city manifests a symptom of the problem that Creon is causing: the disruption of a custom in which women mourned for the dead, recalling their life as a memory that allowed the passing of the dead. It is this “law,” of course, to which Antigone refers in her claims to be doing the just thing in burying Polynices.

Prohibiting the memorializing ritual of mourning that Antigone would perform, Creon causes a disruption that then manifests itself on the living body, in the form of a plague. In his rage at Antigone’s subversion, Creon disrupts the divine order of things, which leads to a disturbance in the order of the polis, as well. The chorus addresses the problem of such violent anger in their fourth song, which revolves around a discussion of the dangerous threat that passion poses:

You [Eros, passion] wrench just men’s minds aside from justice, doing them violence; it is you who have stirred up this quarrel between men of the same blood. Victory goes to the visible desire that comes from the eyes of the beautiful bride, desire that has its throne in sovereignty beside those of the mighty laws.

Avoiding a direct condemnation of either Creon’s or Antigone’s violence, the chorus uses the violent conflict between Polynices and Eteocles as an example of the damage that passion can cause, diverting men from justice to injustice. As an example of right action, however, they provide the image of the desire emanating from the eyes of a bride, who in occupying the customary position for the female in society therefore follows the “mighty laws” (θεσμών), that is, those that are established. Having confirmed this precept, the chorus can then accuse Antigone on the grounds of the hubristic folly to which her passion has led her, as well as for the established laws that her father broke before her: “Advancing to the extreme of daring, you
stumbled against the lofty altar of Justice, my child! And you are paying some torment [inherited] from your father [προβάσι' επ' ἀσχατον θράσους / υψηλόν ες Δίκας βάθρον / προσέπεσες, ω τέκνων, ποδί. / πατρών δ' εκτίνεις τιν' ἀθλον']” (853-6). Not only has Antigone gone too far in pursuit of her own desires, the chorus argues, but she also suffers in repayment, as a pay off or vengeance, for her father’s crime. The chorus here accuses Antigone of acting against divine justice, as a result of her own passion and her father’s incest. Antigone takes up only the second of the accusations against her (one of which, ironically, her father might also be accused), seeing her own predicament as punishment for the fate cursed upon her by Oedipus:

You have touched on a thought most painful for me, the fate of my father, thrice renewed, and the whole of our destiny, that of the famous Labdacids. Ah, the disaster of marriage with his mother, and my father’s incestuous couplings with his ill-fated mother! From what parents was I born, miserable one! To them I go, to live with them, accursed, unmarried! Ah, brother who made a disastrous marriage, in your death you have destroyed my life!

Providing the fullest reference in the play to her father’s crime, Antigone specifically describes Oedipus’ transgressions of established law: not only did he marry his own mother, but he had children from this incestuous coupling. By leaving out the other aspect of Oedipus’ crime, his murder of his father (i.e., the shedding of kindred blood that Creon is trying to avoid by burying Antigone alive), Antigone’s speech depicts Oedipus’ crime as one of pollution: by committing incest and bearing children who are also his sib-
lings, Oedipus has prevented, in a sense, the passage of time, the movement forward of generations. Thus Oedipus’ offence against the laws of the gods and society is here raised in terms of temporal disorder – a corruption of time, a failure to pass on, that makes the memorializing of mourning impossible. These are the transgressions for which the gods will make Antigone suffer, as both the chorus and Antigone suggest, providing a demonstration of Antigone’s suffering as a lesson about breaking established laws and creating divine disorder (or stumbling against the altar of Justice), just as Creon sought to make a demonstration of his own order by means of his punishment of both Polynices’ and Antigone’s bodies. Such a reading is corroborated by the language the chorus uses above to refer to the debt of suffering that Antigone owes: coupled with the idea of paying a penalty, \(\alpha\theta\lambdaο\varsigma\) acquires the sense of not only a struggle or contest, but even a torment or ordeal. Through suffering some torment or punishment, the chorus and Antigone’s response imply, the debt owed for causing such disorder might be paid and order be restored. The punishment of Antigone will provide a meaning or value for Oedipus’ past life, a painful labour whose significance exceeds the limits of her corpse.

**Punishment and Spectacle**

Elaborating upon the significance of suffering punishments, the fifth song of the chorus (944-87) describes a series of punishments: the tomblike imprisonment of Danae, the rocky imprisonment of Lycurgus, and the blinding of the sons of Phineus. Avoiding a consideration of responsibility or guilt, the chorus focuses on the process of suffering punishment, concluding with the notion that inescapable Fate manifests itself in each of these examples. In this sense, the punishments stand as evidence of both the ineluctable nature of the difficulties Fate imposes, but also of the power of Fate, in its ability to punish without mercy.

In a more immediate sense, Teiresias prophecies a similar case of the punishing payment of vengeance when he warns Creon of the exchange of corpses that his hubristic actions will provoke:

Then know well that you shall not accomplish many racing courses of the sun, and in that lapse of time you shall give in exchange for corpses the corpse of one from your own loins, in return for having hurled below one of those above, blasphemously lodging a living person in a tomb, and you have kept here something belonging to the gods below, a corpse deprived, unburied, unholy. Neither you nor the gods above have any part in this, but you have inflicted it upon them! On account of this there lie in wait for you the doers of
outrage who in the end destroy, the Erinyes of Hades and the gods, so that you will be caught up in these same evils.

αλλ’ ευ γε τοι κάτιςθι μη πολλούς έτι τρόχους αμιλλητήρας ηλίου τελών,
εν οίσι των σων αυτός εκ σπλάγχων 
νέκυν νεκρών αμοιβός αντίδοτος έση,
ανθ’ ων έχεις μεν των άνω βαλών κάτω,
ψυχήν γ’ ατίμως εν τάφω κατοικίας,
έχεις δε των κάτωθεν ενθάδ’ αυ θεών 
άμοιρον, ακτέριστον, ανόσιον νέκυν.

ψυχήν γ’ ατίμως εν τάφω κατοικίας,"

εν ταύτας αυτοίς τοίσδε ληφθήναι κακοίς. (1064-76)

Teiresias’ warning raises the future curse of Creon in terms of antidote (from the verb αντιδίδωμι [1067] derives the noun αντίδοτος, something given in remedy, an antidote): the corpse that the gods will demand from Creon will be given in payment for the disorder he has created by the mismanagement of corpses (not only has he refused to bury a dead body, but he also gives a living body burial). In this way, then, Creon will provide an antidote to the plague caused by unburied corpses from which the city suffers. Referring to this plague on the city again on lines 1081-3, Teiresias emphasizes how the cosmic disorder that Creon has caused resulted in a disorder manifested in the city. With this, Creon assumes the position in which he has placed Antigone, the cause of disorder in the polis; the spectacle of punishment with which he has threatened her hence becomes a spectacle of punishment under which he must suffer.

Creon finally responds to this final warning of Teiresias, and exits the stage intending to bury the corpse and then release Antigone. Nevertheless, less than one hundred lines later, a messenger arrives to announce the payment of the antidote, the death of Creon’s only son Haemon, who, he announces, has died by his own hand, “in anger against his father for the murder he committed [αυτός προς αυτού, πατρί μηνίσας φόνου]” (1177). He describes to the chorus how he, along with several of Creon’s other attendants, heard a cry issue from the cave as they followed Creon toward it, intending to release Antigone. Worried at its portent, Creon urged his attendants forward to see whether he feared correctly that the voice issued from his son Haemon. At their master’s orders, the messenger describes, he and his peers looked in on a tragic scene of loss: Antigone
hanging by the neck and Haemon clinging to her waist, lamenting her death caused by his father. When Creon finally approached, the messenger continues, Haemon lunged at him with the sword, missed and then drove it into himself, finally achieving a sort of union with Antigone in his death throes:

Still living, he clasped the maiden in the bend of his feeble arm, and pouring forth a sharp jet of blood, he stained her white cheek. He lay, a corpse holding a corpse, having achieved his marriage rites, poor fellow, in the house of Hades, having shown by how much the worst evil among mortals is bad counsel.

In death, Haemon and Antigone rejoin society through their achievement of the marriage rites (τα νυμφικά τέλη λαχων), resolving the passion-induced mistakes described by the chorus in lines 791-4 (and, even in dying, realigning their desire within socially and divinely approved parameters, as does the bride described by the chorus in lines 795-9, quoted above). In addition, though, the scene of Haemon’s dying provides a lesson, as well: it “shows” or displays (δείκνυμι) to the witnessing phalanx of guards (and, via the witness’s report, the chorus of Theban citizens and the audience, too) the extent to which “bad counsel” is the worst of human evils.

The paradigmatic and gruesome suffering of Haemon’s death throes resonates in his dead body when Creon appears later, bearing it onstage. The chorus responds to his entrance: “Here comes the king himself, bearing in his arms a conspicuous memorial; if we may say so, his ruin came not from others, but from his own failing [και μην άνα και το εφηκε / μνήμεν επίσημον δια χειρός ἐξην, / ει δεμες ειπειν, ουκ αλλοτρίαν / άτην, αλλ’ αυτός αμαρτών]” (1257-60). Thus, the chorus provides a narrative description of Creon’s appearance on stage, explaining the deictic significance of Haemon’s corpse: it functions as a distinguishing mark (επίσημος), a mimetic sign or reminder (μνήμη) of being guilty (αμαρτάνω). Not only does the body Creon carries bear a lesson for himself, however; the reminder, displayed in his arms onstage (in front of the palace doors that would have been depicted at the back of the stage), speaks to the city as well. As Segal explains, “The term ‘conspicuous memorial’ … refers
specifically to the commemorative ceremonies of the public funeral and the entombment of warriors who have fallen in behalf of the city." Thus, the corpse of Haemon, exhibited in the arms of his father the king, bears along with it the meaning of his life in death: the mourning prohibited by Creon’s edict returned to the city in a public mark of mourning.

Creon’s antidote has yet to take effect, however: the exchange of corpses continues only a few lines later, with the messenger’s announcement of the suicide of the queen, Eurydice. Enhancing the exhibition of Haemon’s body in Creon’s arms, the corpse of Eurydice also appears displayed prominently on the stage, as the chorus indicates in their exclamation: “You can see it! It is no longer hidden indoors [οράν πάρεστιν. ου γαρ εν μυχοίς έπη]” (1293). Most commentators agree that this scene would have been staged with Eurydice’s body then appearing onstage on the ek-kuklema, a mechanized wheeled platform that would have been pushed onto the centre of the stage, probably through the opening of the palace doors at the back. The corpse thus presents a dramatic spectacle over which the messenger describes the manner of her death as Creon laments his fate.

As in the case of Haemon, the messenger describes the details of Eurydice’s death: hurling curses upon her husband, the killer of her son, Eurydice copied the method of Haemon’s death, “so that she experienced the suffering of her son [όπως / παιδός τόδ’ ήσθετ’ οξυκώκυτον πάθος]” (1315-6). With this double death, Creon finally recognizes his culpability in the downfall of his family, his ineluctable guilt: “Ah me, this can never be transferred to any other mortal, acquitting me! For it was I that killed you, unhappy one, I, I speak the truth! [ώμοι μοι, τάδ’ ουκ επ’ άλλον βροτών / εμάς αρμόδει ποι’ εξ αιτίας. / εγώ γαρ σ’, εγώ σ’ έκανον, ομέλες, / εγώ, φάμ’ έτυμον]” (1317-20). Creon’s formulation of this lament in terms of an accusation or charge (αἰτία) that he can never escape echoes the accusation that the messenger utters upon announcing the death of Eurydice: “You were reproached by the dead as guilty of those deaths and these [ως αἰτίαν γε τώνδε κακείνων έχων / προς της θανούσης τήσδ’ επεσκήπτου μόρων]” (1312-3). Thus, the description that follows of Eurydice’s death, coupled with the display of her corpse alongside Haemon’s onstage, calls an accusation upon Creon. It is this guilt that Creon then assumes when he recognizes his actions as cause of Eurydice’s and Haemon’s deaths.

Creon reemphasizes the losses he has suffered as he leaves the stage at the end of the play, though his words begin to turn responsibility for his suffering away from himself and onto fate. While his speech marks the presence of the corpses next to him, his lament also indicates that there is something more that is unrecognizable to him:
Lead me out of the way, useless man that I am, who killed you, my son, not by my own will, and you here too, ah, miserable one; I do not know which to look on, which way to lean; for all that is in my hands has gone awry, and fate hard to deal with has leapt upon my head.

άγοι’ αν μάταιον ἀνδρ’ εκποδών,
oς, ω παι, σε τ’ ουχ εκών κατέκανον
σε τ’ αυ τάνδ’, ώμοι μέλεος, οὐδ’ ἐχω
προς πότερον ἵδω, πα κλιθώ. πάντα γαρ
λέχρια ταν χεροίν, τα δ’ επί κρατί μοι
πότμος δυσκόμιστος εἰσήλατο. (1339-46)

As Griffith points out, Creon’s speech suggests a contrast between what is visible (the dead bodies of Haemon and Eurydice) and what is invisible (the mysterious but inescapable hand of fate). Creon’s struggle with seeing such a spectacle also puts an emphasis upon his pain in witnessing the results of his folly; thus Creon assumes the position of witness that the guards, chorus, and audience have previously occupied (and continue to perform in this scene). The spectacle of dead bodies before him forces him to bear witness to what they represent – in this case, his complicity in their death. The accusation against Creon, then, is something that he witnesses alongside the others: embodied in the corpses of Haemon and Eurydice are the signs of his guilt.

Yet, as Antigone points out previously in the play, a dead body, being dead, cannot bear witness (“The dead body will not bear witness to that [ου μαρτυρήσει ταύθ’ ο κατθανών νέκυς]” [515]). How, then, can a corpse deliver an accusation of guilt against another? For the corpse of Antigone, as well as that of Haemon, Eurydice, and Polynices, it is the narrative surrounding the corpse that communicates the meaning of it. In other words, the corpse alone does not convey the meaning, but something more embodied in it does so. The sight of the dead body makes present a past life; the end of a life provides a frame for considering that life’s significance (a significance that is worked through in mourning). However, as long as life remains, as long as life continues to unfold, the ultimate fate or significance of that life remains unknown. Ruing the fate of Creon, the messenger refers to this temporal distinction just before announcing Haemon’s death: “there is no state of human life that I would praise or blame as though it had come to a stop; for fortune makes straight and fortune brings down the fortunate or the unfortunate man at all times [ουκ ἔσθ’ οποίον στάντ’ αν ἀνθρώπου βίον / ουτ’ αινέσαιμ’ αν οὔτε μεμψάιμην ποτέ. / τύχη γαρ ορθοί και τύχη καταρρέπει / τον ευτυχοῦντα τον τε δυστυχοῦντ’ αεί]” (1156-9).
The meaning of a life unravels as it passes; the only unchanging life is a dead one. Thus the synthesis of the passing events of life can only be made after death: for example, in the interpretation of mourning – or, likewise, in the narrative accounts of the messenger.

The messenger’s speech above suggests that a difference between mortal and immortal is in the subjection of mortals to a mysterious fate that always surprises man with fortune or failure – that works upon man’s life, in other words, outside of his control. For this reason, the only way to escape change or fate in life is death. Once death has occurred, mourning or a narrative might take up the death, and the past life that it marks, and give it meaning. In seeking to control the deaths of others, Creon might thus impose his own meaning upon them. The effective potential in the display or spectacle of corpses has already been suggested in connection with Creon’s treatment of the corpse of Polynices. Creon raises the possibility that such a display could be directed against another person when he angrily threatens his son with witnessing the death of his fiancée: “Bring the hateful creature, so that she may die at once close at hand, in the sight of her bridegroom! [ἀγετε το μίσος, ως κατ’ όμματι αυτίκα / παρόντι θνήσκη πλησία τω νυμφίω]” (760-1). Perceiving that he has lost the support of even his own son, Creon furiously proposes to punish him for his betrayal by murdering his beloved right in front of his eyes. This seems to be a case, then, in which a corpse is meant to provide retribution; by means of his ability to take life away, Creon will suggest the necessity of supporting the authority of the king, “paying back” Haemon for his hint of insubordination.

Thus, Creon’s threat to Haemon involves more than the simple presentation of Antigone’s dead corpse for him to witness, but the action of her being killed in front of him. It is in the process of being deprived of life that Antigone’s death will gain meaning for Haemon – a punishing meaning, Creon hopes. In this sense, the tormented struggle in payment for justice of which the chorus warns Antigone (in lines 853-6, quoted above) becomes the meaning of her death, which evolves, as suffering, in the process of mourning.

**Torture, punishment, and control**

The significance of the threatened torture of Antigone echoes a more sweeping warning that Creon delivers before the guard and the chorus of elderly Theban citizens only a few lines before this exchange. Convinced that the criminal burying of Polynices manifests a money-driven conspiracy against him, Creon asserts his authority by issuing a general threat of punishment to all present. Since, in this case, Creon expresses the terms of
the conspiracy as monetary, the sense of this imminent punishment as “payment” appears clearly: “But those who to earn their fee have contrived to do this thing have ensured that in time they will pay the penalty [οὐ οὖν δὲ μισθαρνοντες ἤνυσαν ταδὲ, ἐρωτευόμενοι εἰς τὴν δικήν]” (302-3). In this exchange, Creon suggests that justice will necessarily be effected upon the conspirators; the threat of punishment that immediately follows links this retribution directly to the torture that those will suffer who choose the profits of conspiracy over bending to the king’s authority. As he exclaims in threatening fury to the citizen chorus and the guard, “If you do not find the author of this burial and reveal him to my eyes, a single Hades shall not suffice for you, before all have been strung up alive to expose this insolence [εἰ μὴ τον αὐτόχειρα τούδε τοῦ τάφου / εὐρόντες εκφανεί’ εἰς ὀφθαλμοὺς εμοὺς, / οὐχ ὑμῖν Ἀιδῆς μοῦνος αρκέσει, πρὶν αὐτὸν δὲ ζώντες κρεμαστοὶ δηλώσει δηλώσθη’ ύβριν]” (306-9). Here, not only does Creon threaten his subjects with torture, but he marks the method of torture as a public display of their crimes. Those not complying with his edict will manifest or exhibit (δηλόω) the extent of their hubris (i.e., the folly of usurping Creon’s authority) by means of their public spectacle of their torture (being hung out alive [ζώντες κρεμαστοὶ] and, presumably, suffering the corresponding punishments). Thus, Creon proposes to bring before the polis a visual reminder of the results of breaking his laws.

In addition to the public spectacle of torture as retribution for subverting his authority, Creon also implies with this threat that he will control the manner of their dying (i.e., they will not merely suffer a simple trip to Hades). With this claim, Creon assumes a position that supersedes the limits of the mortal; for, as the chorus that follows this scene indicates in its “ode to man,” death presents the most clearly insurpassable limit to mankind, despite all of his skill in thought and tekhe: “only from Hades shall he apply no means of flight [Αἴδα μόνον / φεύξειν οὐκ επάξεται.]” (361-2). This limitation of mortals occurs in the midst of a song glorifying man’s great potential of creation. Thus, the subjection to death appears as a limit point for mankind; despite their cleverness with laws and technology, mortals remain inescapably subject to death. With his suggestion that he might control the working of death upon others through subjecting men to his laws – in the most extreme sense, by means of punishing torture and a tormented death – Creon raises himself beyond the bounds of mortals, toward the immortals.

For the divinities, in their eternal existence, remain exempt from the death that stands at the limit of mortal life. The third choral song emphasizes this immortal timelessness, in regard to Zeus and his laws:

Zeus, what arrogance of men could restrict your power? Neither
sleep the all-conquering nor the unwearying months of the gods defeats it, but as a ruler time cannot age, you occupy the dazzling glare of Olympus. For present, future, and past this law shall suffice: to none among mortals shall great wealth come without disaster.

teάν, Ζεύ, δύνασιν τις αν- δρών υπερβασία κατάσχοι; ταν ούθ’ ύπνος αίρει ποθ’ ο παντογήρως ούτ’ ακάματοι θεών μήνες, αγήρως δε χρόνω δυνάστας κατέχεις Ολύμπου μαρμάρεσαν αίγλαν. το τ’ έπειτα και το μέλλον και το πριν εταρκέσει νόμος οδ. ουδέν έρπει θνατών βίοτος πάμπολυς εκτός ἀτας. (604-14)

The chorus suggests that the law of Zeus remains, along with the god, infinitely, beyond temporal limitations or the efforts of gods or man to defeat it. Recalling Creon’s hubristic nomoi with this remark, the chorus then goes further to specify the nature of this eternal law of Zeus, foreshadowing Creon’s own defeat. For the essence of Zeus’ law, the song indicates, emphasizes change: if a mortal holds wealth, inevitably he will lose it. The divine law thus demonstrates its unique superiority in precisely what it portends for mortals: eternal and unchanging, divine law specifies that mortals must always be subject to change.

Not only are mortals consigned to change, however, but, as the song goes on to describe, they are subject to being ignorant of when or how that change will occur: “For widely wandering hope brings profit to many men, but to many the deception of thoughtless longings; and a man knows nothing when it comes upon him, until he scalds his foot in blazing fire [α γαρ δή πολύπλαγκτος ελ- / πίς πολλοις μεν ὀνήσις ανδρών, / πολλοίς δ’ απάτα κουφονόων ερώτων· / ειδότι δ’ ουδέν έρπει, / πριν πυρί θερμώ πόδα τις προσαύση]” (615-9). Thus, the inevitability of change in human life raises the necessity for reminders. As the exposed corpse of Polynices might serve to remind Theban citizens of both Polynices’ crimes against the city and of Creon’s authority as ruler, the suffering of Antigone and Creon – a suffering made material by the spectacle of the corpses that surround them – serves as evidence of their “crimes.” While the dead bodies, in their insistent presence, bear witness to the Theban citizens and the audience of the tension between the laws of gods and of men, the suffering of Creon and Antigone recalls the persistent limit of mortal life, which unfolds as it
passes away.

While the presence of the corpse persistently reminds those who wit-
ness it to mourn publicly, the living body that suffers unto death evokes an
even greater meaning: the irresolution of that mourning. With the torture he
inflicts, Creon addresses the transgressive thought or idea by means of the
body; he inscribes punishment, vengeance, or, in other words, justice, in
visible marks which will endure, along with the body, even after death. The
physical presence of the body seems to lend the certainty of its physical
permanence to the intangible idea inscribed upon it. Used in this way, the
material body is set apart from itself, objectified; its physical elements,
which, in their presence seem unchanging, offer themselves as materials
upon which the invisible workings of a permanent spiritual antidote might
be demonstrated.

The pain of a punishment meant to evoke justice suggests a compli-
cated interrelation between the body and the spirit; the messenger alludes
to their peculiar bearing on each other in his evocation of the survival of an
unhappy life: “For when a man’s pleasures have abandoned him, I do not
consider him a living being, but an animated corpse [και γαρ ηδοναί / όταν
προδώσιν ανδρός, ου τίθημ’ εγώ / ζην τούτον, αλλ’ έμψυχον ηγούμαι
νεκρόν]” (1165-7). Not only is the unchanging man a dead man, but the
man without pleasure is dead, as well. This sentiment adds to the mysteri-
ous element of fate in mortal life an invisible quality that animates the body:
without it, the body becomes devoid of meaning or intention, merely an
animated corpse.

Such a possibility implies a gap in the living mortal between the body
and the spirit – that which feels pleasure or bends to fate – hidden within. 36
Sophocles raises the consideration of a difference between the body and
the mind or heart – that is, an “inner” sense – in the first angry exchange
between Creon and the guard who brings news of Polynices’ burial:

Creon: Do you not know even now how your words pain me?
Guard: Is it your ears or your soul that feels the pain?
Creon: Why do you try to measure where my pain is?
Guard: The doer pains your heart, but I your ears.
Creon: Ah, you are a chatterer by nature, it is clear! (trans. mod.)

Acknowledging that he causes Creon discomfort with his words, the guard
attempts to distinguish the sort of pain he causes; while Creon resists the attempt to locate it, the guard insists on differentiating between the bodily pain that he inflicts on Creon’s ears and a different sort of pain caused by the one doing the crime he has reported. This other pain attacks, the guard insists initially, the psychē (ψυχή) – the soul, spirit, or mind – or, as he next proposes, the “heart” or phrēn (φρήν). Although Creon responds by disregarding this distinction, the guard’s protestation implies a difference between two types of pain – bodily pain and that which is less easily measured or located: pain to the psychē, heart, mind, understanding, phrēn. His attempt to locate Creon’s pain thus appears clearly as an attempt to claim himself as inflicting the lesser of the two sorts of pain: bodily. Yet this defense of himself also suggests that Creon (mistakenly) treats him as if he were imposing the more serious sort of pain, to the psychē or phrēn. Creon’s last comment before exiting the stage confirms this fear, as he threatens the guard, once again, with torture: “But if you do not reveal the doers to me, you shall testify that low desire for profit is the cause of pain [εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μη / φανεῖτε μοι τοὺς δρώντας, εξερείθ’ ὅτι / τα δειλά κέρδη πτήμονάς εργάζεται]” (324-6). Coupled with the pain that Creon threatens to inflict, what the guard utters (εξερέω) will bear witness to what his maneuverings have accomplished: that pain (πήμα) he suffers. The pain in this exchange functions both as a demonstration of punishment for the guard’s crimes and as a verification of the crimes themselves. With this threat, Creon aims bodily torment at the aspect of the guard that exceeds his body, his psyche, which (Creon hopes) will remember his crimes as his body suffers for them. In inflicting the torture which will compel the guard to testify to his guilt before witnesses, Creon will exert his authority over both the guard and those to whom the guard, by means of his pain, will confess to his guilt – that is, in Creon’s terms, his transgressions against the city.

In Antigone, Creon’s hubristic pursuit of power, which emphasizes the problem of establishing and maintaining the law in the city-state, manifests a tension between the individual and the public citizen of the polis. Christian Meier sees in Creon’s tyrannical actions a comment by Sophocles on a potential problem in democratic, fifth-century Athens: “justice had now become a matter of free-willed … decision-making.”37 In his use of the body, both living and dead, Creon creates the impression of certain authority by playing uncertain ideas out upon the physical presence of the body. Expressing a similar concern, yet in less specifically political terms, Lesky also suggests that a central concern of this play remains this problem of certainty, “a tension that must have been felt in a time that saw both the completion of the Parthenon and the beginning of Sophism.”38 Indeed, in its spectacle of suffering and death, the tragedy itself also
imposes its own meaning upon these bodies placed upon the stage; as Segal suggests, “Tragic art enables the polis to confront the contradictions which man’s place in nature poses.”39

Tragedy expresses the failure in communication of such contradictions by bridging them over with a correspondence of language and gesture. As we have seen, the tension between nature and technē, between the individual and the city, arises from an excess that resists containment in either category: the body. In both cases, the conflation between a torment and death whose outcome is meant to indicate justice depends upon the inescapable persistence of the changeable body, enduring suffering to the end and remaining after death. The perseverance of the body, in other words, determines its value as antidote or demonstrative proof, enabling it to function not only as a reminder of what has passed but as an apparent “proof” of what is present. With mourning, the unique physicality of the corpse integrates the span of the passing of an individual, mortal life into the enduring presence of the collective public, of the polis.

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**NOTES**


2 When he arrives in the grove of the Furies at the beginning of the play, Oedipus himself refers to the conclusion of his life as literally a “καταστροφήν” (103).


5 Though, as Lucas and others point out, the text of this passage is uncertain and spurious, the turn that Aristotle makes here remains, regardless, an emphasis upon language and rhetoric in tragedy.


7 Lowell Edmunds, _Theatrical Space and Historical Place in Sophocles‘ Oedipus at Colonus_ (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), p. 3.

8 William Blake Tyrell and Larry J. Bennett provide a helpful study of the results of the transference of funeral rituals from individual and family custom to a public rite.
Mourning the Public Body

(Recapturing Sophocles’ Antigone [Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998]); see especially pp. 5-15.

According to the myth, the significance of Oedipus’ political crimes is made clear in the previous public “outing” of them, when he discovers he is married to his mother (as depicted by Sophocles in Oedipus Rex).

Though written, of course, years before Sophocles’ plays that describe these events.

The chorus’ laments on lines 1257-60 and 1293, as well as Creon’s speech, line 1299 and lines 1341-6, deictically and verbally indicate the visible presence of the corpse onstage. Mark Griffiths also suggests this in his commentary (Sophocles. Antigone, Mark Griffiths, ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999]: 354).

Simon Goldhill’s discussion of rhetorical display and the polis, and the corresponding association of vision and knowledge, has been a great help to me in considering the spectacle of punishment in these plays (“Programme notes,” Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy, eds. Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne [Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999], pp. 1-29).

A very prominent example of this fear, of course, appears at the beginning of the Iliad (I.1-5), as well as at the end, with the provocation for Priam to recover Hector’s body (in Book XXIV).


Simon Goldhill has noted the opposition of polis (the city) and oikos (home and family), arguing that for Antigone philos is an appeal to the oikos. Reading her loyalty to the oikos as a manifestation of independence, power, and authority, Goldhill notes that such an assertion would have been perceived as particularly problematic for a woman, because of her inevitable participation in, and dependence upon, a network of relations in the family and polis. This raises, he suggests, an important challenge to Antigone, one to which we will return later: “For in democratic Athens, an essential demand of the ideology of city life is the mutual interdependence of citizens” (Reading Greek Tragedy [Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1986], p. 91). The opposition raised by the conflict between Antigone and Creon, in other words, forces a consideration of the conflicts of interest between the oikos and the polis.

Identifying Creon with the city, as well, Albin Lesky (Greek Tragic Poetry, trans. Matthew Dillon [New Haven: Yale U P, 1983]) shifts the stakes of the opposition by emphasizing Antigone’s claims to be doing the will of the gods by burying her brother. Lesky points out that Creon’s assessment of the city’s primary importance overturns even the traditional primacy of the gods: “When [Creon] says of the polis (189): ηδ’ εστιν η σωζουσα (it is she who saves us), this signifies a secularization that no longer recognizes any absolute value higher than the state” (135). Thus, Lesky sees in the play a struggle between man (Creon) and the gods (Antigone). While Creon stubbornly enforces his man-made laws, Antigone bears witness to the “unwritten laws” of the gods (141). In her attachment to the corpse of her brother, Lesky sees Antigone as actually ascribing to immortal, unearthly,
divine laws.

Such a dialectic suggests the ethical struggle that Hegel sees enacted in the tragedy of Antigone: as a result of action, the unspoken, unknown law is broken, giving rise to the ethical conflict. Of course, Antigone, for her part, is aware of the civil law that she breaks, but she transgresses the law because she perceives it to be violent and wrong. Nevertheless, by knowingly breaking the law, her action becomes for Hegel more inexcusable, her guilt more severe; it is for this reason, Hegel argues with a quote from the play, that she must suffer: "Because we suffer we acknowledge we have erred" (Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller [Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977], p. 284 [quoted from Antigone, l. 926]). In this sense, Antigone's suffering demonstrates her individual guilt in the ethical order. In her opposition to the laws of Creon, Antigone thus appears as aligned with the natural laws (as opposed to the sort of man-made laws that the second choral song, the first stasimon, the "Ode to Man," describes [332-75]), or with nature, in general. Hence, Charles Segal explains, "In the great fifth-century debate between nature and convention, physis [nature or the natural qualities, form] and nomos [law, usage, custom], Antigone stands on the side of nature. She defends those relations and aspects of life that man possesses by the given conditions of his birth against those which he creates by strength and force" (Tragedy and Civilization: An Interpretation of Sophocles [Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1981], p. 155). In her individual opposition to Creon's political laws, Antigone thus appears as a natural force whose struggle results from an encounter with the techne of society.

In this sense, Antigone as representative of the natural laws is sometimes seen as a feminine force, rebelling against the laws of the patriarchal society. This is the Carol Jacobs' reading; she finds in Antigone a revolutionary female figure, following and critiquing Hegel's reading of her character. Jacobs describes the terms of the dialectic which Hegel finds manifested in the play as those of gender: "The stakes for Hegel ... are sexual difference, the relation between family and state, and the movement from matriarchy to patriarchy in the pagan world" ("Dusting Antigone", MLN 111.5 [1996], p. 889). For Jacobs, Antigone reflects both her female status and her (related) connection to nature or natural law in her approach to the earth – that is, by the manner in which she buries Polynices. Although Creon excuses his intention to execute his son's fiancée by asserting that there are other fields to plow (569), Antigone, Jacobs points out, works the earth differently, by not breaking it, or marking it as hers, but rather by just dusting Polynices' body with it. In this reading, then, Antigone poses a threat to the male system, making the mark that cannot be located, in a strange sort of écriture féminine transferred to the fifth-century ritual of burial. Jacobs contends, in other words, that the unintelligibility of Antigone's action, its refusal to fit into any given tradition or law, provides it with the ability to subvert not only the male system but the concept of opposed poles of conflict, in general: "Antigone, indeed, changes and transforms the concept of ethics; it perverts the universal and its promise of property: it perverts as well any fixed concept of revolution against patriarchy" (911). Antigone, seen as allied with nature, not only subverts the nomoi of the dominant system (that is, Thebes under Creon), but in doing so disrupts the limits of each of the terms of opposition as well.

Cynthia Willett, in her own reading of Hegel's reading of Antigone, also ascribes a wide-ranging disruption to the manner in which Antigone, or her actions,
resists the terms of the dominant model. For Willett, however, the laws that Antigone subverts through her actions in the play are both the laws of Hegel’s dialectic and the rules of tragedy Aristotle prescribes in his Poetics. Tragic drama, she suggests, with its reversals and discoveries, parallels the dialectic form of Hegel. Following this scheme, then, dialectic depends upon a cathartic moment like tragedy: “dialectic demands the catharsis, or purging, of emotion from educated spirit” (“Hegel, Antigone, and the Possibility of Ecstatic Dialogue” [Philosophy and Literature (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press) 1990: 14], p. 268). Yet, she argues, catharsis proposes a purging of desire that is no more possible in dialectic than in tragedy. Because of this, Willett seeks to find in her exploration of Antigone a reconception of tragedy “that is not cathartic but ecstatic” (268). Willett demarcates clearly the relation between suffering and ethics as Hegel conceives of it:

Tragedy ends in the incipient reconciliation of the ethical powers which come into conflict. … Tragic pathos, or suffering, brings each hero to recognize the opposing ethical vision which concludes a play. As the choruses of Sophocles’ plays proclaim, tragedy engenders learning through suffering. (271)

Thus suffering brings about the self-knowledge that enables the ethical self-consciousness that Hegel finds in tragedy. In taking up the agon or conflict and suffering through it, the tragic hero suffers a reversal of what appears to be true; the resolution of the tragedy conveys the recognition of this lesson. In dialectical terms, then, catharsis is “the systematic expulsion of what cannot be taken up into pure thought” (273). Given this, Willett argues that dialectic proceeds at each stage by a forgetting (that is, a purging out) of what remains incommensurate with the absolute totality of thought. Willett identifies this forgotten element as desire. While Hegel will argue that, “The relationship between the brother and sister alone satisfies the requirement that ethical duty to the family is pure of the vagaries or accidental attractions of natural desire” (273), Willett points to events in the play that indicate that Antigone’s passionate feelings for her brother transgress Hegel’s claim by stemming from love. In addition, Willett argues, Antigone’s “worship of death” carries erotic overtones and at several moments in the play she manifests a maternal instinct. These factors enable Willett to claim that “The agony of Antigone intimates that the righteous defense of ethical duty originates not purely in a sense of duty but in a subjective passion that determines the performance of duty” (275). Such an assertion, she insists, appears clearly in Creon’s own inability to avoid passion; he himself becomes enraged, or passionate, in his attempts to quell Antigone’s passion. For this reason, Willett proposes to reread the tragedy Antigone and Hegel’s dialectic, allowing both to retain desire, in an ecstatic rather than cathartic pursuit of knowledge. In doing so, she hopes to “refigure a women’s dialectic” that allows for an ecstatic conception of tragedy, an excess of desire in the dialectical relation of tragedy (and philosophy): “Antigone’s dialectic mediates the engagement of wife and mother within an ethics that no longer expunges subjective feeling from duty” (282). For Willett, then, the possibility of including desire in the function of tragedy or philosophy becomes aligned with the feminine; in her feminine, maternal desire, Antigone suggests the possibility for an ecstatic pursuit of truth that includes “subjective feeling” or desire in its scheme and thereby obviates forgetting. Willett’s reading draws a parallel between the “rules” of dialectic, the form of tragedy, and Creon’s laws, as well. By emphasizing the limitations which Creon’s laws impose on Antigone’s “desire” – laws that Creon himself, she
notes, cannot help but transgress – Willett suggests that the play describes a conflict between individual desire and the order of the polis (as well as between individual desire and the order of philosophy).

In a slightly different perception of an opposition between reason and passion in Antigone, Mary Whitlock Blundell sees the conflict personified in Creon, who undermines his own rational principles with a passionate pursuit of power. For Blundell, too, Creon’s submission to passion re-emphasizes the driving force of passion for Antigone. In this manner, she sees the tragedy as manifesting the interplay of reason and passion: “Thus passion as well as mortality sets limits to the power of human reason” (Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics [Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989], p. 143).


18 On line 519, she claims that Hades demands the laws she follows.


20 Antigone, in her recounting of the edict (35-6) stresses the public nature of the execution, ending the phrase and line with ἐν πόλει. Griffith feels that her language here echoes the formal language of an actual edict, except for in the use of φονόω, which typically designates a more violent death such as murder, rather than judicial execution (see Griffith’s commentary on lines 35-6).

21 Segal considers this need to avoid disorder as part of the impetus behind Creon’s prohibition against mourning Polynices: “Women’s lament helps the dead make the proper transition from the realm of the living to the other world but is also perceived as a source of emotional violence and disorder. It is associated with a maenadlike (sic) release of uncontrollable and disturbing emotions; and in its call for vengeance it can also lead to an unpredictable and uncontrollable cycle of vendettas” (Sophocles’ Tragic World, p. 119).

22 Creon accuses Antigone of being disorderly (ἄκοσμος) in his conversation with Haemon (730). Much earlier, on line 172, Creon refers to the violence of the brothers against each other as a “pollution” (μίασμα).

23 Tyrell and Bennett suggest that the public appropriation of funeral rites created a tension between government and family: “The public funeral exacerbated the antagonism of the dêmos and the family over funeral celebrations by separating the dead from their families” (Recapturing Sophocles’ Antigone, p. 9). In this sense, Creon may be seen as creating additional tension or disorder by removing the right to burial from Antigone and taking it on for himself.

24 Translation modified (following Griffith).

25 The temporal disorder of incest makes the mourning of Oedipus seem impossible, as Antigone complains in Oedipus at Colonus, quoted at the beginning. The symptom of Oedipus’ crime, a plague on Thebes, recalls the plague that Teiresias warns Creon against causing. The symptoms of the plague or pollution in each
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case are the same – the stagnation of time, the cessation of reproduction, the inability to move forward. Thus the plagues that correspond to Oedipus’ and Creon’s crimes suggest in their nature the inability to mourn, the inability to remember, the failure to pass into history.

26 Griffith: “εκτινω δικην / τισιν = ‘pay the penalty’” (272).
27 Danae is unjustly imprisoned by her father.
28 Lycurgus is punished with imprisonment (and perhaps a madness that drove him to kill his own children) for attacking Dionysos.
29 The sons of Phineus are blinded by their stepmother, Eidothea, who stabbed their eyes out in vengeance against their mother, Phineus’ first wife, Kleopatra.
30 Translation modified, incorporating Segal’s interpretation of μνήμεπισημον as “conspicuous memorial” (see infra, n. 31).
31 For staging of this scene, see Rush Rehm, Greek Tragic Theater (London and N.Y.: Routledge, 1992), especially p. 37; and Tyrell and Bennett, Recapturing Sophocles’ Antigone, especially pp. 148-51.
32 Segal, Sophocles’ Tragic World, p. 120.
33 Segal suggests that Eurydice’s suicide is her way of mourning Haemon; thus, he suggests, this reverses “Creon’s victory over Antigone [i.e., his prevention of her mourning Polynices] in the first half of the play” (Sophocles’ Tragic World, p. 121). Conversely, Tyrell and Bennett argue that in her suicide, “Eurydice has silenced herself; she will not mourn his [Creon’s] son for him. This is the dikê, the penalty, that Eurydice extracts from Creon … Eurydice gives Creon the woman he wanted, a silenced woman who refuses to mourn a philos, and gains for Antigone the vengeance she prayed for, a silent funeral for Creon” (Recapturing Sophocles’ Antigone, p. 151). Though a very dramatic interpretation, Tyrell and Bennett’s reading fails to account, as Segal’s does, for the performative aspects of the play, which contradict the idea of such a “silent funeral.” In either case, Eurydice’s suicide gains significance in its relation to mourning.
34 Griffith disagrees with this, suggesting that Eurydice’s body probably would have simply been carried onstage and lain next to Haemon’s (p. 349-350). In either case, at any rate, the corpses present a remarkable spectacle accompanying Creon’s rueful speech.
35 Griffith notes of this passage: “Hanging a man from a gibbet or board, and either leaving him to die of starvation and exposure, or beating him to death … was a familiar mode of execution, at least for low-class criminals and traitors” (Antigone, p.176).
36 This difference resonates with Creon’s distinction between the visible corpses of Haemon and Eurydice and the invisible hand of fate (1339-46; see, also, discussion earlier).
38 Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p. 143.
39 Segal, Tragedy and Civilization, p. 206.